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RIVISTA MILITARE



The Black Sea

Pristina's Dream

Guerrilla Warfare, Terrorism
and Asymmetric War

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

It is with pride and enthusiasm that I am taking on the role of Editor-in-Chief of *Rivista Militare*, a prestigious periodical bearing forth an age-old tradition as an indispensable instrument for effective communication both within and outside of the military community. Today the army finds itself coming up against ever more demanding challenges, both on domestic soil and abroad, in missions in which our soldiers of all ranks have brought honour unto themselves by gaining unanimous support. In today's situation, it is the «man» himself who is in the front line – with his personal potential, desires and expectations, his family ties. Technology, the doctrine of its use and its efficiency – all of this revolves around the «man». It is this great, invaluable and irreplaceable value that *Rivista Militare* intends to preserve by spreading ideas and new concepts, as well as promoting frank and open debates and discussions, doing away with outdated forms of conformism and old stereotypes, to achieve whatever may be best for our beloved institution. However, we need everyone's contribution, translated into readable, agile and significant articles. To my eyes, the three main elements to focus on from this standpoint are: technology, in all of its multifacetedness, human and technological-professional experience gained in «outside operations», and innovation in all fields. There is an especial need to make way for the thoughts of young soldiers wanting to take part in a living, important and dynamic structure. I hope to welcome many of their contributions for a journal which is a means to spread and share ideas and knowledge, which often come to the surface with the needed clarity only when varying points of view are placed side by side. Tradition and its gifts will guide us on the path of fair comparison and ever greater breadth of knowledge. The technical side of equipment and vehicles will also have its place, with engaging and simple graphics and important vehicle «cross-sections», to avoid a decline in necessary technical understanding, a fundamental aspect of military knowledge.

I therefore would like to encourage each and every one of you to contact my staff and myself to offer any suggestions you might have, so that we can all share in, and work alongside one another to further improve, the legacy of our Service. I hope that *Rivista Militare* can be an ever greater instrument for an understanding of the Army even in civil society, being an indispensable reference point for those not part of it but wanting to know more. Collaborations with similar foreign periodicals, the presentation of *Rivista Militare* in offices and symposiums and – why not? – even the contribution of citizens and local and institutional bodies, will go towards this end.

I am being welcomed onboard by a closely-knit, highly-prepared and strongly-motivated staff, and I am sure that – with your help – we will achieve our goals. There is no doubt that we will be putting our all into it, in line with the our Army's traditions and with the sense of commitment that in other fields our men and women have born witness to in abundance, both at home and abroad.

I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the publisher, the Minister of Defence, for the trust he has placed in me, and to the Army Chief of Staff, for having proposed me as candidate.

My warmest farewell goes out to my predecessor, Colonel Marco Centritto, thanking him for the praiseworthy and prestigious results that *Rivista Militare* achieved under his direction.

Enjoy the reading.

THE EDITOR



An AAV 7 RAM RS of the "Serenissima" Lagunari Regiment landing on the Lebanese coast. The out-of-area missions have given clear indications on the qualitative level of our Army, capable of conducting secure and effective operations in a complex environment of multinational integration.

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THE BLACK SEA

THE BLACK SEA

Crossroads of discord

Pivot of NATO's southern flank, for most of the 20th Century the Black Sea has been a watershed and a natural barrier against the Soviet expansionism towards the Euro-Mediterranean area. After the Cold War, it reacquired its significance and centrality as a fundamental hinge for the transit of Euro-Asian resources towards the Western markets. It is a theatre which, being on the eastern border of the EU, appears to be one of the most complex and crucial factors for the development of the international relations in the entire Euro-Asian area.



Orhan Pamuk, Noble prizewinner for literature, in his latest book on Istanbul, when pausing to admire one of Antonie Ignace Melling's carvings, he defines the point where the Bosphorus opens out to make space for the Black Sea as «the point where melancholy blends with joy». Obviously, the landscapes that were immortalized by this French «Piranesi», who lived for 18 years in Istanbul in the 17th Century, have changed.

The elegant caiques, which crossed the Bosphorus with their elongated shapes and were similar to the Venetian gondolas, have been replaced by the heavy tanker traffic. Every year more than 8000 tankers full of oil and gas travel back and forth along this strait that links the

Title pages.

The bridge over the Bosphorus.

Above.

The gas distribution network.

Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, whose coasts are populated by about 20 million people.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union and the downfall of the regimes that orbited around it in central-eastern Europe, the region has become an important laboratory of state building in the last fifteen years, as well as a testing ground of the new system of international relationships in the Eurasian area. The passage from centralized economies to market e-

conomies and the approach of some countries to the Euro-Atlantic regional structures have established the first border between those States that have gone into the gravitational orbit of the Atlantic Alliance and the EU and between the States that are still dangerously in balance between the past links with Moscow and the new attempt at westernisation.

The entrance of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO in 2004 has added two important coast States to the two traditional pivots of the Atlantic Alliance in the region: Greece and Turkey. At the same time, the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU (2007) has completed the picture of the eastern borders of the Euro-Atlantic system.

Therefore, the south-west side of the basin seems to be included in the Euro-Atlantic system, but we cannot say the same with regard to the north-east side on which Moscow continues to exert a strong influence, for example on countries such as the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia which at various times have tried to embrace the political, economic and institutional models of the West.

What makes the picture of the regional alignments more complex is the overlap between the policies of the coast countries, with their fluctuant bilateral relationships, and the policies of the regional organizations that operate in that area. As well as the well-organized institutions such as the Atlantic Alliance and the EU, there are the CSI (Community of Independent States) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which are dominated by Russia, and a series of other regional organizations which act as laboratories of cooperation and instruments of infiltration of the great powers. We refer to the BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), the BSF (Black Sea Forum), GUAM (Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), the BLACK-SEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Force) and the EurAsEC (Eurasian Economic Community). This «constellation» of agreements and multilateral relationships shows the importance of the strategic interests that are at stake in this area and is made complete by the cooperation both between NATO and the Partnership for Peace and between the EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The dimension of political and economic interests and the constellation of fluid relationships and incompatibility in these international organizations clearly define the borders of an

“ This area extends up to central-eastern Europe and to the basin of the Caspian Sea ”



The Bosphorus.

area of analysis that does concern only the Black Sea. This area extends up to central-eastern Europe and to the basin of the Caspian Sea. The international organizations mentioned above play a key role just in this large region, where geopolitics overlaps with geo-economy, or even better *kapitalpolitik*.

This brief research is aimed at highlighting a policy that is being shaped in the general context of the international relationships.

To this end, our analysis uses a theoretical tool that was devised in 2003 by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in the work «Regions and Power – the structure of International Security»: that of the «Regional Security Complex Theory» (RSCT).

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union have brought about theoretical revisions in the world of international relationships. But the analyses of security are still closely linked to the realist thought or to the studies on globalization. The last conflicts have seen the establishment of the «regionalism». Without this view we cannot understand what Mary Kaldor called «new wars» in which the Armed Forces of different countries from 1989 to today have fought.

Whereas the «security constellation», which was elaborated by Buzan and Waever and was constituted by four levels of analyses (domestically in the state of region; state-to-state relations; the region's interaction with neighbouring regions; the role of the global powers in the region) provides us with a precious tool of un-

derstanding of the dynamics that are taking place in the region of the Black Sea, this study investigates the same dynamics focusing on the issues of cooperation and competition in the area. This leads us to refer to the question of regional security. It has two aspects that must be considered: the «hard» aspect, that is the strategic-military element, and the «soft» aspect, which concerns the new frontiers of energy and environment security.

ENERGY SECURITY AND THE «ENLARGED» BLACK SEA

Both the gas and oil-producing countries of the Caucasian and Central-Asian area and the consumer countries of western Europe play «the game» concerning the transport of energy resources. In fact, in this context the Black Sea represents the principal link between these two areas.

The increasing European energy requirements and the dependence on external suppliers have forced the EU to formulate a Common Energy Policy for its 27 member countries. The «Green Paper» that has been published in «A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy» that was preordained by the European Commission in March 2006, the following notification in «An Energy policy for Europe» (in January 2007) and the «Conclusions of the European Council» of March 2007 have laid the foundations for energy security through three aspects that are correlated with each other: security of the supplies, the diversification of the sources and an efficient exploitation.

The policy of the diversification of the source of supply represents, in this context, the cornerstone of the European energy policy. In fact, the excessive and increasing dependence on Russia has destabilizing effects on the occasion of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in the winter of 2006. The suspension of the supplies that passed through the Ukrainian territory to Europe have highlighted on the one hand the weakness of the European supply channels, on the other hand the intention of Moscow to use the «energy card» as a soft weapon in the context of its foreign policy.

In the last ten years projects of diversification of energy transport have been launched in the area of the Black Sea to break the Russian monopoly of the hydrocarbon transport. We refer to the building of the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the parallel gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. The two lines represent the first channel of bypassing of the Russian energy

routes that is situated between the Caspian oil-fields in Azerbaijan and the terminals in the Russian territory. This project is aimed at linking these channels to the rich oilfields of the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea – in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – through a plan of building of an oil pipeline and a gas pipeline on the seabed. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the principal political and financial supporters of the project are the United States and the Anglo-American multinational companies. In addition, it is no coincidence that GUAM was established in the mid-1990's at the instigation of the US to encourage the collaboration between the ex-Soviet Republics that no longer wanted to depend on Moscow.

It is important to refer to the European project that has been called «Nabucco» that is due to be inaugurated in 2011. The gas pipeline «Nabucco» is expected to transport 30 cubic metres of natural gas through its 3300 kilometres every year, from Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The surplus value of the «Nabucco» would consist in encouraging new projects of energy transport from Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Egypt to Turkey.

The United States, the EU and Russia are not the only important actors involved in the control of the energy supplies in the area of the «enlarged» Black Sea. The considerable economic development and the consequent energy requirements of emergent realities, such as India and China, bring new actors to play the game of the energy in this area.

In this way, we can understand the meaning of the definition of «enlarged» Black Sea and the importance that the entire region has assumed with regard to the distribution of energy resources coming from Russia, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia, Iran and Iraq (and in future they will come even from Egypt). Not only is the region where the image of an «enlarged Middle East» overlaps that of an «enlarged Black Sea», but in this area geopolitical and geo-economic interests are all interlinked.

STRATEGIC-MILITARY SECURITY

Since the end of the bipolar contraposition the concept of security has coincided with that of social, energy and environment security for the States of the «old Europe». It has not been the same for the States that act in the area of the enlarged Black Sea. There is still a significant number of «frozen conflicts» in the region as well as possible breeding grounds of politi-

THE «GREAT GAME»

Interview with Gareth Winrow, professor of International relations at the «Bilgi University» of Istanbul and member of the Executive Committee of the Italian Center for Turkish Studies

Following the dynamics of the relationships developing in the area of the Black Sea, which country is establishing itself as a «power» in the region? Is it correct to say that Russia aims at cooperation with regard to energy security?

At the moment both Russia and Turkey represent the greatest regional powers. Recent facts, especially what has happened in the Ukraine in January 2006, have shown that Russia is trying to use its energy resources as a political instrument; some people think that Moscow is using these resources even as a weapon.

Will NATO be able to play a more dominant role in the Black Sea or will Russia try to establish a regional approach to the security of the area for fear of isolation?

Both NATO and the US hope to play a more active role in the region of the Black Sea. In the past these hopes were jeopardized when Turkey, which was strongly encouraged by Russia, stopped the enlargement of «Operation Active Endeavour» (NATO) from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Despite the restrictions envisaged by the Convention of Montreux (1936), the Government of Ankara had no intention of provoking Russia by creating a new security system without Moscow and with the permanent presence of NATO forces in front of its coast.



Could Turkey and the US be partners in the region?

Probably they will not be partners in the region in the next years, and this will be the result of this situation. Also the American occupation of Iraq has fuelled resentment against the Government of Washington. The future situation of Kirkuk and of the Turkmenian population, as well as the fight against the PKK and the American support for the Kurds of North Iraq, highlights the regional incompatibility between the two actors, as the recent energy agreement between Teheran and Ankara (which Washington has strongly opposed) has shown.

Do Romania and Bulgaria support the American policy under the NATO flag?

Both of them defend their own interests and these overlap with the American ones. The recent agreements between the Government of Washington and those of Sofia and Bucharest on the establishment of NATO military bases in the two Countries set a perfect example.

In your opinion, does Romania aim to become a geopolitical centre between the Balkans and the Black Sea?

Sure. The Romanians would like to be seen as a geopolitical pivot between the Balkans and the Black Sea. President Basescu has done his best to promote this view, especially through the inauguration of the «Black Sea Forum» that was held in Bucharest. However, up to now the effects have been negligible, also considering the lack of support from Russia and Turkey, which prefer the forum provided by the BSEC. The Government of Bucharest, in addition, is going ahead slowly with the «Pan-European oil pipeline project» which will link the port of Constanța with that of Trieste.

G. E.



cal and military conflicts. With regard to the «frozen conflicts» we refer to the conflicts in the predominantly Russian separatist region of the Transdnistria region of Moldova, in the

Above.
Energy sources and their distribution networks.


Left.
A tanker crossing the Bosphorus.



Azerbaijani region that has been under the Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh for ten years, in the separatist and pro-Russian re-

gions of South Ossetia and of Abkhazia in Georgia. With regard to the regions that are at risk, we refer to the predominantly Russian areas, such as Crimea, in the Ukrainian territory, to the autonomous ferments in the regions of Javakhetia and Adjara in Georgia, as well as to terrorist and destabilizing activities in the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey.

This is the reason why in the area of the «enlarged» Black Sea the question of energy security must be faced taking the issue of strategic and military security into consideration. It is no coincidence that in this context when regional associations (such as GUAM) were established they were founded on energy and military cooperation, also in order to seek alternatives to the strategic cooperation that was imposed by Russia in the first years of the Nineties, through



peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the CSI and the CSTO. In this context we should consider the efforts of «conflict management» that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) made as well as the nebulous European policy aimed at making its «neighbourly policy» an instrument for resolving the conflicts in the area. After having reached an agreement with Bulgaria (April 2006) on stationing 2 500 soldiers in four bases in the country, Washington pushed Bucharest to create the Black Sea Forum, in which the government of Moscow does not take part. Among other things, this Forum receives funds from German Marshall Fund, from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and from the American Foundation «Charles Stewart Mott». In 2001 in Central Asia The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), whose leaders are Russia and

The energy sources.

China, was founded and the underlying aim was to resist any attempt at «western infiltration» into its traditional sphere of influence, as the election of Putin as President of the organization has shown. The BSEC, the CSTO and the SCO are under Moscow's influence: in fact Russia is the only country that is geographically linked with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, as well as being the major energy resources producer and distributor.

There was a significant change in the Russian strategy that occurred in two crucial moments: the first was the summit on the 15th anniversary of the BSEC that was celebrated on the 25th June 2007 in Istanbul. On this occasion, President Putin, who had already reached several agreements on energy issues with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan

“There is still a significant number of «frozen conflicts» in the region as well as possible breeding grounds of political and military conflicts ”



The region of the Black Sea.

and Austria and the agreement «South Stream» between Eni and Gazprom, was the real protagonist. He was able to make his policy central. At first he voted against the Turkish proposal to involve the BSEC in the resolution of regional conflicts, then with the support from Ankara he rejected the Bulgarian attempts to institutionalize the BSF.

The second moment was even more decisive. Putin managed to free the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea from American soldiers. At the second «Summit of Caspian nations», which was held in Teheran in October 2007, unresolved juridic problems, such as the Caspian Sea's original nature of sea or lake, were discussed and with the «Joint Declaration» that was signed by the coast countries a clear message was sent to Washington. It was signed by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turk-

menistan on the 16th October 2007. The five countries committed themselves to demand the exploitation of the resources in the Caspian Sea and to prevent other countries from taking advantage of the territory in order to hit one of them. In addition, the signers committed themselves to fight terrorism and drug dealing in the area.

Moscow actively cooperates also with Ankara to find a solution to the problem of the security of the Black Sea. In December 2006, the two governments signed a cooperation agreement to ensure the security of the region. The agreement «Operation Black Sea Harmony» followed on from the Turkish initiative of March 2004 according to the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council n. 1373, 1540 and 1566, which were aimed at combating terrorism and asymmetric threats at a global level and lots of experts have seen it as the reaction of the two major coast countries to the American attempt to penetrate into the

area of the Black Sea (Operation Active Endeavour under the NATO flag).

Turkey and the EU, whose policies are still indefinite, will probably play a key role in future. In fact, in the last years Turkey has adopted a more balanced policy of regional dialogue. After a phase of excessive and counter-productive alignment with the American foreign policy for the most part of the Nineties, today Ankara agrees to have fruitful talks both with the traditional American ally and Russia, which is its long-standing rival. The energy project «Blue Stream», which was carried out by ENI to link Russia and Turkey through the Black Sea represents a good result of this policy. Therefore, this regional policy is based on energy cooperation and could lead Turkey to be the forth channel of energy supply in Europe. The EU itself could become another key actor in the game of security in the area of the enlarged Black Sea. Even though it is still influenced by the obstacles that have been posed by the areas of national sovereignty of its members, Brussels is trying to assume a leading role in the area. In this context we should consider the neighbourhood agreements with the countries of the Caspian Sea and the attempt to follow a consistent common energy policy. If this strategy manages to achieve its goals, the coalitions of the Eurasian area, which have been opposed up to now, will undergo a significant change.

CHESSBOARD AND PAWNS

In our analysis of the situation developing in the Black Sea we have had to refer to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. In fact, the «Great Game» is entering the Mediterranean Sea, as Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya has pointed out in one of his article.

However, the real Trojan horse that Putin has been silently building is represented by a strategy that is based on peacekeeping missions. In a post-Cold War policy, under the guise of «war on terror» and of «peacekeeping operations», a policy of «containment» that sees the Black Sea as a frontier between incompatibility, interests, security and democracy is beginning to take shape.

As NATO, with its new strategic concept approved in 1999, authorizes its forces to operate even outside the territory of the signatory countries, other international organizations, which include States of different geographical contexts, are going in the same direction and probably they will put themselves forward as

international agents in the near future.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise to hear that Nikolai Bordyuzha, General Secretary of C-STO, considers a «Collective Security Treaty Organization» (made up of Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Uzbekistan with Iran that has shown interest in it) to be ready to be involved in Afghanistan in «global peacekeeping operations».

Therefore, no matter what kind of coalition or organization (NATO, SCO, CSTO) these soldiers belong to, they will act as pawns in a globalized game where the war on terror overlaps with energy resources and where the «regional» has its effects on the «global» (the effects that the possibility of an attack mounted by the Turkish Armed Forces against the terrorist organization PKK in North Iraq has had on oil prices).

Europe has become aware of its new border recently and we can make the same criticism against the coast countries that have not yet adopted a common security policy for the Black Sea.

«Frozen conflicts», which are «conflicts» that are cooking at a low heat, are threatening these corridors, through which goods, oil and gas pass and consequently which could also export criminal activity, make a policy of crisis prevention necessary.

Therefore, it is necessary to overlap the concept of security, which was developed by Barry Buzan (a security which includes economic, political, military, social and environmental sectors) with that of the «Regional Security Complex Theory» about this large region, in order to have a clear overall view of the situation.

The world is becoming more and more militarised. For this reason, in the future a greater operativeness and proper «regional» training of the Armed Forces will be required. In addition, the so-called «think tanks» will have to display good analysis skills.

To conclude, as Ambassador Tedo Japaridze, a member of the Scientific Committee of the «Italian Center for Turkish Studies» and former Secretary General of BSEC, has said, «what is happening in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, in Africa and in the region of the Black Sea represents an urgent problem for Europe. If it is not faced today, it will have to be faced tomorrow».

Giovanni Ercolani
Professor

of «Global Terrorism» and «Peacekeeping and Resolution of international Conflicts»

Carlo Frappi

Director of the Italian Center for Turkish Studies



A photograph showing a line of trucks on a dirt road in a dry, hilly landscape. Several people are sitting on the roofs of the trucks. The trucks are loaded with goods, including large stacks of green and brown bags. The scene suggests a humanitarian aid mission or a displacement of people.

DARFUR: THE ENDLESS MASSACRE

DARFUR: THE ENDLESS MASSACRE

In this tormented western region of Sudan, where religion and economic interests intermingle in an inextricable web, the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union are engaged in an active peace-keeping operation, whose results can hardly be decrypted.

The institutions are by now in a clear state of decay whose reflections threaten to involve also the neighbouring Countries. This article reports what is taking place and stigmatises the tragic developments of a seemingly unrestrainable genocide.

Sudan – or, to be more precise, Beled es-Sudan, the “Country of the Blacks” – took on the trappings of a political entity only in 1820, when the Egyptian Mohammed Ali Pasha, the viceroy under Ottoman sovereignty, sent his troops to the regions beyond the southern border of the country. The vast area invaded by Egypt remained under the power based in Cairo for 60 years – and therefore, officially, under the Ottoman regime – subjected to corruption and despotism. In 1880, Mohammed Ahmed (known as “Mahdi”) led a people’s uprising which, following four years of bitter fighting, managed to defeat the Anglo-Egyptian troops sent to quell the rebellion. Ahmed also managed to capture the capital Khartoum and take Governor General Gordon Pasha prisoner.

The newly founded State was built on a theocratic basis and, even after Ahmed’s death, survived until 1898 – when Sudan was conquered by Lord Kitchener and brought under joint Anglo-Egyptian administration. Only on January 1, 1956 did the first Sudanese Parliament declare the Country’s independence with official recognition from Great Britain and Egypt.

THE DIFFICULT ROAD TO SUDANESE UNIFICATION

The same year, with a semblance of legality and respect for human rights, the country’s request for admission into the United Nations was accepted and, at the end of 1956, with unanimous approval from the Security Council, was ratified by the General Assembly. Sudan also became a member of the Arab League, the International Monetary Fund, UNESCO, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.

However, the country was not yet prepared for parliamentary institutions based on the British model, and with a coup d’état in 1958 the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General Ferik Ibrahim Abboud dissolved Parliament and all political parties, as well as abolishing the Constitution.

Title pages.

Red Cross humanitarian convoy.

Below.

Darfur refugees.



The constitutional body became the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, made up of a limited number of members: initially 13, to later be reduced to 11. These high-ranking officers were entrusted the top governmental duties, giving rise to the general discontent of the generals excluded from the Council. In 1959 the first attempt at a coup d'état was violently put down.

Only in 1969 did a Revolutionary Committee, led by general Jaafar al-Nimeiry, succeed in taking power with another coup d'état, as well as keeping it until 1985. However, in the early 1980s the difficult economic conditions in the Country fanned the flames of a civil war between southern rebels (Africans, for the most part Christian, or of other indigenous religions) and the central government led by northern



Above.
Anti-government guerrillas.

Left.
A collection camp.



peoples (mostly Muslim Arabs) – though the civil war had actually started long before. Having broken out with the proclamation of independence (1956), it was led by the Anya Nya movement until 1972, and then – from 1983 onwards – by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) under Colonel John Garang de Mabior.

After 16 years of unconditional power, President al-Nimeiry was ousted with a violent coup d'état. In 1986 the first democratic elections were held. The legitimately elected government was then deprived of power in 1989 with yet another military coup d'état, led by Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, who transformed it into a civilian government only in 1993 – even if political parties were still prohibited – when Amnesty International first accused the Nuba ethnic group of “ethnic cleansing”.

“...with a decisive contribution by the United States and western countries... which have long backed a peaceful settlement to the controversy”

In 1998 a new Constitution came into effect based on Islamic law (also known as Sharia, it was imposed at a national level and, therefore, also on the southern regions inhabited by those of other religions) and, the following year, the president dissolved the new parliament and declared a state of emergency.

The peace process is one of extraordinary length and complexity. The first attempt at national unification in 1994 by the “Mediation Committee”, made up of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda (as the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, or IGAD), did not reach the desired results, as was the case with the signing of the Preliminary Peace Accord in 2002.

The situation grew complicated to an even greater degree by entrance of Ugandan troops into southern Sudan in 2003 – with Khartoum's consent – to wipe out the bases of Ugandan rebels, even at the cost of hundreds of civilian lives. In the latter country the situation is equally as turbulent. Since 1988, when the military was defeated by the anti-governmental faction Alice Lakwena, in the north of the country the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) fighters led by the visionary Joseph Kony have been making use of child soldiers and forcing young female children into prostitution and

slavery. The declared intention of the rebels is that of ousting President Yoweri Museveni and imposing a legal system based on Old Testament precepts.

However, the stakes run high for Khartoum: the government sees the African groups as a serious threat to its Arab leadership, while the latter want the revenue from the mineral and oil resources of their region. In western Sudan, wide-ranging and highly valuable oil reserves (light, with extremely low levels of sulphur) have been found and, since 1999, the country has been the second largest exporter in the Sub-Saharan area after Nigeria, as well as the seventh largest producer on the African continent.

The first phase of another round of peace talks concluded in January 2004 in Naivasha (Kenya) with the signing of an agreement between the Khartoum government and the SPLA, with a decisive contribution by the United States and western countries. Italy had an especially crucial role, long having backed a peaceful settlement to the controversy. The basis of the agreement seemed to meet with satisfaction on both sides: 300,000 barrels of crude oil extracted daily, for an estimated profit of over 2 billion dollars annually, with the possibility of increasing to 800,000 were the conditions for political stability as linked to industrial activities to be created. Revenue is to be divided equally between the two parts for a 6-year period starting from the definitive end to hostilities. Once this period is over, a popular referendum will have the chance to decide on the future of the southern region, between remaining part of the Sudanese Republic and taking on administrative self-determination (independence?).

On January 9, 2005, Nairobi (Kenya, since President Mwai Kibaki had played a particularly influential role) was the site for the signing of a peace accord between the Sudanese government (Vice President Ali Osman Taha) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (John Garang) in the presence of US Secretary of State Colin Powell as well as numerous representatives of western governments. And after almost 50 years of civil war between the Arab north and the Christian-Animist south (with two million dead and over 4 million displaced), in September 2005 Nafie Ali Nafie, Vice President of the National Congress announced the formation of the first national unity government between the north and the south of the country.

The Army was unified – or, more precisely, the use of the two countries' armed forces in joint and separate ways was defined – and John Garang returned to Khartoum after 22 years as a guerrilla fighter, carried in triumph by over a

million demonstrators, to take on the role of the first Vice President of Sudan. The enormous number of people who poured into the streets for the event frightened the country's military-Islamic leadership. The National Congress ordered the state-run television not to provide live coverage of Garang's arrival at the airport, and arranged for the welcome dinner to be held not at the presidential palace, nor at the parliament, but in the party headquarters. The message was clear: the National Congress and the State were one and the same. The party in power since 1989 (after al-Bashir's coup d'état) is the National Islamic Front (NIF), made up mostly of moderate Arab Muslims disinclined to tolerate rule by the Muslim-oriented iron fist backed by the most extreme faction, the Na-



tional Congress. With Garang's new role in the highest levels of the State, friction between the two factions seemed to grow worse. However, after only three weeks in the vice presidency, he died in a plane crash on August 1, 2005.

Thus, it cannot be said that the peace has been restored to the country. Moreover, since 1995 a coalition of factions which had split from the SPLA and joined forces in the National Democratic Alliance has been engaged in a new front in north-eastern Sudan, making use of logistical bases in Eritrea. Complicating the internal situation is the enormous Mayo refugee camp just outside Khartoum, which since 1981 has held almost half a million people fleeing the south: a wretched village of mud and straw with

no running water, electricity or a sewer system. Since 2002 aid from international organizations (3 dollars per day per person) has been cut off and the Sudanese government, greedy for land to build on, systematically knocks down ten or more huts with alarming frequency.

Over this vast territory almost the size of France looms the spectre of Darfur, casting its shadow of terror from the remote western region of Sudan.

HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE OR GENOCIDE?

While United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke optimistically about the rapid conclusion to the troublesome issue of nation-



al unity, the Sudan Liberation Army Movement (SLAM) – an armed group formed in 2003 – began speaking out harshly against the Khartoum government. It claimed that the western province of Darfur was wilfully being ignored by the central authorities, both from an economic standpoint and a state aid one.

Armed clashes between Darfur rebel fighters and governmental forces had already resulted in 3,000 victims (mostly civilians) and about 100,000 refugees crossing the border into neighbouring Chad. The economic and political recovery of the country – after having got through the difficult and incomplete bringing about of peace to the southern regions – was now to have to deal with the rebellion in Darfur.



Above.
Water distribution to the refugees.

Left.
African Union soldiers boarding an American plane.

In the beginning of 2003 the Front for the Liberation of Darfur (FLD), led by the lawyer Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur and made up of Self-Defence Committees for the villages of the Fur ethnic group in Jebel Marra, rose up against the central government with the backing of other regional ethnic groups. As consensus grew across the territory, the Front took on the name of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and allied itself with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from the northern part of the region.

President al-Bashir reacted with utter ruthlessness. The pro-governmental Arab militias known as Janjaweed systematically laid waste to villages, water sources and food reserves, as well as looting, raping and killing indiscriminately. There were over tens of thousands of victims in the first few months of 2004, and forced migration led to over a million refugees in makeshift camps along the border with Chad, where those who had survived met their end from hunger or disease. The Janjaweed and Sudanese governmental troops then pushed onwards across the border to lay siege to refugee camps, despite outspoken protest by General Idriss Déby, the president of the Chadian Republic.

With no actual political accord between the government and rebels, President al-Bashir signed into being another “ceasefire” which lasted 45 days (N’djama, April 8, 2004). In reality it was simply the third truce in six months, with the most urgent request by rebels and international organizations (the disarmament of the Janjaweed) utterly ignored.

THE POPULATION OF SUDAN

Inhabitants: 40,187,486

Ethnic groups: Blacks 52%, Arabs 39%, Beja 6%

Religions: Sunni Muslims 73%, Animists 16.7%, Christians 9.1%

The geographical division of Sudan into a northern part – traditionally including also the centre and western sections – and a southern one roughly corresponds to the ethnic division between Muslim Arabs and the Africans.

The north, Arab and Islamized, belongs to the Middle East from a cultural point of view, while the south, populated by Negroid and Nilotic pagan tribes, has an African social-ethnic structure.

The Nilotes are one of the large ethnic families of Africa, found for the most part in the Upper Nile basin, with the most widespread populations living in the Republic of Sudan – though nowadays the term Nilote tends to be restricted to the two most important groups (Luo and Dinca-Nuer) and a minor one in which Camitic influences are accentuated (Nilotes-Camites).

The Arab populations of the north can be divided into city dwellers, nomadic cattle and camel herders, and farmers living in rural communities.

Between Atbara and the mountain chain that runs alongside the Red Sea are the Beja, while the region between Assuan and Dongola is inhabited by Nubians, the first inhabitants of the north who are now deeply Muslim after a lengthy presence of Arabs in the area.

The plateau of southern Kordofan is inhabited by the Nuba, a Negroid mountain-dwelling people of various origins. The Bahar al-Ghazal regions in southern Sudan are inhabited by Nilotic tribes, the main ones being the Denka, the Sciluk and the Neur.

In the “equatorial regions” in southern Sudan there are also the Nilo-Amitics, who differ sharply from the Nilotes in terms of language and type of civilization, as well as the last population group in the south, the Zanda, who have settled on the Ironstone plateau.

In the eyes of Khartoum it was merely an “internal affair, and a regional one at that”, and North African countries all took the same stance. Libyan leader Qaddafi called it a “tribal conflict”, therefore not open to any African interference, while the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference remained silent on the issue.

However, at the end of an inquiry into Darfur the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed the seriousness of the situation in speaking of “war crimes and crimes against humanity”, and the European Union offered to support the African Union (allocating 12 million euros) in its setting up of a 12-month monitoring mission in the region, to make use of 120 observers and a Protection Force with 270 soldiers entrusted with the sole duty of defending the contingent’s security.

The European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson, convinced



A caravan of nomads in the desert.

the G8 (London, 11 June 2005; the summit in which an agreement was signed to annul the public debt of the poorest countries) to approve the earmarking of 6 million more euros – in addition to the previous 20 for aid to Sudan – and to include a training plan for a 50,000-strong military force for peace missions in Africa to be developed over 5 years.

In July 2004, the first group of African Union international observers took up residence in an enormous villa in the residential area of Khartoum to monitor the observance of the painstakingly wrought-out “cease-fire”, with 300 soldiers from Rwanda and Nigeria arriving in Darfur the following month.

Despite the fact that the African Union has always been considered an extremely cautious organization which shies away from taking positions in contrast with African governments, a report drawn up by its functionaries harshly accuses the Janjaweed, even if “it has not been proven that the Sudanese governmental army is fighting alongside the Arab militias.”

The condemnation – released with a Reuters dispatch and broadcast by the BBC – concerned the atrocities committed by Arab militias against the black populations, not restricted to looting huts and setting them alight, raping the women and killing them alongside their men after taking the children hostage, but, in the July of the ob-



servers' arrival, they had chained together the inhabitants of the remote village Ehda to then burn them alive. The report also underscored that "the attack on the village was unexpected and no provocation."

It was simply another report to add to the pile, including those drawn up by the OCHA (the agency in charge of safeguarding human rights), the World Food Programme ("we will begin dropping food in the zones where it is impossible to arrive"), Medecins Sans Frontieres ("governmental soldiers push back anyone attempting to approach the refugee camps") and Terre des Hommes ("humanitarian aid was blocked for weeks and unblocked only thanks to international pressure").

And international pressure was what made it possible for a small group of African Union observers to be added to the group of military ones, for the most part Americans with an Italian among them.

In a document approved on July 23, 2004 for the first time the United States Congress used the word "genocide" when referring to the tragedy in Darfur. George W. Bush and Colin Powell had decided to do away with the term "humanitarian catastrophe", since by defining it genocide multinational intervention would automatically be allowed under UN regulations. Disappointed by the Sudanese government's intran-

sigence (to London's proposal to send a military contingent to create humanitarian corridors Khartoum had replied that "we will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs"), the White House agreed with Kofi Annan's proposal to disarm the Arab militias and draw up a draft resolution condemning the government, prohibiting travel for its officials, and placing an embargo on the sale of weapons. As far back as 2003, Sudan had begun spending massive amounts on armament (from the former USSR, thanks to mediation by trafficker Victor Bout), with the purchase of planes, helicopters, cannons, automatic rifles and anti-personnel mines.

Even if Khartoum repeatedly denies backing the Arab militias, there are numerous documents collected by Human Rights Watch stating that "high-level government officials are involved in the recruitment and training of pro-governmental militias", as well as ones by Polyanna Truscott, the Amnesty International Coordinator for Dar-

fur, in which the Sudanese government is accused of encouraging the Janjaweed to rape as part of a deliberate policy for ethnic cleansing: "when systematic, it cannot be simply the act of individual, undisciplined militia members."

The international organizations unanimously recognized the atrocities organized by the cen-

“ The International organizations unanimously recognized the atrocities organized by the central government and are only waiting for the UN to speak openly of genocide ”



conomic and diplomatic activities with Khartoum”, as provided for by Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, even if non-compliance with the ultimatum would lead to “serious consequences.”

Another concession was agreed on in favour of the Sudanese government. The militias had to be disarmed and answer to the call of justice, but the Sudanese Armed Forces – though charged with undeniable protection of those committing the crimes– were exempted from any type of sanctions or similar measure.

Left, below and facing page.

The shabby huts in the numerous refugee camps.

tral government, and are only waiting for the UN to speak openly of genocide: the only term under the Organization’s Statute calling for immediate troop deployment to put an end to it by force.

Most likely, the Khartoum government was not able to put an end to the conflict in the short term (to then present the fact to the international community), and its plan to Islamize the country was no longer able to count on general consensus. In addition to the fact that Muslim tribes inhabit the region – and therefore not being simply a case of exclusively eliminating infidels – within the central authorities there were factions fomenting the turmoil in Darfur as a means of undermining the entire peace process recently brought in for the south. Moreover, Darfur-born governmental army officials had refused to bomb the region’s villages, and the risk that large sections of the armed forces were on the verge of a revolt ran high.

UN RESOLUTION 1556

On July 30, 2004, with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions (China and Pakistan), the UN Security Council passed a resolution on the disarmament of Darfur militias within 30 days, with the threat of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Khartoum showed itself inflexible once more, rejecting the request out of hand and calling for “political and strategic” mobilization, officially warning that any foreign interference would be dealt with harshly. In Paris, President Chirac ordered the French contingent stationed in Chad (200 soldiers) to travel to the Sudanese order and organize air transport for humanitarian intervention. The resolution – supported by France, Germany, Spain, Romania and Chile – was approved only after the United States discarded the word “sanctions”, replacing with “threat of interruption for all eco-



Once more Khartoum’s reaction was intended to provoke. Not only did it not even take the resolution into consideration, it announced that it would be “dealing with all foreign soldiers who set foot in Sudan in a suitable manner.” As a unmistakable act of defiance, 49 imprisoned leaders of the Islamic opposition were immediately released to “unify the internal front.” That those words were meant as a threat seems clear. Even when faced with the humanitarian tragedy considered by the United Nations to be the world’s worst, Khartoum chose to raise the stakes and give off disturbing signals.

The reaction within the country itself seems uniform. Daffi Khateeb, Secretary General of the Information Ministry, said that “we have done and are doing everything in our power to disarm the Janjaweed,” claiming that 3500 police had been sent to Darfur and that the humanitarian crisis was due to rebels refusing to take part in peace talks. Even if the Sudanese government felt “offended”, the general opinion was that resolutions were not helping to resolve the catastrophe. The lawyer Ghazi Suleiman, President of the Sudanese Group for the Defence of Human Rights, believed that the root of the problem was that Darfur had been chosen as a battleground by Islamic extremists. On



one side were government troops led by President al-Bashir, and on the other rebel fighters with links to Hassan al-Turabi, Sudanese fundamentalist leader. In the eyes of Suleiman, the population in Darfur made up the core of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the religious Muslim party which, with the coup d'état in 1989, "wiped out democracy in Sudan." When the NIF divided into two political factions (the moderate wing and the National Congress), the Darfur tribes split and took up opposing sides, with the Janjaweed having become "both of one side and the other."

Even Alfred Taban, the director of the daily paper "Khartoum Monitor", who has been in jail roughly ten times for anti-governmental positions, believes that both sides are responsible for the bloodshed. "It is not a matter of the good guys and the bad. If people grow embittered as a result of inappropriate measures, then the situation may get worse. We need to force the two sides to negotiate."

The problem is seen as not that of possible sanctions, but the UN request to disarm the pro-governmental Arab militias to put an end to what is clearly a massacre. The real problem for the government is that over 40pct of governmental troops were born in the Darfur region, and, as a consequence, are on the side of the guerrilla fighters. Were the horse-mounted militias to be demobilised, the entire region would immediately fall into the hands of the rebels and the Khartoum regime would be ousted, leading to dire consequences.

However, even the stance taken by the European Union is less than clear. Immediately after the UN

resolution, Pietre Feith (special envoy of High Representative for EU Foreign Policy Javier Solana) led a team of experts to Darfur in charge of drawing up a report on the situation. Even if the mission agreed that the massacres were carried out systematically and that villages were being burnt to the ground on a massive scale, the general situation "cannot be seen as genocide." Moreover, "there are serious doubts over the government's desire to protect the civilian population, with the Janjaweed at times seeming to act independently, while at other times they seem to act as governmental security forces" (press conference on August 7, 2004).

Among the measures taken into consideration by the European Union, Fetih emphasized sending police to work alongside the Sudanese ones. "We have proposed that the EU police corps be put to use in the chain of command for the Sudanese forces" (though to come into effect, such a measure would need unanimous approval by the EU General Affairs Council), to then conclude by saying that the crisis in Darfur is "as political as it is humanitarian."

US Senate majority leader Bill Frist spoke out in no uncertain terms in the press conference held in Nairobi after an official visit to Sudan. "What is happening in Darfur is genocide. I do not agree with the European Union's assessment." According to Frist, the central government holds the power to put an end to the massacre of civilians, and the Janjaweed "are not only backed by the government, but seem to be their armed wing."



Above.
The distribution of humanitarian aid.

Right.
Explosive devices are scattered across the entire territory.

Simultaneously, Washington (Adam Ereli, State Department spokesman) had praise for Khartoum's recent statements concerning its commitment to creating "buffer zones" in Darfur to aid food and water supply to civilians. Was it at long last a first step? In the eyes of Foreign Undersecretary Margherita Boniver, not in the least. On her return from a mission in Sudan – after meeting with the Sudanese Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and visiting the village of Nyala in Darfur – she said that "the situation, instead of showing improvement, is getting worse from any and all points of view, from those concerning negotiations to humanitarian and political ones" (September 22, 2004).

In the very moment when the undersecretary was making her statement, Sudanese helicopters were razing to the ground a series of villages near Nyala, to regain the bases the Sudan Liberation Army had forced them to leave a few weeks before.

The situation for international organizations had become critical. After continual attacks on humanitarian convoys and the raiding and looting of villages, Italy sent Barbara Contini (the former governor of Nasiriya) to the region, entrusting her with 10 million euros to put to use on several important projects: a hospital in Kulbrus, the reorganization of plumbing systems in Garsila and the reconstruction of an aqueduct in Kas.

However, a piece of news which cropped up in an Italian paper ("Il Foglio", September 28, 2004), heightened the sense of horror surrounding the situation. According to several American intelli-

gence agencies, there was "the presence in Sudan of Syrian military units armed with chemical bombs and artillery. The weapons, supplied to Sudanese forces, have reportedly already killed hundreds of civilians in Darfur villages inhabited by Africans. The use of aggressive chemicals enables Khartoum to sow panic among the population of the region, leading to an exodus towards Chad, with Damascus being given the chance to test its weapons of mass destruction and provide its specialized units with experience."

AN ENDLESS WAR

At the beginning of 2005 there were only two international institutions in Sudan with military missions: the UN (UNAMIS, the United Nations Ad-



vance Mission in Sudan) and the African Union, or AU (AMIS, African Mission in Sudan). With the new Resolution 1590 on March 24, 2005 the Security Council established that the mission in Sudan, having taken on the name UN-MIS, would include 10,000 soldiers, a suitable civilian component and 715 police units. And while the Italian government was weighing the decision to send a 220-men strong contingent of the "Folgore", a new and powerful actor stepped onto the scene: the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the African Union had to increase its presence from 2,200 soldiers to over 7,700, NATO made the decision to contribute to the logistical support needed for the growth of the contingent: air transport for thousands of African peacekeepers, the training of hundreds of Union officers and the supply of communication systems for the various units. It was a skilful compromise allowing the United States to support the efforts of the Union under watchful NATO eyes and, at the same time,



"Janjaweed" pro-government militiamen.

tantamount to an indirect recognition of the needs of an important African body. However, it was necessary that NATO keep a low profile. A high-ranking Marines officer at the head of the Alliance's military organization, General James Jones, rushed to say that NATO intervention in Darfur – even if some international leaders had urged such action – was out of the question.

But the situation continued to grow worse. In the north-western area, an attack of unprecedented ferocity by the Janjaweed (which translates as "devils on horseback") against the Aro Sharow and Gosmeina refugee camps was only the latest in a long string of massacres of helpless civilians forced to live in dramatic conditions and decimated by hunger and disease (official UN sources, Geneva, September 29, 2005). Muslim Arab militias once again soil their hands with the blood of Christian-Animist black civilians in the village of Madayum, crossing the border with Chad for an operation of ethnic cleansing and cattle raiding (Chadian military sources, N'djamena, September 29, 2005).

The eastern border of Sudan with Eritrea had also become tense. After over ten years of low-level clashes, Eastern Front (in which the Beja Con-

gress and the Rashaida Free Lions had joined forces) launched a violent and organized offensive with support from Asmara and JEM, the Justice and Equality Movement which was also fighting for Darfur. The scene of the fighting was Tokar, only 120 kilometres south of Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

But it was Darfur which gave rise to the most concern for the international community. After a violent resumption of fighting in the summer of 2005 (a state of emergency in Sudan and a curfew imposed in Khartoum after John Garang's death), the UN decided to evacuate most of its personnel working in the western area of the region as a precautionary measure.

In the autumn also the replacement of the "Folgore" Brigade parachutists (task Force "Leone", Operazione Nilo of June 18, 2005) by Italfor Sudan soldiers was completed. Those involved were the 183rd parachutists regiment "Nembo", the 1st Carabinieri parachutists regiment "Tuscania", 9th assault regiment "Col Moschin" and the 7th Trasmissioni regiment, as well as personnel of the administrative superintendence centre.

The peace accord signed in Nigeria (Abuja, May 5, 2006) was not underwritten by all the parties involved. According to the JEM and a minority faction of the SLM, Khartoum's offer was not yet sat-

“Darfur is inflaming the whole region. It is a war without end which has spread into Chad and the Central African Republic...”



Non-Aligned Countries (Cuba, September 16, 2006), with a show of pride he said that “we do not want the UN to return to Sudan for any reason [...] we reject the Security Council decision”. He also did not neglect to underscore the fact that close economic ties with China, Pakistan, India and Malaysia would allow his country to survive any type of sanction, just as Cuba had held up despite 40 years of American sanctions. In reality, the president was afraid the UN contingent might have carried out inquiries and ar-

Left.
The Darfur region.

Right.
The United States has provided an invaluable support to the African Union Forces.

Below.
Guerrilla fighters on training.



rested local authorities involved in ethnic cleansing operations, as hoped by the International Criminal Court for genocide and crimes against humanity.

Darfur is inflaming the entire region. It is a war without end which has spread into Chad and the Central African Republic, both having borne witness to the immunity enjoyed by the Janjaweed and, as logically follows, all non-governmental armed Arab groups which, for a variety of reasons, feel at liberty to assert their superiority over ethnic and religious minorities.

According to Esam Elhag, spokesman for the S-LA, the Khartoum government has also recruited fundamentalists arriving in Sudan from all parts of

isfactory. The same position was taken by other minor groups which managed to recruit men from among the refugees infuriated by the continual attacks by the governmental army and pro-governmental militias (in the southern area of Darfur, in various refugee camps on several occasions, numerous African Union Peace Force soldiers have been taken hostage to protest against the lack of protection for women and children).

Among these groups, the most-organized is the NRF, the National Redemption Front, which uses its considerable battle skills to inflict heavy blows against Sudanese governmental troops.

For the time being, the United Nations Security Council has only managed to bring in restrictions on the freedom to leave the country for the four held to be responsible for impeding attempts at dialogue between the parties involved in Sudan (General Mohamed Alhassan, Air Force Commander; Adam Yacub Shant, Liberation Army Commander; Gabril Abdul Kereem Badri, Commander of the National Movement for Reform; and Shaik Husa Hilal, leader of the Julul tribe in northern Darfur).

Kofi Annan then once again brought up his proposal for a peacekeeping contingent – with better equipment and a more incisive mandate – under the United Nations: 20,000 soldiers and international police officers to take over from the 7000-strong African Union force whose mandate was to expire on September 30, 2006.

For his reply, President Hassan al-Bashir chose a significant audience. During the summit of



the Islamic world (including Afghanistan and Iran), organizing their base camp at Saraf Omra near Kabkabia in northern Darfur. Osama bin Laden – guest of the Khartoum government until the early 1990s – has already gathered together his extremists to fight western interests in Sudan, and even if a formation of militants able to resist the presence of the UN (the reason for it being there) remains unlikely, it cannot be ruled out that numerous foreign extremists have infiltrated the country. At the beginning of October 2006, the decapitated body of Mohamed Taha, director of the pro-government newspaper *il-Wifaq*, was found in the suburbs of Khartoum. Member of the Islamic group Muslim Brotherhood, Taha had been accused of blasphem-

my after his inquiry into the genealogy of the Prophet, having claimed that Mohammed's father bore the name of pre-Islamic idols. His beheading seems to be an unequivocal sign.

AN UNBEARABLE CRISIS?

In Ethiopia, in his opening speech at the African Union, newly-appointed United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon forcefully requested approval of the decision to "immediately" send to Darfur a joint contingent of the Green Helmets (the new name for African peacekeepers) alongside the Blue ones. This time Khartoum, flanked by the Arab League, hinted at possible consent even if the conditions concerning on-the-ground operability were extremely limited, restricted as they are to logistics and communication. However, a small step seemed to have been taken (Addis Ababa, January 29, 2007).

The situation in Darfur did not cease to be dramatic. According to an Amnesty International report, governmental authorities continued to unleash attacks on civilian objectives. Russia and China supply weapons to Khartoum, breaching the embargo imposed by the United Nations. Moscow and Beijing have rushed to make public denials, but yet another UN report has stated that the Sudanese government even paint their planes with United Nations colours to conceal the transport of weapons.

President George W. Bush then decided the situation had become unbearable. After having laid down unilateral sanctions against Sudan (following those in 1997 for having granted assistance to bin Laden), a harsh warning was given to Omar Hassan



Above.
Aerial view of a village immediately after a clash between rival factions.

Right.
Troops from the African Union contingent.

new international image in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games. Already under accusation for the railway linking China with Tibet, for the damage caused to the water supply system of the Mekong river and for its continued supplying of weapons to the Sudanese government, Beijing cannot allow itself the luxury of laying itself open to further criticism from western chancelleries and the international press.

Immediately after pledging not to exercise its right of veto, General Luther Agwai (former General Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces) took on command of the AMIS and began working with Rodolphe Adada (Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo), the political representative of the UN-AN mission waiting for the next important project to get underway.



al-Bashir: "the time has come to stop stonewalling and allow United Nations troops to help those of the African Union [...], because the population in Darfur has suffered too long from a government aiding the attack, killing and rape of innocent civilians." The United Kingdom and France spoke out in favour of fresh sanctions, but while Ban Ki-Moon was dealing with the thorny issue of the Command of the Joint Forces, Liu Guijn – the Chinese envoy to Africa – insisted that the Beijing government was against a new resolution, saying that "only economic development of Sudan can lead to peace."

However, the united front of the Sudanese authorities seemed to have cracked. On 12 June 2007 the Reuters press agency reported that Sudan was ready to accept a mixed peacekeeping force of African Union troops and UN ones, with the sole condition being that the contingent (23,000 troops) be made up predominantly of African soldiers.

But who is calling the shots? Even if western analysts had long been pointing the finger at Beijing, the change in attitude showed by China during the Paris Conference (June 25, 2007) was to confirm the direct dependence of the African state on the Far Eastern giant. China, still one of the major stumbling blocks to international cooperation for Darfur, gets 60% of Sudan's oil output and has always prevented an agreement from being made on sanctions against Khartoum. The change in stance could be interpreted as a sign of the need for a

And finally, after over 200,000 killed and two million displaced, unanimous approval was granted to Resolution 1769, setting up the UNAMID mission (United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur), the broadest and most expensive (2.6 billion dollars in its first year and 1.4 in the following ones) peacekeeping operation by the UN ever. The date was July 31, 2007.

The last, complex draft – presented initially by Great Britain (Gordon Brown) and France (Nicholas Sarkozy) was brought before representatives of the 15 members of the Security Council. Italy –not included as permanent member for 2007–2008 – subsequently gave its support to the proposal. After arduous negotiations (nouns, adjectives, details and commas were all taken issue with and modified) even China, the most critical party against it, granted its backing. The document authorizes the sending of 26,000 soldiers and police officers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which defines cases where "necessary action" is called for (the authorization of the use of force) for self-defence of United Nations and African Union personnel. The objective is that of ensuring the freedom



Guerrillas of the Sudanese Liberation Army.

of movement for humanitarian aid, though the most significant part is the intention to “protect civilians threatened by violence.”

Unfortunately, the pressure from China resulted in the deleting from the original text of the right of UN forces to “seize” illegal weapons, replaced by the authorization to “keep them under control”, as well as the annulment of any reference to Janjaweed militias and any mention whatsoever of a possible use of sanctions. The mixed mission, under joint UN-AU control, is defined in a rather bureaucratic manner: 19,555 soldiers, 360 military observers, 19 units of 140 police officers and a component of 3772 civilians. The bulk of the mission must be supplied by African countries, but a non-continental contribution is provided for were the first option not to be achieved.

The United States will not be sending troops, but only a sizeable amount of financial aid and collaboration in the transport of personnel (humanitarian concerns took precedence over pressure from large oil corporations, excluded as they were from exploiting the country’s oil fields). China and Pakistan have pledged to send doctors and engineers, while Ghana, Senegal, Kenya and Benin will be doubling their already-present contingents in the

region of Darfur. Egypt and Nigeria have agreed to send 6000 troops.

A sense of satisfaction is clear in the first words spoken after the voting by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon: “It is an historical operation without precedence.”

But not even three months had gone by when violence broke out once more. An African Union Forces base (Haskanite, in the eastern part of Darfur) was attacked by a group of militants with thirty armed vehicles. The attackers’ identities were not established with any certainty – whether they were rebels or governmental militias – but the toll extracted proved very high indeed, with ten Green Helmets killed and thirty wounded, seven seriously. The field was looted and entirely destroyed.

At the end of the raid 50 additional soldiers had gone missing.

The rainy season over, hunger and disease continue to reap their victims. The region is a huge lager, with civilians used as hostages both by African rebels and Arab militias. Groups of outlaws and looters raid and rape with complete impunity. Children taken hostage are then sold as slaves in the capital.

Will salvation ever come?

“...after over 200,000 killed and two million displaced, unanimous approval was granted to... the UN-AMID mission,”

Daniele Cellamare

Professor of International Relations



PRISTINA'S DREAM

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
The unilateral independence of Kosovo has been proclaimed. But Belgrade is in staunch opposition, the European Union is divided on the recognition, the United Nations Security Council is split in two, and Russia and China support the Serbs.

After a troubled course, Kosovo is still an entangled, complex international mess: interests and rancour mar political and diplomatic actions, jeopardizing the peace and stability of the tormented Balkan region.

On May 4, 1980 Josip Broz, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, better known as Marshal Tito, met his death. The first episodes of violence in Kosovo broke out in 1981, when the Albanian majority, totalling 80 percent of the population, demanded that the province be transformed into a federal republic. Following Tito's death all provinces of the Yugoslavian Federation put pressure on the central government to be granted independence. When in 1989 Kosovo requested autonomy (since 1945 an autonomous province of the Serbian Republic within the Yugoslavian Federation), Serbian forces put down the region by force, suppressing its state of autonomy. In 1990, when Communist party dominance left the political scene, Albanian secessionists unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Kosovo, followed by Croatia and Slovenia. The sending in of Serbian troops to Croatia then sparked the violent clashes that saw the bloodshed spread across the entire area. On April 17, 1992 the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the birth of a new Yugoslavian Federation under Slobodan Milosevic. Serbia provided support to Serbian guerrilla fighters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the heavy sanctions the UN laid on the Federation in the attempt to stem the clashes.

Only at the end of 1995 was a peace accord signed between Milosevic and the leaders of Bosnia and Croatia. The next year the United Nations Tribunal began the proceedings for war crimes committed in Yugoslavia, while battles continued to rage in Kosovo between Serbian forces and secessionist guerrilla fighters.

At this point Belgrade made the attempt to change the ethnic balance of the entire region (with more Albanians due to the high birth rate) by sending in Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. Although the Albanians manage to set up a parallel state (complete with a president, parliament, u-



Title pages.
Aerial view of Pristina.

Above.
Vojislav Kostunica, Prime Minister of Serbia.

niversity and schools), the fear of the grave threat posed by the Serbian military prompted part of the populace to get involved in the guerrilla movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Force (KLF). In 1999, following savage "ethnic cleansing" by Serbian troops, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance pressured the government in Belgrade to put an end to the conflict. Following Milosevic's refusal (the failed Rambouillet talks), NATO launched an air strike in Yugoslavia without previous UN approval. The Yugoslavian army resumed operations in

Kosovo, taking on a terror-based strategy leading to an exodus of Albanian Kosovars into neighbouring countries (the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia puts the number of victims from Serbian military operations at 100,000). Milosevic agreed to the conditions dictated by the Cologne G8 (along the lines of the NATO ones), and, a week later, a powerful International Force – 50,000-strong – sent by the UN was deployed in Kosovo under the provisional administration of the United Nations. The withdrawal of Yugoslavian troops brought with it a large part of the Yugoslavian population, threatened by retaliation by Albanians. Defeated by opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica (presidential elections of 2000, boycotted by Albanian Kosovars), Milosevic rejected the elections results to thereafter resign following strong insurrections by the populace. In the same year municipal elections were held in Kosovo, won by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), representing the first step towards the formation of a government independent of Belgrade. In 2001 representatives for the Legislative Assembly were elected and, for the first time, Albanians and Serbs (for the latter 10 out of the 120 seats were reserved) go to vote alongside one another. These elections are also won by the LDK (46.29%), followed by the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Hashim Thaci, former KLF leader, 25.45%), with the Coalition for the Return – the sole Serbian party – receiving 10.96%. In 2002 the new Assembly elected the first President of Kosovo, Democratic League of Kosovo leader Ibrahim Rugova. It was also in 2002 that the trial against Slobodan Milosevic began at the International Court in the Hague, under charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide for the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo (66 charges in all). Meanwhile, Yugoslavia had gained recognition as a new union between Serbia and Montenegro, and the premier of the Serbian Republic Zoran Djindjic was assassinated in Belgrade. In the spring of 2004 a violent revolt broke out against the Albanian minority. The death toll was stunning: 19 dead and 900 injured (including 65 UNMIK police officers, 58 from the Kosovo Protection Service and 61 NATO soldiers), as well as the destruction of 700 Serbian homes, 10 public buildings, 30 churches and 2 Serbian-Orthodox monasteries. Refugees numbered 4,500. However, many analysts feel that the root of the violence lies in a message to the international community: the time for independence has come. But what is really going on in Kosovo?

THE NEW SERBIAN CONSTITUTION

With the referendum on 21 May 2006, Montenegrin secessionists succeeded in winning juridical



An Italian patrol in the outskirts of the village of Decani.

separation of Podgorica from Belgrade. After a series of alliances against common enemies – with the same ethnic origin, language and similar cultural roots – Milosevic's co-belligerent, energetic Premier Milo Djukanovic, grew into a skilful anti-Serbian politician. Known for his quick-change style of politics, Djukanovic had been criticized for his willingness to engage with the most ruthless of businessmen. Surrounding him were the "seaside Montenegrins" – those who feel closer to Europe than the "mountain Montenegrins", who feel their Serbian roots even stronger than Serbs themselves, and who constituted the 45% opposing separation. Their leader Predrag Bulatovic, following European indifference and reluctant acceptance by Serbia, did not bring up any ghosts of retaliation or armed conflict. Having established peaceful co-habitation between the coastline and the mountains, Serbia and Montenegro were on their way towards the creation of two distinct political and institutional entities.

Not even five months had gone by before a referendum is held in Serbia on the Constitution (October 30, 2006) laying claim to Belgrade's sovereignty over Pristina: "Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian territory, the Serbian state and the Serbian population". After seven years of international isolation – with leaders assassinated, crimes unpunished, Milosevic's death and the separation of Montenegro – the Serbian population still did not see Kosovo as a lost cause, with it being a UN-administered region with 1600 peacekeepers and a strong Albanian majority. The clock's hands seemed to have stopped in 1999. Two days of voting, almost three and a half million taking part (the 53.50% quorum was reached despite the opposition's calls for a boycott of the elections) and the response was 95% in favour of the new constitution. Strongly backed by the government in Belgrade, this referendum on the first constitution af-



Serbian President Boris Tadic.

ter the Milosevic period abolishes the death penalty, annuls the final vestiges of socialism, outlaws human cloning (the only European country not to have prohibited it) and reinstates Cyrillic to its ancient glory as the only official writing of the state. However, the true crux of the matter are not the attempts at alignment with European policies, nor even those to delay the handing over to the Hague Tribunal the war criminals Mladic and Karadzic, but the stubborn will to reaffirm Serbian supremacy over Albanians.

The major figures in these calls for Belgrade's sovereignty are noteworthy. In the lead is Serbian president, 49-year-old Boris Tadic, a Sarajevo-born psychologist and one of the founding members of the Democratic Party. He is the strong man of the alliance, backing a strict brand of politics with no room for interpretation – yes to Europe and no to the independence of Kosovo. His program is simple. United Nations Resolution 1244 does not define the final status of Kosovo, instead undoubtedly upholding Serbia's claim over it. Therefore, while greater autonomy of the region is formally provided for, "independence would open up all the old wounds of the Balkans". According to Tadic the Serbian population in Kosovo today lives a ghetto-like existence and is the most seriously threatened community in the whole of Europe. A 2005 survey confirmed that almost 80% of Serbs were for European membership, and 38% even supported becoming part of NATO – despite so few years having gone by since the bombing of Belgrade – and 70% wanted to take part in the NATO "Partnership for

Peace". It is a democratic process which was not to be slowed by the destabilisation of the country fostered by the crisis in Kosovo. Holding the same view was Serbian premier Vojislav Kostunica ("the new constitution cancels out the one under Milosevic and leads us closer to Europe") as well as Orthodox patriarch Pavle, who cast his vote for the first time in his life at the age of 92. Belgrade politicians concentrated their efforts on rendering it more difficult for Pristina to be granted independence at a judicial level.

The sole maverick was Cedomir Jovanovic, the leader of the students whose protests forced Milosevic's resignation, and who had meanwhile become head of the front against the constitutional referendum: "Continuing to lay claim to Kosovo is proof of the immaturity of the political class which has shattered this country over the past fifteen years." When Italy, by way of Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, gave its backing to the compulsory hand-over of war criminals, Jovanovic's response was in no uncertain terms: "The Serbia D'Alema is addressing is not the one that wants to make a complete break with the past [...] this leadership is not given any way out." However, the international community had already given its tacit assent to a form of independence on the part of Kosovo, as well as possible European Union membership. To accusations of illegality (and uselessness) of the referendum brought in by the "Albanianized" Parliament of Pristina is added the reassuring statement by Frank Wisner, the American envoy to the region: "by the end of the year Kosovo will be independent".

The issue of war criminals had yet to be settled. Since the beginning of 2006, discussion had been underway in Vienna on the future of Kosovo (with Serbs speaking of autonomy and Albanians of independence), but the issue of the region's final status seemed subordinated to Belgrade's membership in the European Union, in turn conditioned by the handing over of war criminals to the Hague Court. After General Pavkovic, the thirteenth Serbian charged with war crimes and handed over to the Court, Mladic and Karadzic were still at large, wanted by the authorities since 1995. Ratko Mladic, 66, was Commander of the Serbian-Bosnian Army during the war in Bosnia (1992– 1995) and wanted for genocide and war crimes. He was the one behind Srebrenica, which saw the massacre of 8,000 Muslims and furious debate over the steps taken by the UN (in 2000, Kofi Annan admitted that it was "an everlasting source of shame for the United Nations" that they were not able to protect the 20,000 Muslims who had taken refuge in the UN base in Potocani). Radovan Karadzic, 63, psychiatrist and poet, was president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia during the war and is said to be

currently in hiding in Bosnia, where he has allegedly written a novel rapidly climbing the best-seller lists.

On the international front, the United States and Great Britain were behind a full and unconditional independence for the Serbian province (respect for self-determination of populaces in order to put the war against Milosevic behind them?), but Kosovo also cropped on Vladimir Putin's agenda. It is by no means simply a case of traditional defence of Slavic peoples, nor that of ties between Russian and Serbian orthodox communities to condition the Kremlin's choices, but a worsening of relations with the White House. When the new constitution was approved in Serbia, the disagreement with Washington was over Iran and North Korea, as well as Georgia and the Caucasus. The latter has NATO aspirations, and Russia aims to reaffirm its primacy in the Caucasus (with its oil and gas routes) and, so, the destiny of Pristina may turn into a bargaining currency or at least an incisive element of pressure on Washington, with Putin having veto rights in the Security Council, an obligatory step for Kosovo's future status.

Former Finnish president Marti Ahtisaari, the man the United Nations had put in charge of finding a solution for Kosovo (UNOSEK, the Office of the Special Envoy for the definition of the status of Kosovo – meaning the exit strategy for the end of the UNMIK mission), then presented a report in which he outlined his formula for a “conditioned independence”. In reality it suggested entrusting Kosovo's sovereignty to careful international monitoring: the Serbian minority would continue to be protected militarily and the Pristina government could underwrite treaties and belong to some multilateral organizations, but was still excluded from the UN and NATO. However, Kosovar premier Agim Ceku had always said that Pristina would accept only an “unconditional independence”, and the Serbian constitution reaffirmed its sovereignty over the region. The fear is that of a unilateral proclamation of independence (with likely American support) and a Europe divided over whether or not to recognize its statehood, a hostile Russia in other crisis areas and a dangerous “gift” dropped into the hands of Belgrade politicians, who could skilfully transform the issue into a yet another reason for the legitimate defence of national sovereignty.

UN RESOLUTION 1244 OF 10 JUNE 1999

While Serbia was bringing in its new constitution, Italian general Giuseppe Valotto was commanding the multinational security force for Kosovo KFOR (also known as the Kosovo Force) under NATO.



A map of Kosovo.

With the task of maintaining and developing a situation for the security of all the ethnic groups to live together (mostly Albanians with a Serbian minority, as well as Roma, Ashkali, Bosnians, Turks and Egyptians), KFOR was a guarantee for the directives of the alliance which provided for presence and surveillance (freedom of movement over the territory), the commitment to fight against any possible sabotaging of the peace process and interventions to assist the population, with numerous civil and military cooperation projects (CIMIC). It still being in formal terms a Serbian province, Kosovo is subject to provisional administration by the United Nations through its civil mission UNMIK, defined by Resolution 1244.

With its sorrowful string of firsts – the first NATO armed intervention in the post-war period lacking formal authorization from the Security Council, as well as the first bombardment on the Old Continent since the end of the Second World War – the history of the United Nations Resolution began with the condemnation of war weapons and the repeated violations of human rights by Slobodan Milosevic (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina). Even if when some analysts speak of Kosovo they prefer to call it a form of apartheid rather than ethnic cleansing, during the NATO bombing the Albanian guerrilla movement (KLF)

grew stronger, which has as its aim the de-legitimization of the system of the parallel structures created by Ibrahim Rugova during Milosevic's regime. KLF leader Hashim Thaci then set up a self-proclaimed government of Kosovo, with a paramilitary regime bearing the same features – outside of international transparency standards and those of respect for human rights – that have caused NATO to tackle a costly war in order to punish Belgrade. After the Kumanovo Accords between NATO and the upper levels of the Serbian military (Military Technical Agreement), the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (with the official creation of UNMIK, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and, on 12 June 1999, KFOR troops entered Kosovar territory.

Article 5 of the Resolution indicates “the deployment in Kosovo, under the aegis of the United Nations, of a military and civilian presence provided with appropriate personnel and adequate means”, while Article 10 authorizes “the Secretary General, with the assistance of all relevant international organizations, to set up an international civilian presence in Kosovo in order to provide a provisional administration for Kosovo under which the population can enjoy considerable autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, preparing a transitional government while helping in the establishment and supervision of the development of democratic institutions for self-government which ensure the conditions required for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”

Unfortunately, the result of these nine years of provisional government is less than what could have been hoped for. While acknowledging that the governance abilities of such a complex, bureaucratic structure of the UN was not equal to the task, the United Nations are accused of having installed a ruling class in power frequently been involved in corruption scandals. But at the same time, it should not be ruled out that the activities brought in to fight organized crime (police operations and management for the administration of judicial power) have disturbed the criminal groups involved in drugs, smuggling and weapons trafficking, producing a backlash in the form of a discredited and inefficient image. In any case, the United Nations are perceived by the populace as the last stumbling block to their achieving of independence, even if the final status of the region will be in the hands of the latter. The UNIMK mission (11,000 people involved, for an annual cost of 1.3 billion dollars) risked tarnishing even the image of KFOR itself, which in the period after the war managed to stand out as the only credible agent of security and reconstruction. KFOR also serves as support for the civilian police units, and most especially for the Kosovo Police Service, in charge of first line tasks

in the fight against criminality and part of a program run by the UNMIK Police, the United Nations police forces in the area. After 2004 rioting, KFOR contingents beefed up their ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) companies – not only with radar and UAV systems, but also with a new information system for satellite localization of every single KFOR patrol (Interim Force Tracking System). However, the true innovation was the helicopter exercise program, drastically cutting the time needed to intervene and making immediate reactions to any threat possible.

The European Union began preparing to take the place of the United Nations in 2006 (the European Council decided to set up the EUPT Kosovo, the EU Planning Team) and the new civilian mission to take the place of the UNMIK has been named the ICO (International Civil Office), presumably led by the EU and organized along the lines of the “conditioned independence” called for by Martii Ahtisaari.

MARTII AHTISAARI'S REPORT


Previously discussed, the report by the head of the UNOSEK was based on the attempt to propose solutions in the form of a compromise that the talks between Belgrade and Pristina had failed to work out. Taking as its basis the complexity of the “parallel institutions” developed by both Albanians and Serbs, the project's strong point is its “decentralization”, meaning the creation of six new municipalities (Gracanica, Novo Brdo, Klokott, Ranilug, Partes and Mitrovica Nord) in the zones inhabited by Serbs but currently part of the larger municipalities controlled by the Albanian majority. These new institutions are to be given specific areas of competence (healthcare and education, even at a higher level) and wide-ranging financial autonomy, in confirmation of the current Serbian desire to maintain political and economic relations with Belgrade. Serbs in Kosovo chose to boycott provisional institutions (now numbering 20 seats out of 120) to keep alive the main political parties of Serbia as sections. It is therefore a case of creating clauses for the security of Serbian enclaves which aim to reduce the risk of an exodus of the about 130,000 citizens after a possible declaration of independence. What may happen following a possible independence of the region is still unforeseeable. If not sufficiently protected, the Serbs in the minority enclaves may decide to leave their villages and take refuge in the safer northern municipalities, or even move to Serbia itself, as occurred subsequent to the beginning of the war in 1999. In addition, the densest Serbian community of the four municipalities north of Mitrovica could

call for secession (already in existence, in de facto terms) to unite with Serbia once more. And, finally, another unknown aspect concerns the refugees currently living in Serbia and Montenegro (between 60,000 and 200,000) who may claim property loss in the region were the independence to be self-proclaimed. With the addition of the new Serbian municipalities to the current five ones (Zubin Potok, Zvecan and Leposavic – north of the river which splitting Mitrovica in two – as well as Strpce and Anamorave), the new configuration would have the advantage of making Serbian contribution valid, as well as cooperation with Belgrade institutions. At the same time, the change from a geographical standpoint would favour the emergence of a new party willing to take part in the post-independence elections – ensuring itself certain participation in the new government in Kosovo – and the moderate Serbian leader Oliver Ivanovic may be able to ensure this very type of political project.

Ahtisaari's program also calls for the recognition of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with all of the property and historical privileges it has long enjoyed. It would prove necessary to create protection zones to safeguard the forty religious and cultural institutions. This Church also boasts of property rights for the land occupied by monasteries and religious communities, and at the moment the only sizeable presence is in the western part of Kosovo. Even if it initially backed Milosevic's brand of nationalism, today the Serbian Church can rely on a certain degree of influence not only on Belgrade but also on the international community. KFOR soldiers have always guaranteed the protection necessary for places of worship. "My former wife, who has become religious, lives in the Pec Patriarchy and is in daily contact with the Italian contingent, without which staying in those places would be impossible" (interview with Boris Tadic by Franco Venturini published in "Corriere della Sera" on April 28, 2005).

Among other things, Ahtisaari's program also calls for the dissolution within a year of the KPC, the Kosovo Protection Force, made up of former KLF members with civil protection duties, an expedient used by the first United Nations representative Bernard Kouchner to disarm Albanian fighters.

The new constitutional structure of Kosovo would be subject to the control of an International Civil Office led by a representative placed in charge by the EU, thereby freeing itself from direct administration by the United Nations. This European-led structure would have the power to annul all laws adopted by Kosovo and considered not in line with "the letter and the spirit of the project". Another institution, the Steering Group, is to be assigned the task of assessing the timeline and



The NATO intervention in 1999 met with enthusiasm in Kosovo.

modalities for the carrying out of the project. And, finally, the military presence of the Atlantic Alliance (KFOR) is confirmed until "Kosovo institutions are considered able to take on full responsibility for security."

The immediate reactions to Ahtisaari's project came directly from Pristina. The concept of decentralization – while inspired by Serbian integration and the participation in various institutional levels – was seen as a lack of trust in its ability to protect minorities. Moreover, if the protection of Serbs was to be entrusted to local authorities according to ethnic criteria, Kosovo would never be able to completely implement its judicial system. Only a sharp refusal by Belgrade induced Kosovar authorities to declare the slightest hint of openness

INTERVIEWS
(by Serena Sartini)

COL. PAOLO FILIPPO TATTOLI, COMMANDER, TASK FORCE "AQUILA" AT DECANI

Col. Tattoli, what are the commitment and the activities of the Italian military Contingent?

Our activity here in Kosovo, and in particular at Decani, is aimed at laying the foundations for a democratic development of the Country, so as to create a safe environment where all the economic initiatives can develop and take root in an increasingly stable democracy. Our activities are mostly carried out on the ground. There are planning activities and activities that take place later in the field. In order to maintain this situation of calm and tranquillity for the development of democracy, we make the best of all the instructions for which we have been training, to prove that the KFOR's presence is in defence of the whole population.

Recently, 560 men of the "Julia" Brigade have arrived at Decani. Does it mean that there is a higher level of attention?

No, the arrival of the "Julia" contingent pertains to the training strategy of the units that will presumably be employed. The intention is to acquaint the contingent with the territory and make it ready for any occurrence.

FATHER ANDREJ, SPOKESMAN FOR THE ORTHODOX MONASTERY OF VISOKI DECANI

Inside the base, under military protection, there is the monastery of Visoki Decani. It is called the "armoured Paradise" because, since it contains some of the most ancient and precious frescoes of the entire Serb orthodoxy, since 1999 has been protected by the Italian military Contingent of KFOR. During the last years, the monastery – looked after by Serb monks – has been the target of several attacks and is under Italian protection. It is located near the Bistriza river, under the steep slopes of the Prokletije Mountains and is immersed in an enchanting water-rich wood. Precisely at Decani, where the Serb orthodoxy was born, in the XIV Century King Stephen Uros erected the monastery of Christ the Saviour, which today belongs to the world patrimony of UNESCO and houses over one thousand original frescoes. The attacks and lootings that took place throughout the centuries cannot be counted, but the monastery remains a living witness of the bloody history of the Balkans. To enter the orthodox complex, one must cross two checkpoints, and even the military must leave their weapons outside the place of worship.

Father, what is the atmosphere in the monastery?

We are like a sick person bound to the machines that keep you alive. Our lifebuoy is the Italian military base, which is 600 metres from here and helps us in our service. Since 1999 we have been under the protection of the Italian military Contingent. The war was not of a religious character, therefore we must say that we have never had big problems with the other religions. Our identity is Christian first of all, then Orthodox and finally Serb. We are too often seen as representatives of the Serbian State in Kosovo, but this is not true. It is a calumny that goes around in some extremist circles. This is why the monastery has often been under fire. In the last few years we have been attacked four times, with 23 grenades.

The last attack took place on March 31, 2007, when a rocket hit a wall, barely 20 metres from the apse.

What are your activities?

They are manifold. In the first place, during the Communist period, the Serb-orthodox Church has been deprived of many possessions, and we have had to resort to self-support. For this reason, we have an engraving workshop and a laboratory of iconography. We sell icons all over the world. We also have some land that we farm, and every monk has his own sector. Then, obviously, there is prayer, both in common and individual.

How is coexistence with the military?

For us the presence of the military is absolutely necessary. They have done everything possible to make our life easier and almost normal. From the very beginning, we have been seeking to have good relations with everybody, and I am sure our life will go back to normal when things calm down.

*Journalist

to it (Hasim Thaci called it "a difficult but acceptable compromise"). Even the European attitude, initially in favour of the complete integration of the project, changed its direction after Belgrade's refusal. The countries at the greatest risk of ethnic tensions (Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus) broke ranks by voicing their doubts. In any case, the European Union and Serbia went through

with the signing of an "Accord for Stability and Association" (November 2007), even if Belgrade refused to accept any condition as concerns the future of Kosovo.

Russia, setting aside its age-old pan-Slavic and Orthodox entente, made an attempt at bargaining for its backing of Kosovo's independence with the secession of Ossetia from southern Georgia,

America's first true ally in the Caucasus. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana reported to the European Commission on the "terrible concerns" spoken of by Georgian president Saakashvili about the consequences that the result of the final status of Kosovo could have on the territorial completeness of his country. The campaign for independence had by now lost any and all homogeneity of support, both inside the EU and in the Contact Group (the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy), not to mention the United Nations Security Council. Russian ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Alekseev declared that Russia would be vetoing any solution imposed on Belgrade without its consent.

But, objectively speaking, is Belgrade really in a condition to assert its sovereignty over Kosovo? Serbians must guarantee the protection of their community in a region 90% inhabited by Albanians and, presumably, the first step could be carried out exclusively by large-scale police intervention and numerous soldiers to prevent hostile armed forces from forming. Even if unilateral independence were to be declared, the only path that could be taken seems that of territorial division, from a certain point of view taken into consideration by western chancelleries: the north-western part (bound by the Ibar river, which runs through the centre of Mitrovica) could be occupied by the Serbs. However, Serbia, without a satisfactory preventive accord, would never agree to leave the Serbian enclaves, which include historical and religious sites, in the hands of the KFOR, and specially not to the mercy of Pristina. What ever the case may be, the possibility of territorial division could end up being tantamount to independence itself, with Srbska having already announced its intention to secede from Bosnia: the domino effect, so feared by European countries, would be brought about regardless.

SERBIAN ELECTIONS, BETWEEN NOSTALGIA AND MODERNISM

At the beginning of 2007, six million, six hundred thousand Serbians cast their ballots for 250 representatives and 4 years of legislature. But what was really at stake was another matter altogether, in the form of the future of Serbia, between the backdrop of international isolationism (the hand-over of the final six war criminals still at large) and its entrance onto the European chessboard (the final status of Kosovo). Even if no candidate in the elections was in favour of trading European membership for the independence of Kosovo, concerning domestic politics party alliances were all focussed on economic growth, so-



An Italian checkpoint at Djacovica (1999).

cial reform and the fight against corruption, but looming over Serbian voters seemed to be the ghost of a return to violence in the Balkans, with a resumption of vendettas between Serbians and Albanians and the party in the lead being that under the radical and ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj, imprisoned in the Hague for war crimes. During his December hunger strike – which seemed to be bringing him to his deathbed – his popularity ratings exceeded 40pct, but once out of in danger it slid back to 29%. The "Democratic Front" in opposition was made up of the liberal reformers under President Boris Tadic (weighing in with 26pct according to predictions) and the moderate nationalists under Premier Vojislav Kostunica (forecast to rake in less than 20%). Getting past the 5% threshold were only two other parties: G17 Plus – the economic intelligentsia – and the progressive left under Cedomir Jovanovic (the former student leader and right-hand man of Zoran Djindjic, the historical pro-Western leader assassinated in 2003), the only one in favour of independence for Kosovo. But even if the majority of Serbian voters

most likely felt that the future of Belgrade and Kosovo were in the hands of the United States and Russia (by this time the “Dossier Kosovo” had become one of the largest at international level), voter turnover was over 60%. Winning were the ultra-nationalist hawks led by Vojislav Seselj (28.7%), the ideologue of the 1990s ethnic cleansing and the man in favour of waging a war for Kosovo and against the arrest of war criminals. Following was Boris Tadic (22.9%), the man pushing for European membership with a “pact of new responsibility” and the pendulum in the hands of Vojislav Kostunica (17%), open to a possible hand-over of war criminals but intransigent on the independence of Kosovo. But beyond whatever majority was to be constructed, the real winner in the elections was Rajko Djuric. Journalist and poet, twice-nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature, he is the leader of the “Union of Serbian Roma” and the first gypsy political party in the world to get a foothold in Parliament. Supported by 800,000 Roma, after his victory he declared that “our promised land is Europe, and the way to get there is through Serbia”. But concerns did not subside for the Serbian populace, with the highest level of unemployment in Europe (40%) and housing going for prices higher than those in Manhattan. The disillusionment with a difficult situation translated into a disconsolate refrain which bounced from one teenage cell phone to the next: “In ten years Skoda has become a machine, Bulgaria has become Europe, and Montenegro a foreign country. And once again we vote for the party of a corpse.”

Meanwhile Vladimir Putin was keeping a close eye on the elections and was on hand to reassure Belgrade. Aware of the fact that the Serbian voters opted for a harsh line as concerns Kosovo, in the joint press conference held with German chancellor Angela Merkel in Moscow he said that “we want a solution satisfactory to both Belgrade and Pristina”. Prepared to exercise his veto rights on the UN Security Council (otherwise how could he deny freedom to Chechnya?), he could afford to openly criticize the 1999 attack on Yugoslavia: “Is it normal to bomb the centre of Europe on the eve of the XXI century?”. The arrows were shot directly at Washington. Decisions on the objectives to hit during the bombings were decided on by the White House (using F117A Stealth and Tomahawk missiles from ships on the Adriatic), leaving the traditional systems to the discretion of Javier Solana and Klaus Naumann, then Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Now America most likely wanted to lighten its pressure on the Balkans and not irritate Moscow to prevent its reaction from further compromising the already difficult relations on the most thorny of international issues, from Iran to North Korea.



Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Martti Ahtisaari’s plan for Kosovo – in the final version neither under Serbia nor independent – reflects the same ambiguity of UN Resolution 1244, and when the final draft was officially put before Agim Ceku, President of “Albanian” Kosovo, “unquestionable independence” was what had been called for, while in the eyes of Kostunica and Tadic (who refused to receive the mediator sent from Brussels) “any form of international independence of Kosovo imposed on Serbia constitutes a violent alteration of the recognized borders of a UN member state.” In Ahtisaari’s eyes, the new Kosovo should take on the assets and debts of the former Yugoslavia (with access to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and its citizens should be able to enjoy dual citizenship. Belgrade should have the chance to finance the Serbian enclaves so long as the money be paid directly to the government in Pristina and the government of Kosovo pledge to ensure the protection of Orthodox monasteries. The self-governance of the Serbian minority (the over 100,000 Serbs in the north) would have to be guaranteed by 2,500 local police assisted by 16,500 NATO soldiers for the entire 2008. However, in reality Kosovo is a country in the clutches of desperation. With a territory the size of the Abruzzi region, unemployment is over 70% and half the population lives under the poverty threshold (15% with 10 euros per month). The 14 billion

dollars allocated in recent years in international aid ended up in the hands of war-hardened and dangerous local mafia. On 15 March 2007 the International Court at the Hague started the proceedings for war crimes against former premier Ramush Haradinaj, but was not charged for either drug trafficking or the numerous instances of illegal trafficking the AAK leader had engaged in. Even Agim Ceku (KLF militia leader and prime minister) and Hashim Thaci (former Commander of the Armed Militia and leader of opposition party PDK) – ended up on the list of those wanted by Interpol. Both had been arrested in 2003 and immediately released due to lack of evidence. In reality, the collusion between the ruling class of Kosovo and organized crime in the region runs particularly deep. According to Avni Zogiani, COHU coordinator (Organization for Democracy, Anti-Corruption and Dignity), the fault lies with the United Nations: “If Haradinaj and the other KLF veterans hold onto political power and criminal networks with impunity it is thanks to the protection and complicity of the upper echelons of the UNMIK.” Even German intelligence services note that the investments to launder illegal revenue are linked to the Haradinaj – Ceku – Thaci threesome. The operations centre is in Pristina’s Grand Hotel, owned by Agim Ceku, as well as the Sloga company and about a hundred restaurants and night clubs. According to Europol and UNICEF reports in 2006, human trafficking (of children) is growing exponentially. In the 2005–2006 period, the arms and explosives trade was particularly lucrative and often found to have taken place in KPC bases (Kosovo Protection Corp), made up of KLF veterans with civil protection duties that Ahtisaari’s project called for an end to. But in Kosovo, Agim Ceku is considered a hero. He is the one to have re-organized the KLF Albanian militias in the last weeks of the war against Milosevic and was the Connection Official with NATO in the 1999 conflict. Sworn enemy of Belgrade, after the NATO bombings expelled the Serbs from Kosovo he was hailed as “Victorious general”. Agim Ceku also fought in Croatia, being awarded 8 honourable mentions and suffering numerous injuries. The UN Court has not brought charges against him but Belgrade has issued an arrest warrant in his name.

SERBIA, KOSOVO, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

In any case, Ahtisaari’s draft plan convinced the United States and Great Britain, was not disliked by France and Germany and was somewhat approved of by Italy, but met with no sympathy on the part of Russia. The Financial Times commented with thinly-veiled irony that “it will be the first case of

a piece of Europe being directly administered by the European Union.”

And while Serbian National Council was organizing a protest in front of the American embassy in Belgrade (with 20,000 protestors accusing the United States of favouring the independence of the region and asking Russia to use its power of veto on the Security Council), Carla del Ponte’s voice fell on deaf ears. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the Crimes of the Former Yugoslavia, the Hague Court which had put Slobodan Milosevic on trial, feared that political convenience of the moment could wipe out years and years of work. The European Union was on the path to re-opening talks for Serbian membership in the EU (suspended in May 2006) and Del Ponte recognized the real possibility that Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic would not from that point on be handed over to international justice to stand trial for war crimes. Faced with Italy, Spain and Austria’s desire to come up with proposals, the prosecutor wondered “where all this rush is coming from” and praised Belgium and Holland for their setting the hand-over of war criminals as a pre-condition for the resumption of talks. In her eyes, in the midst of the international community the “poor Serbs” syndrome was spreading, a sense of guilt for the 1999 bombings and consequent economic and international crisis – and since the West intended to deprive Serbia even of Kosovo, it was necessary to compensate with the resumption of EU negotiations, especially to prevent even stronger ties with Moscow. The United Nations Security Council decided that the Hague Court would have to carry out all the first degree trials by the end of 2008 and appeals by 2010, and then close the cases once and for all. When the prosecutor requested an extension, the Security Council (with Russia and China in the lead) responded with a definite refusal. International law was to bow down before politics. The Riga summit at the end of 2006 had by that time approved the integration process for Serbia and resolutely outlined its direction: a NATO office was to be opened in Belgrade and Italy was to take on the role of “Contact Country”. When on 31 January 2007 the Italian undersecretary of defence (Lorenzo Forcieri) met with his Serbian counterpart (Snezana Samardzic-Markovic), the topic of discussion was the cooperation between the two countries for the upcoming bringing into line of the Serbian Armed Forces with NATO standards: “We will open Italian and NATO training schools to Belgrade officers [...], Serbian detachments will have the chance to work alongside our contingents in Lebanon and Afghanistan.”

The conclusion to Martii Ahtisaari’s work on the matter went without saying. After thirteen months of negotiations, no compromise was reached in

Vienna and the decision was passed on to the United Nations Security Council. Serbian ultra-nationalists warned that they would protest in the streets against a secession (in the eyes of Premier Kostunica, it is tantamount to amputating 15% of Serbian territory) and Albanians repeated that they were no longer willing to wait for independence (President Sejdiu and Premier Ceku held that no level of autonomy, even if to a very high degree, would ever be worthy of consideration). The tension between the two sides gave rise to concerns that fresh violence was about to break out, and 17,000 NATO soldiers got ready to set in motion the protection and evacuation plan for the 10,000 Serbs left south of Mitrovica. One year after Milosevic's death (on 11 March 2006), a crowd of those nostalgic for the past regime gathered around his tomb in his birthplace of Pozarevac, in central Serbia, and Serbian newspapers extolled the merits of "the first victim of the new world order". Born in 1941, Slobodan Milosevic began his rise to power in 1987 during a gathering held in Kosovo Polje, the Serbian Jerusalem. Shouting to his fellow nationalists that "no one has the right to attack you", he was soon to become a national hero. Even if his rise and fall is studded with four Balkan wars and 200,000 deaths, the murky circumstances of his death – aged 64 and in a UN jail in the Hague, where he had been held since 2001 – zealously feed "Serbian victimism", the strongly-rooted conviction of being a population misunderstood and humiliated by the West.

It was Russia once again to hold out its hand. Even if the Albanian majority was overwhelming, and already exercising de facto sovereignty under the UN through self-governance institutions entirely autonomous from Belgrade, Moscow held that the independence of Kosovo was an entirely political matter. If the United States were not prepared to interfere in the issues of Georgia and the Ukraine, or to if they would take into consideration forgetting about the plan for missile launchers in Poland, then a possible "conditional independence" could be taken into consideration. Belgrade was aware of the fact that the price asked of Washington was too high, used this to their advantage by nominating as parliament speaker Vojislav Seselj, on trial at the Hague for war crimes. It seemed that the road towards Europe was growing ever more difficult (the EU had criticized the fact that no government had been formed three months after the legislative elections) and when the president of the Serbian Republic, Boris Tadic, visited Rome to meet with Premier Prodi and Foreign Minister D'Alema, he used a peremptory tone in speaking of the resumption of talks with the European Union, saying that "we will not accept blackmail as concerns Kosovo". However, on 9 June 2007 the European Commis-

sion announced that it wanted to resume the negotiations process for the conclusion of an "Accord for Stabilisation and Association", as hoped for by the Foreign Office, which greeted the decision with "a great deal of satisfaction". At the United Nations headquarters things were looking a bit trickier. The text for a new resolution allowing more time for the negotiations (supported by Washington, London and Paris), was declared "unacceptable" by Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin and Serbian Premier Kostunica, the man who ousted Milosevic and who had since become the firmest defender of national pride. The text called for an extra 120 days to find a solution accepted by Belgrade and Pristina, after which time the Ahtisaari plan would come into immediate effect "unless the Security Council were to expressly decide differently". Europe did not want a unilateral independence for Kosovo and already some countries (Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Spain) declared that they would not be recognizing it without the aegis of the UN. In reality, the largest wars fought on European soil have left many unfair borders – questionable in some cases – and certain regions could feel encouraged to put forward similar claims (Scotland, the Basque Country and Corsica, to name but a few). But the furrow that Serbia would be cutting in the route to Europe had already been dug. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn predicted that the date would be in 2011 and that the country would be receiving 572 million euros over the following two years in aid from the European Union. Europe would be taking Kosovo under its care, and this was bound to lead to risks. When the Italian Foreign Minister visited Belgrade and Pristina (June 2007), in visiting the Italian contingent he noted that "it will undoubtedly be a contested transition [...] even if inevitable, it could give rise to tensions."

For the first time in UN history, the United Nations summit was held in Turin, Italy in September 2007. For three days discussion centred on the major global strategies, from Iraq to Darfur. The new secretary general Ban Ki Moon expressed the hope that no one would try to use Kosovo to create instability and confusion. When asked whether the region hadn't in reality taken on the status of a tool in the new global stand-off between the United States and Russia, he admitted that the recommendations of his Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari had not met with unanimous consent in the Security Council and that he had turned his attention to the Contact Group, which had decided to continue talks and committed itself to presenting a report by 10 December 2007. From that day on the Kosovo television channel RTV21 decided to broadcast – for a few seconds at the end of every hour – the image of a white box with a red number. The number was the countdown to 10 December, the end



An Italian checkpoint in Kosovo.

of the negotiating round for independence. Agim Ceku suggested that the declaration of independence could even come on 28 November, the holiday for Albanian independence. But was Belgrade going to be ready to accept the secession of such a historically and politically important part of its territory? On a building in Pristina's centrally-located Bill Clinton Boulevard the words "Jo Negotiata, Vetevendosje" were written: "No negotiations, only self-determination". The Serbs left behind in Pristina – a striking example of the "Albanization" of Kosovo – numbered only seventy, up against a community of over 40,000. The KLF separatist militias had terrorized the Serbian populace with the killing of citizens accused of collaborating with Belgrade police and army. The situation in the rest of the region is by no means better. Mitrovica, in an area under French control, has 20,000 Serbs compared with the 80,000 Albanians living south of the Ibar river, the geographical border which has become an un-crossable borderline. Though in the northern zone the official language is still Serbian in Cyrillic lettering, with license plates (when they do actually crop up on cars) belonging to the old Federation and the currency the dinar, once over the Ibar you are in full-blown Albanian territory, complete with the use of the euro. But even more serious is the situation in the village of Gracanica, a few dozen kilometres from Pristina. In the latter, two refugee camps have been set up with hundreds of Serbs living in containers donated by Russia after the Albanian revolt in 2004 which had burned down almost all their houses,

with electricity available only one in every four hours. In the rest of the region the industrial sector is limited exclusively to the city of Oblic, where lignite is mined for the sole power plant, a structure owned by Kek, a publicly-traded company in which the UN holds a stake with approximately 800 employees. Production is not sufficient for the region's requirements and the supply is fragmentary and intermittent. Odd but true: 25 million euros in international aid has been set aside for a meteorological station. And we have already borne witness to the millions of dollars allocated for the almost 6,000 UN employees for the UNMIK mission, costing over 218 million simply for 2006-2007. It is almost surely the "largest money-eating machine" in the whole of Kosovo.

The gears of Serbian diplomacy then began to grind into motion. Prosecutor Carla del Ponte presented a report on the new collaboration offered by Belgrade to the UN Court and, in only three days, Serbia announced that it had put a million-euro reward on Radko Mladic's head. Even for those providing information leading to the capture of Stojan Zupljanin and Goran Hadzic 250,000 euros was set aside (with no reward offered for Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian –not Serbian – citizen). The young, sharp-witted Serbian Foreign Minister (Vuk Jeremic, born in 1975 and Harvard-educated) paid a visit to Minister D'Alema, and even if he said that "we are ready to grant Kosovo

a centimetre from its independence”, in reality he appeared prepared to take into consideration a possible compromise. When it was the turn of our Foreign Minister to pay a visit to Premier Kostunica in Belgrade, the requests to Italy focussed on a self-proclaimed independence: “deny any legitimacy to a possible declaration”. The stance taken by Europe seemed favourable to this type of solution, and if by any chance Pristina – after a unilateral action – were to get a place at the UN, the way would clearly be blocked by the necessary resolution provided for by the Security Council.

On 23 October 2007 at the “Italian Village”, the Military Base in Belo Polje near Pec, general Nicolò Falsaperla (Commander of the Motorized Brigade “Aosta”) took on the Command of the Multinational Task Force – West (MNTF-W), which has the task of ensuring security and freedom of movement for the population of Kosovo regardless of the ethnic group or religion.

THE ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

On 17 November voting was held for parliamentary and municipal administration representatives of Kosovo, a State which has not yet taken on statehood, a piece of Serbia in which Serbia has no say in the matter. The national anthem, the flag – and the football team – were ready: voters were tired of dealing with Belgrade and had lost faith in the United Nations. Interior Minister Blerim Kuci announced during the election campaign that “we have been patient for too long, and no postponement is unacceptable.” But the worries of Wolfgang Ischinger, former ambassador to London and now at the head of the “Troika” mediators (the United States, Russia and the European Union) were by no means over. Even if his attempt at mediation – following the one by Martii Ahtisaari – was floundering among the rocks of the intransigence shown by Belgrade and Pristina, the assessments coming to the fore after the proposal for a unilateral proclamation of independence constituted a serious problem. Recognition of an ethnic-based secession risks encouraging in the Balkans (and not only), separatist tendencies barely hidden beneath the surface. In Bosnia there is the problem of the Serbs of the Srpska republic, also making up 90% of the population and occupying half the territory of Bosnia, continually stirred up by Belgrade. In Macedonia and Presevo, the Albanian minority has once again started stockpiling weapons. In Sanjaccato and Voivodina, the community of non-Serbs and Muslim Slavs total 50% of the population. In eastern Serbia, even the sizeable communities of Romanians, Bulgarians and Valachs are

undergoing social unrest, as in Transdnistria and Abkhazia. And what about the Transylvanian Hungarians in Romania? And Greece with its Macedonians in Epirus? In the eyes of Richard Holbrooke, an American career diplomat and ambassador to the UN, the one behind the Dayton Accords for Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo is the true breeding ground for the crisis in the Balkans: “American passivity, subversive activity by Russia and European weakness all come to the fore there”. Will the next Cold War be sparked in Kosovo? The United States has built “Bond Steel” there, one of their largest military bases, and if Kosovo were to proclaim its independence Belgrade is prepared to open its doors to Russian military bases. According to Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili, it is the Russians who are also inciting the large street demonstrations against him (the ambassador to Moscow has been withdrawn and some diplomats expelled), and he interprets the disagreement as stemming from the secessionist claims by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on Moscow’s side. The United States will be the first to recognize the independence of Kosovo (a promise made by George W. Bush on a visit to Pristina) and Serbia continues to call for UN intervention. President Tadic reiterates that the only acceptable solution is the one dictated by the Security Council. Belgrade promises to stand by the law and not use force: “we will annul every one of Pristina’s decisions”. But this could mean cutting electricity (40% of it transits through Serbia), the sealing of borders and a blockade on exports. But doesn’t “starving” Kosovo mean pushing to the very edge those 10% of Serbs that already live in the worst of possible conditions? In Mitrovica Serbian flags have begun flying of “Lazar Guard”, the new paramilitary group taking its inspiration from the mythical Muslim Enemy Prince: “We have weapons and we will be using them. We no longer trust the UN and NATO, but only ourselves. So they want independence, do they? Well, they can come and take it.” Germany has decided to send in to the KFOR an additional 500 soldiers to swell the ranks of the 17,000 already there. The American soldiers involved with the NATO forces number 1600, and Italian ones 3,000, representing – along with Germany – the largest contingent. The KFOR force is subdivided into five Commands. The northern one has its headquarters in Nove Selo (Belgium, Bulgaria, Georgia, Estonia, Luxembourg and Morocco), the southern one in Prizren (Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, Switzerland and Turkey), the western one in Pec (Italy, Spain, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania) and the central one in Lipjan (the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden). NATO foreign ministers have met to prepare to deal with the crisis that a poten-

tial declaration of independence could trigger (Brussels, 7 December 2007) and are prepared to send in reinforcements. Three battalions with about 800 men each has been decided on to send if violence breaks out unexpectedly: an Italian one – already in Kosovo for military exercises – and German and British ones. Italian soldiers control the western sector along the border with Albania, for a territory measuring more or less the area of the Lazio region. For any possible emergency, in addition to the motorized brigade “Aosta”, a helicopter squadron based in Djakova is ready to intervene, as is the blockhouse “Centauro” of the Montebello lancers. Italian soldiers ensure the security of some Serbian enclaves and stand guard over the historical Decani Monastery. According to Abdyl Mushkolaj, a former KLF colonel, our presence is bothersome: “With independence, your soldiers must leave the monastery. Security will be guaranteed by the police and army of Kosovo.” Pro-Albanian fighters from the KLF are estimated to number 50,000, and on the other part of the “front” there are 31,000 members of the Serbian armed forces and 10,000 paramilitary militiamen.

In the Kosovo elections the former fighters won. The president, 56-year-old jurist Fatmir Sejdiu, leader of the “Democratic League of Kosovo”, was defeated. He paid the price for the scandals and divisions within his party after the disappearance in 2006 of the historical leader Ibrahim Rugova, racking up only 23% of votes (in 2004 he had received 45%). The relative majority and 35% are on the other hand achieved by “The Democratic Party of Kosovo” led by 39-year-old “pro-American” Hashim Thaci, one of the head KLF guerrilla fighters with the battle name “Snake”, Milosevic’s “black beast”. Managing over the 5% threshold was also the “Alliance for the Future of Kosovo” under Ramush Haradinaj (on trial at the Hague for war crimes) and 12% was handed to the newly-formed “Alliance for a New Kosovo”, under billionaire Behgjet Pacolli, becoming the third most important party in Kosovo. Behgjet Pacolli, a 56-year-old Swiss-Albanian entrepreneur, is the owner of the Mabetex company – in charge of the restructuring of the Kremlin under President Yeltsin – who promised “piles of money from abroad”, playing off the serious economic crisis of the region.

The only negative record was that of voter turnout. Only 40% of Albanians eligible cast their ballots and Serbian inhabitants entirely boycotted it despite United Nations appeals. But why such low voter turnout in such a delicate moment? The first possible explanation would be that of a difficult relationship between the population and the political class, though it is more likely that Kosovar voters – faced as they are with pressing economic problems and the potential future scenarios



An Italian soldier stands guard over a sensitive point on the outskirts of Pec.

– does not rank independence among its top priorities. And if a self-proclamation were to come into being, how would it be made? Official voting by parliament or a referendum? In reality, the southern part of the populace seems contrary to independence and in favour of greater orientation towards a union with Albania and the FYROM. In particular, Christian Albanians do not want to live in a Sunni Muslim state, in one where there is a growing presence in the mosques of intransigent imams trained in the Koranic schools of Saudi Arabia. Complicating the matter further are the Albanian Kosovar Muslims living in Macedonia and only waiting for the independence of Kosovo to call for secession as well (with a minuscule state having Tetovo as its capital) in the hope of one day joining the new State.

In any case, election day – as was the case for the anniversary of the proclamation of Albanian independence – came and went without any noteworthy incidents. To the news of the failure of the accord, the population of Pristina met to celebrate in front of the monument to the national hero Scanderburg. Minister D’Alema believed it was fundamental that the European Union give the go ahead as soon as possible to the European civil mission (about 1,800 men), which would include the United Nations as witness to the administrative running of Kosovo. Italian foreign policy laid down its lines of demarcation: “independence under international supervision with very rigorous limitations”, and, at the same time, expressed its willingness to set in motion membership talks for Belgrade’s accession to the European Union, without waiting for all Serbian war criminals to be caught and handed over to the Hague Court (to the bitter disappointment of General Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte). Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt went even further, and said that “the European Union is prepared to recognise the independence of Kosovo”.



Albanian flags wave in Pristina during the bombing of Sarajevo in 1999.

vo even without a UN declaration.” And since this statement was by a diplomat who had previously served as EU Special Envoy in the former Yugoslavia, Co-Chairman of the Dayton peace Conference, High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UN Secretary General Special Envoy to the Balkans, its importance should not be underestimated. However, the Kremlin had meanwhile made it known that it would consider any decision on the final status of Kosovo outside the UN Security Council as illegal: “Anyone supporting the independence of Kosovo should think very carefully about the consequences,” (Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister). Instead of immediately declaring its independence – the advisability of the action took the upper hand over nationalistic emotion – Kosovo set up a competition for the restyling of its flag: even a war by symbols has its importance. Hashim Thaci believed it was fundamental to agree on any decision about the division with European capitals and Washington to gain backing, even if the work for the formation of the new coalition and the assigning of ministers has yet to begin.. At the moment it seems only Cyprus is holding out tenaciously against independence (due to the 30-year crisis with Turkey, it does not want to create a precedent which could have a backlash against itself), and unsure are Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The voicing of disagreement on the part of other European governments was postponed until after the declaration of independence, when official recognition will have to be decided on.

KOSOVO INFLAMES THE UN

The meeting of the council of heads of states and governments of the European Union (Brussels,

December 14, 2007) aimed to stabilize the territory of Kosovo but did not meet with the desired results. Even if the decision was made to send in a European civilian mission, no agreement was made on whether or not the European Union would recognize Kosovo if it were to declare independence with having come to an agreement on the matter with Belgrade. Also, as concerns the Italian proposal to speed up Serbia’s membership in the EU the attempt to attenuate the prejudicial condition for a hand-over of Mladic and Karadzic to the Hague International Criminal Court for War Crimes was blocked (despite meeting with general consensus). The foreign ministers agree that, under coordination by Javier Solana, they will be setting down the ways and the operating aspects of the mission according to the calendar of meetings scheduled for 28 January, February 18 and March 10, 2008. While some European countries proposed granting – in any case – recognition of the independence of Kosovo, given the impossibility of a compromise with Belgrade, Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Greece put up opposition. The attitude taken by Cyprus is also worthy of note which, in addition to declaring its opposition, expressed strong doubts about the judicial regularity of the European civil mission. But when Serbia got word of what was going on,

the general perception was that of a slap in the face from the European Union: after having opened its doors to Serbian membership in the EU, now Europe was turning around and committing itself to an international mission to safeguard Kosovo’s independence. This being the situation, it seemed a better idea to once again lay claim to sovereignty over the province and give up the idea of the EU, with the definitive match yet to be played on the United Nations’ table.

But the true division in the international community took place during the meeting of the highest body of the United Nations (December 19, 2007), the most serious split in the Security Council since the time of the Iraq war in 2003. And it was Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema to chair the meeting, which ended with “deeply-rooted disagreement and the impossibility of negotiated solutions.” It was D’Alema himself, who eight years before had (as Prime Minister) led Italy in its participation in the NATO intervention in Kosovo, to say that “I found myself face to face with my responsibility”. Whatever the case may be, the final status will not be decided on by the UN Security Council. From the opening remarks, Russia formally objected to the presence in the hall of the Kosovo representative (President Fatmir Sejdiu), who had been admitted only as a guest and exclusively at a personal level. On the other side, in his official role, was Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica.

And precisely the speeches of the two leaders inflamed the meeting. Beyond the varying interpretations given to Resolution 1244 (according to Belgrade, it prohibits a territorial separation that Pristina considers to be legitimate), the President of Kosovo says that “we are ready to start on the path to independence”, while the Serbian Premier warns the UN “not to approve an independence that would put in doubt its own legitimacy due to the unprecedented decision to break off a region from the territory of a sovereign, democratic nation with recognized borders with an imperious act.” But the defence of Serbia is not restricted to a simple reference to international law. Kostunica declared that in Mitrovica a Serbian “Department of Representation” would be opened, translating into the will to retain total control over areas with a Serbian majority, and a de facto separation of Kosovo into two separate entities. Taking the side of Kosovo’s independence were Italy, Ireland and the Czech Republic, while opposing it were Denmark, Greece, Spain and Hungary. But the most serious rift cropped up between the West and Russia. At the end of the meeting, the United States and the European Union agreed on a document setting down “the impossibility of a negotiated solution”, implying that independence was on its way. Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin, on the other hand, did not mince words: “Sending European police without UN consent is a violation of international law.”

Vojislav Kostunica took his leave by repeating that Serbia would declare all separatist acts by Kosovo unilateral and illegal, and when asked whether this meant war, said that “we will not be engaging in any sort of war. We have more powerful weapons than war to use: those of politics, diplomacy and economy.” But Belgrade’s real “strategic” weapon is Vladimir Putin. In the Serbian stronghold of Mitrovica, the most popular portraits are those of the Russian President, who for the Serbs today represents what Bill Clinton was for the Albanians not long ago. In the fashionable Mitrovica bar “Dolce Vita”, a haunt of intransigent Serbs (who call themselves “turbo-Serbs”), the voices all speak in unison: “Putin is great. Let him come with his soldiers, we’ll give them a warm welcome”.

THE INDEPENDENCE

In the first days of February 2008, the Serbs decide to make a clean break with the past, with Milosevic’s gloomy years and with international isolation. Outgoing president Boris Tadic wins the

elections, defeating ultra nationalist leader Tomislav Nikolic. Serbia is not yet a partner of the European Union but stakes its future on the negotiating table, and Brussels offers his hand “The people of Serbia population have apparently confirmed their backing to the democratic and European course”. But the Serbs of Kosovo are unhappy: “Now Belgrade will dump us”.

In the afternoon of Sunday, February 17, 2008 Albania’s red flags are waving on the snow-clad roads of Pristina, and Ibrahim Rugova’s picture stands out on the city walls. Prime Minister Hashim Thaci formalizes a request for a special session of Parliament in order to vote the independence of Kosovo and at 3.30 p.m. the new Balkan State is born. When at 5 p.m. the news is broadcast, the Russian Foreign Minister asks the Security Council of the UN to annul the unilateral declaration of independence and President Bush reassures Pristina: “We support the new State”.

And Serbia? According to Belgrade it is a “bogus State” that will never be recognised, and for Artemije – Orthodox Patriarch of Kosovo – the hour has come to “buy more modern arms from Russia”. The citizens of Belgrade take to the streets and invade the American Embassy. On the other hand, the “friends” are well known – Russia, China, India and Spain – and equally well known are the “enemies”, the United States and most European Countries, including Italy.

The Serbian Ambassador to Rome, Sanda Raskovic, hands in her formal protest for the recognition of Kosovo, but Italy’s major concern is the security of our contingent: KFOR is on the alert, and NATO deploys the Alpini regiment of the “Julia” Brigade on the northern zone, where the Kosovars of the Serbian ethnic group are concentrated.

And precisely at Jarinje e Brnyak, on the north of the Mitrovica province, the Serbs of Kosovo attack the offices of the United Nations, and a French armoured unit must intervene to disperse the demonstrators. And the revolt continues also in March, one month after the declaration of independence. At Mitrovica the multinational Force is attacked with bombs and firearms; a UN Ukrainian policeman dies, there are more than 150 wounded – including twenty French soldiers – and 53 demonstrators are arrested. A new chapter has just opened in old Europe.

As Winston Churchill used to warn: “The Balkans produced more history than they could digest” and after over half a century, from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia, a new state is being born. But at least Pristina’s dream has come true.

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A EUROPE TO BE REFOUNDED

A EUROPE TO BE REFOUNDED

The most scrupulous observers are agreed in maintaining that some simple institutional adjustments do not suffice to revive the constitutional Charter. For its possible relaunching it is indispensable to explain the project to be promoted and to verify its actual applicability, besides defining its geographic limits clearly.

In 1954 the European Defence Community (EDC) was rejected by the French Parliament. After 50 years, an ambitious initiative of a European Constitutional Treaty was unsuccessful

because in 2005 the majority of the French voted against it.

There is a parallelism between these two events. In 1954, after the failure of the project, there was the signature of the Treaties of Rome to establish the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. In 2005 a new institutional treaty was signed. However, this agreement does not hide problems. In the summit of June 2007, in Brussels, a deep rift between two political approaches developed: on the one hand those who require full integration and a common policy, on the other hand those who adopted a nationalist ideology. We will have to see if the new treaty meshes these two views together.

The French and Dutch refusal has led to a fork in the European project. The Berlin Declaration of March 25, 2007 took this aspect into consideration despite the success of a fifty-year-long process: it focused on the concept of «renewed common bases», avoiding the terms that could have caused disagreements, such as “enlargement” and “constitution”, and setting up a timetable: in 2009 the elections for the European Parliament will take place, followed by the establishment of a new Commission.

The French “no” did not reflect the refusal of the institutional innovations that had been proposed. It reflected the orientation of the European Union in the economic field, which was expressed by the consequent legislative decisions that are in the third part of the project of the Treaty.

Title pages.

The European Parliament in Brussels.

Left.

Hans Gert Poettering, President of the European Parliament.





THE CHANGE IN PROGRESS

On a worldwide scale, the evolution of China and India (since 1978 and 1991 respectively), which can be regarded as emergent «worlds» that entered the global market with their comparative advantages (skills and low salaries), with their ambitions and, more tritely, with their strategies aimed at eradicating poverty, has led to a radical change. This has brought about an acceleration of the historical process, casting doubt on the positions that have been adopted by the European States. Probably, the French voters perceived this triple change, which occurred on a worldwide scale and required a reformulation of the European project. Establishing itself as a political subject in a situation of economic and geopolitical uncertainty would not make any sense. The perception of a social vulnerability and the impression of zero setting as a political subject led the French to vote against the proposal. In addition, what influenced the vote was the heterogeneity of a political entity with indefinite boundaries which

“ The Berlin Declaration... focused on the concept of «renewed common bases», avoiding the terms that could have caused disagreements ”

Partial view of Maastricht from the Mosa river.

contrasts with the French view of a unitary State-Nation, with clear and stable boundaries.

In Holland, which is one of the States that founded the EEC, the reticence of the electors was due to the fear of a loss of national identity, to a crisis of traditional tolerance towards the immigrants and to a refusal of an «expropriation» of sovereignty, which is embodied in the very term “Constitution”.

THE SITUATION IN THE OTHER COUNTRIES

Eighteen States have ratified the constitutional text and 7 have accepted it conditionally, in which the prevalent view is that of a Europe which originated from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, which was ratified by the Treaty of Stockholm in 1959 to counterbalance the EEC, which had been established two years earlier). Then, six of its members entered the



Above.
Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Right.
Javier Solana, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Common Security Policy.

EEC, which was to become the EU in November 1993: The United Kingdom and Denmark in 1973, Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Today, the Association counts just 4 members: Island, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Then, the Czech Republic joined the EEC and its President, Vaclav Klaus, gave his preference to a simple «Organization of European States» instead of a Union whose powers appear to be excessive. The case of Poland is different: it is marked by a sort of populist withdrawal of the elite (a trend contrary to the growing Europeanism of the Polish people), by the attachment to the favourable system of the Treaty of Nice regarding the right of vote (according to which Spain and Portugal have 27 votes in the Council) and by a difficult relationship with their German neighbours. The installation in Poland and in the Czech Republic of the American antimissile systems will exacerbate the conflict with the other members of the Union, especially Germany, about the kind

of strategic relationships that must be established with Russia.

COMPARING VIEWS

The doubts of the French and the Dutch public opinion are also shared elsewhere. In Lisbon and in The Hague people think that if France, which was the founder of the European project refused this proposal, there is something strange in this. Lots of politicians think that there are also other important problems to



face, such as the coordination of the economic policies in the Euro zone, the strategies aimed at reducing the economic uncertainty, the respect for national identities and, consequently, the end of the «headlong rush» into the enlargement.

There are two opposing views. According to the first view, the Union continues to work but not perfectly, it tends to underestimate the institutional aspects and to privilege the common initiatives in some sectors, which are intermediate steps towards a globalised world. According to the new English Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, there is no relationship between the nation and the wide world. This is also the central position of the States working for a continuous enlargement of the European organization and have not yet given their opinion about the project of the Treaty. The other view is shared by Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Poland, and concerns security: the Union is regarded as a clear-cut political com-

munity, which must have efficient and stable institutions and be able to act in a limited area, making its members feel solidarity with each other and adopting a more autonomous and active foreign policy.

However, these Countries disagree with each other on how they should act. Germany follows a new institutional text: its federal structure, like that of decentralized Spain or of Belgium, which is becoming more and more federal, involves a clear sharing of responsibilities. Considering its demographic weight (which gives it the right to have 99 deputies as against 87 of France, Italy and the United Kingdom), Germany has a decisive strenght in the two great parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSE) and the Conservatory Party (PPE), of the European Parliament, which in 2009 should appoint the next President of the Commission (if the regulations of the Treaty that was rejected in 2005 are adopted, without any change, in a new text). Within the Council, Germany would have more power with regard to the right to vote (from 11%, according to the Treaty of Nice, to almost 17%). In France, on the other hand, the goal is to bring the electors of «yes» and «no» back together, and to make their views focus on renewed European objectives. But this has not put the institutional debate on the list of priorities.

THE NEXT COMMITMENTS

The idea of a more active commitment of the Governments of the «Euro zone» to the economic coordination and to the policies of support for growth is emerging. It is necessary to make concerted decisions, between the group of the Ministers of Finance of the fifteen countries of the «Euro zone» (the Eurogroup) and the European Central Bank, about the «grey area» of the policy of exchange rates, in particular with regard to the Asian currencies. In addition, it is necessary to develop and renew the common policies: orienting the agriculture towards ecology, a concerted strategy of energy security; more support for flexibility in the field of research and work; a policy of «circular» management of the waves of immigrants to favour social mobility rather than a definitive migration. It is important to discuss these strategic aspects in the official meetings of the enlarged Europe,

“The idea of a more active commitment of the governments of the «Euro area» to the economic coordination and to the policies of support for growth is emerging...”

without covering the disagreements between the member Countries.

PROSPECTS

The European project needs to be updated. In this new context, which is different from that of 1957, it is essential to explain the «European interests» with public debates and formal proposals. This definition appeared just twice in the document concerning the European security strategy that was introduced in December 2003 by Javier Solana, High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Common Security Policy, about the governance of the countries neighbouring the EU. This definition cannot be found in the annual report of activity of the Committee, even in the chapter about Europe as a world partner.



The Headquarters of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.



Above.
Great Britain's Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Right.
The President of Poland, Lech Kaszynski.

This is probably linked to the fact that right from the start the Americans have taken it upon themselves to defend the European strategic interests, in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each member country should develop its own view of the world to be able to preserve the social state and the European lifestyle (Artleban, as Angela Merkel says) and to orient the evolution of the EU in a civil sense.

In a world where the existence of different centres of power does not guarantee their cooperation and the West will not have the power to establish the international agenda, as it has done since the end of the 18th Century, the primary objective is to favour concerted decisions.

This concerns commercial negotiations and also other sectors, such as regulations and sustainable development, where the EU should have a pioneer role.

After 50 years, history is known but geography is uncertain. More than half of the member countries do not have an embassy in the other 26 States.

“...the «Europe» as a long-lived socio-historical category and the «Europe» that has been established as a European Union should not be confused...”

Therefore, it is necessary to face the problem of the «frontiers» seriously, in order to find a solution.



CONCLUSIONS

According to Washington, the European Union will have to include all 46 member Countries of the European Council, to the exclusion of Russia. In this context, the Union is the civil and financial component of a strategic agglomeration, whereas NATO represents the military component. This American strategy aimed at excluding Russia is risky, as the cases of Ukraine, Moldavia and the Countries of southern Caucasus have shown.

To build a different geopolitical scenery, the «Europe» as a long-lived socio-historical category and the «Europe» that has been established as a European Union (a voluntary association of democratic States which have a legitimization of their limits) must not be confused. It is necessary to stabilize limits and, at the same time, to adopt a more effective strategy aimed at cementing the relationships with the neighbouring countries, especially facilitating circulation and training. Two problems



Above.
The European Parliament in Strasbourg.

Left.
Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic.



sufficient to solve the deficits of the construction of national States. Before becoming member States it is necessary that they should build their state identity and establish good relationships with their neighbours. With regard to the second problem, that of Turkey, the negotiations continue but there is the mutual fear of losing the other interlocutor. It has to be decided whether to accept the important «passages of sovereignty» required by the European Union.

After defining the frontiers and their articulation with the continent and the coastal regions of the Mediterranean, and explaining the objectives of this Europe as well as the options of economy and external action, the Europeans would have the chance to be political subjects of a shared geopolitical project again.

Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi
Expert in Geostrategy

must be faced: the first concerns the western Balkans, where the geopolitical fragmentation continues and the enlargement could not be



EUROPE LOOKS TO THE EAST

EUROPE LOOKS TO THE EAST

Security and defence are values absolutely necessary for the realization of a political, economic and social structure of the Euro-unionist project. After the recent signing in Lisbon of the new basic text, in a 27-member scenario, the future strategy will increasingly depend on a clear sharing of responsibilities within the continental area. A sharing that should continue to privilege the relations with the United States, but also be oriented towards a reinforcement of the eastern “peripheries” taking in due account Moscow’s needs.

Together with the renouncing of a European Constitution – vis-à-vis the renewed treaty on fundamental themes, re-defined in Lisbon last December and aimed at reinforcing a democratic participation in Europe, and the Union’s capability of promoting the interests of its citizens – the most important problem has remained open: the definition of the European Union as a political identity juridically qualified within the sphere of a common policy of security and defence. That is, if the values, already shared in the reality and formalized in the Fundamental Charter proclaimed in Nice in 2000, implicitly did determine the acceptance of a comprehensively European identity, or not. Therefore, in the uncertainty that a unanimity of opinion could ripen, security and defence are not negligible values, neither are they objectives of lesser importance for the realization of an extensive political, economic and social structure, such as the Euro-unionist project is by now almost ready to become. To meet these challenges, every single partner must be able to recognize them as such, especially today, since the assumption of international responsibilities is greater and more direct, and occurs in a climate of necessary sharing of choices and effects that the policies adopted in defence matters entail. In this sense, and trying to take up a fair position vis-à-vis too static a vision of international law, the European approach must combine democratic interventionism with the affirmation of international norms and regulations. The primary political lesson that can be reasonably learned from the observation of the events occurred in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Central Asia in the past years, is quite clear. Namely: the European identity must be built in a positive way, and not in opposition to Washington or, least of all, Moscow. In a scenario with twenty-seven partners, the future of a security and defence policy will increasingly depend on the international action that the European Union is able to implement through a clearer sharing of responsibilities in the continental area. A sharing that should not exclude the Atlantic dimension of the relations with the United S-

tates, but be oriented towards the strengthening of its commitment to the stabilization of the peripheries more to the east of the Russian space. An objective that should be achieved by solving, once and for all, the disputes in the Balkans, Turkey’s role within the framework of shared security and the possibility of relations with Russia on an equal basis, despite the difficulties arising from an interlocutory project of antimissile defence.

CENTRE AND PERIPHERIES OF THE ALLIANCE

If, for example, all concur in believing that both the enlargement of the European Union and that of NATO, such as they are envisaged by the European partners, are not against Russia, then a horizon more and more to the East cannot but represent an opening towards a new form of continental relations, cooperative rather than competing. A system of relations where a prospect of guarantee of economic and political stability of the European communities would be introduced, within which to restore a will of collective security aimed at preserving, and thus sharing, a social and juridical space of common growth. Looking to the East on this basis, although NATO expresses in itself a kind of aggregative capability, one can believe that the Euro-American dimension is not exclusive, or determinant by itself for the future of the Alliance. Actually, if one considers relevant the observations of an Alliance that could change in its essence, due to its adaptation to the international system and for a new convergence of interests, this cannot leave out the partners that have managed to be part of it: the Nations of the East. In the face of these considerations, there would be two options. Either NATO has changed because interests have changed or, after all, the Western boundary line is moving forward...or, rather, is moving towards the East, almost sealing a common perception of the value of continental security. In fact, even today, after the “eclipse of deterrence”, there is no doubt that NA-

**Title pages.**

A view of Riga, the capital of Latvia.

Above.

The 2005 Prague summit.

TO must assert its politico-military continental centrality in the peripheries more and more distant from the Euro-American hard core of the aggregation. Therefore, by reason of such awareness, Russia itself should not be considered a simple periphery. As a matter of fact, the relation between centre and periphery within the NATO organization should not model itself on any vertical leadership, if not within a multidimensional and horizontal formula of common participation of the European States, including those that joined the Atlantic space since the time of Partnership for Peace. In view of this, the very limit of a possible engagement "out of area", wouldn't have much significance, neither political and much less juridical, in an interdependent system where the security of an enlarged community can turn into different scenarios, not necessarily coinciding with the continental space. In this sense, if the enlargement to the East of the Alliance has had a result, it is certainly that of having attributed a new political capability to the West. A role of responsibility in the management of a univocally acknowledged value, such as security and growth of the Euro-continental space in a climate of cooperation and dialogue. A possibility of redefining the continental relational terms in a new operational conception that should consider the sensitiveness of Moscow, once more wary of a possible Western policy of advanced defence. An opening that should define the opportunities of a convergence of interests, so as to promote a widening of the conception and strategic significance of the enlargement itself. A meaningful construction of an architecture of reciprocal concessions based on a physical and political security guaranteed by NATO. In short, a regional policy made credible by the choices of the European Union as regards defence and by an economic security promoted by the latter vis-à-vis the new economies of the East.

TECHNICAL TESTS FOR A "NEW" ALLIANCE?

The history of NATO after the Cold War was marked by two phases, and in many aspects has regarded two "different" alliances. In the first phase, the "Balkan" years, the Alliance was pulled on both sides from the old and from the new members: the former preferred a NATO focused on tasks of collective defence, the latter wanted it enlarged to the new missions. Subsequently, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have prompted such a radical change of mind about NATO's purpose that very little has remained of the original lines of division. In this window of history, each of the three Countries that had first joined NATO in 1999, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, had particular reasons for wanting to join the Alliance, but the basic ingredients were the same. All of central and Eastern Europe shared a sentiment of historical injustice. It believed, that is, that without having any guilt, from WWII onwards as many as two generations had been deprived of the fundamental liberties and opportunities in the name of a prevailing idea of non-personal collectivism. Certainly the adhesion to NATO could never have given back what had been taken away. But within the framework of a revolution of hearts and ideas this was going to place the other half of the continent back among the free and democratic Countries of the world. Years of political turbulence and internal passions, in the drama of historical reports, have helped a process of slow democratisation. The very adhesion of the Eastern Countries to the Al-

"...a horizon more and more to the East cannot but represent an opening towards a new form of continental relations, cooperative rather than competing ,"

liance has contributed to curb potential and real antidemocratic excesses. For the neo-candidates the threat to be excluded from the list of partners of the Alliance represented, in other words, a strong deterrent that kept them from going beyond the fixed limits. Moreover, none of the Countries of central and Eastern Europe experienced an easy transition

from communism. Thus, while none of the former communist States were completely safe from the possibility of falling back into totalitarianism, Moscow's political difficulties, in the eyes of the Countries candidate to enter the military space of the West, made Russia the usual neighbour. This was a consideration that was not stifled at all by Moscow's inability, or unwillingness, to solve the transit problems pending with the Balkan States. It is within this political picture that NATO's original mission introduced itself in the discussion about the enlargement. Once inside the Alliance, the candidate Countries believed that art.5 of the Treaty would eliminate any potential difficulty with Moscow. After all, for the new members, the Alliance was mainly a symbol that had survived the East-West confrontation. A symbol of recovered freedom, a de-

terminant instrument, because it was operationally concrete and available for exerting a moderating influence against internal conflicts. A barrier that was not hostile, but sufficiently high to stem the instability on the East. Nevertheless, there was a firm logical connection between the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the effort to reinforce and ensure peace in the Balkans. A kind of complementary reason, functional to a choice of enlargement, which could attribute a pregnant meaning to the realization of a stable and peaceful Europe. Thus, even if the operations carried out by NATO in Kosovo in the nineties were difficult to understand by Countries that had come out from communism only a few months before, there was a firm belief that a wider Atlantic community would ensure stability and growth to the young democracies of the East. Once the Balkan question was partially solved – frozen in an interlocutory phase with the deployment of NATO forces, and at least the reorganization of the institutional structures of Bosnia Herzegovina – and having met the expectations of the entry into the Alliance of the neo-candidates that had crossed the doors of the partnership, there was a change of viewpoints and strategic horizons also in matters of security and defence. Thus, if Russia's internal weakness has made it less fearful for its neighbours, this is due to the fact that the difference between new and old members was gradually diminishing. A large part of the remaining divergences suddenly disappeared from “ground zero” onwards, with the entry of the Countries of Eastern Europe into NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, if until 2001 both sides were divided by the attention given to traditional missions rather than to the new art. 5 operations, or on operations based on “responsibility to be safeguarded”, the possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack was something that both had underestimated. The urgency of the threat was evident as it was, for almost everybody, its definition. The Allies were agreed on the fact that terrorism constituted a non-conventional threat, which was in general controlled by groups and individuals, and which could not be defeated by traditional means. A useful observation, not simplistically negligible, on the strategic horizons of the new and old democracies of the European continent.

BEYOND NATO?

Looking to the East, if the concern of the European Union in 2003 was to find a common denominator to the perception of security, nevertheless it was equally difficult to affirm a shared value. For the young eastern democracies, the entry into the Union had to guar-

antee the integrity of the single sovereignty, rather than a common good to be defended in a shared vision. Thus, since 2003, there were attempts at trying to find a remedy to another fundamental critical situation: that of the lack of a European strategic concept that would go beyond the simple Atlantic formulation, a concept that had already been timidly anticipated by the decisions adopted the same year at the European Summit of Thessaloniki. Among these there was the approval of a thesis: “A safe Europe in a better world”, by Javier Solana, who analysed the threats that could have hit the Old Continent. Concluding his work Solana stated, without many reservations, that if one in the future wanted to have an international organization, and regimes and treaties effective vis-à-vis peace and security, one had to be ready to make deals precisely when there are no rules. A formula that looked like an acknowledgement of freedom of action, but also of conscious responsibility. A formula that induced every “Euro-partner” to assume, together with the adoption of the Constitution of the Union, a well defined commitment in this sector, in order to ensure the success of the common defence policy. In other words,

“Once inside the Alliance, the candidate Countries believed that art.5 of the Treaty would eliminate any potential difficulty with Russia”

an ideal commitment believed indispensable for realizing a secure Europe in a better world, defending the heritage of values on which the whole new process of integration was to be consolidated. Already since the European Council in Thessaloniki, one could not avoid acknowledging clearly that Eastern Europe, owing to its

historical background, had a perception of danger more marked than the Western region's. As a matter of fact, in the collective imagery of the eastern communities, despite the end of the Cold War and the deep changes occurred in the international system, Russia continued to be considered an interlocutor not always endowed with symmetry of viewpoints. Today, for instance, the very proposal of an advanced antimissile defence towards the Russian borders has again redefined the assets of power dealing. A situation of strategic superimposition of interests, which the Kremlin, vis-à-vis a shifting of the West towards the former imperial peripheries, interprets as a kind of political overextension of its old competitor. A particularly felt sensitivity towards a possible domino effect caused by a promotion of democratic values that reaches Chechnya and Georgia. This is an occurrence that would manifest itself in a sort of equally competitive prospect that would call into question the very power system of governed democracy that characterizes today's Russia, which is compelled to reckon with the Caspian-Caucasian fragilities. The territorial perception of an Atlantic Alliance's shift towards the East, if it does not involve Moscow in a cooperative and participative key in the continental models of defense, it risks to be per-

ceived as a kind of old style-imperial confrontation, since, for the Kremlin, a system of antimissile defence deployed close to its borders could involve the Russian space as far as the Urals. A possible result is a return to the arms race with the following, probable, freeze of the CFE Treaty (1), which would risk thwarting the efforts made until now. The price of these efforts would be paid by the European Union from a viewpoint of political capability and credibility, but also by the Kremlin, which would be compelled to re-direct towards military expenses a large part of the financial resources available and employable to strengthen an economic model on the rise. Nevertheless, the European Union and NATO are underrating the fact that contemporary Russia – in absorbing the impact of the advancing independence of the States of Central Europe and of their insertion in the Atlantic and political defensive space of the European Union – today tends to reduce its strategic withdrawal. The consequence of this consciousness is that every extension of the Western arm produces a kind of reluctance from Moscow to withdraw its projection towards the West, as little as it may be by now, and give up its influence in the Balkan Countries, and in Ukraine above all. In the face of such a repositioning of the strategic terms, the Alliance, and likewise the European Union, should re-examine in a contemporary key Moscow's priorities, setting them in an interpretative, strategic, political and continental framework. In other words, it should have at its disposal a comprehensive picture of the opportunities/risks, within which to implement its policy of defense and security and carry out its action, planned in synergy with the political objectives of the European Union. In any case, it is clear that a new Cold War would give no strategic advantages on the Continent to none of the possible competitors. For the Kremlin a new Cold War should be avoided, even if announced, for obvious reasons of weakness of its economic system as a whole. Also a new competition in the elitist political relations with the West should be avoided, because it would rely once more on a system of relations that would imply a political and military isolation of Russia. If this were the case, the system would not escape the danger that the void left by the Russian forces in the ex-allied Countries be filled not so much by Western forces but, in particular, by new "internal" forces hostile to Russia. A ghost that could reappear even today, not only as a threat to post-Soviet Russia's security, but also for Europe's stability. A limit to any dream of political and economic integration, founded on future equal and cooperative relations.

POLITICAL WILLS AND CAPACITY OF ACTION

The preceding observations make it evident that in realizing a common strategic horizon that should en-



The NATO summit in Rome (2002). From left to right: Silvio Berlusconi, Vladimir Putin, Lord George Robertson, George W. Bush.

sure stability to the Western democracies and to the young democracies of Eastern Europe, Russia's participation in the continental security and defence policies cannot be considered a possibility but a necessity. The transformation of the Joint Standing Atlantic Council into a NATO-Russia Council has allowed Moscow to express itself on a plane of equal dignity about issues of common interest. Cooperation in antimissile defence, war on terrorism and peacekeeping represent the most sensitive matters for ensuring a possibility of concrete cooperation on the European continent. A will of political sharing of the strategic interests, which in the recent past has led to work out a joint paper by Moscow and NATO already in May 2002 (2). In short, the enlargement can ascribe to the continental process of integration a new capability of promoting common values in an equally changed dimension of dialogue and identical responsibility. In view of this, the projection to the East of the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Unionist model has by now made the European Union responsible of the destinies of the Balkan communities. For this reason, in defending the reasons of the enlargement, the European Council of Copenhagen stated that such extension of the community dimension would brighten the relations with Moscow and would sustain them, also thanks to the accords with Ukraine, Moldova and Byelorussia, as well as with the Countries of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean (3). It is however an interlocutory situation, which remains open at the moment, like the question of the engagement in the Balkans, which was Atlantic yesterday and is Euro-Unionist today. Nevertheless, with the European Council of Seville of June 2002, the European Union attempted a qualitative leap, while waiting to realize and conduct on its own a mission of international policing in Bosnia Herzegovina, especially in the face of a possible disengagement of NATO from the Bosnian theatre, with the end of the SFOR mission. And, in a certain sense, the European Union, during the last years has managed to enter with its own capabilities in the picture of the Balkan crisis, without superimposing on its Atlantic military commitment a new engagement of Armed Forces, even if aimed at ensuring the stabil-

ity of the region. In view of this, the Security and Defence Policy has taken the shape of a container adaptable to any pre- and post-conflict situation in the achievement of a political and institutional stability in crisis situations. Thus, police forces, law officials, attorneys and judges have in fact become instruments for realizing a political action of stabilization, in defence of the juridical dignity of a political community acknowledged as such.

STARTING AGAIN FROM PRAGUE

The choice of such undertaking in the shape of police operations represented nevertheless the simplest option for testing the capabilities of action in the management of a situation of politico-institutional instability. The Union acknowledged the fundamental role that had to be attributed to the Security and Defence Policy as operational instrument. It also tried to shape a European Action Plan on Capabilities (EACP), aimed at testing the possibilities of intervention and of autonomous crisis management, both in the military and civil dimension. Thus, while waiting to manage to define in Copenhagen the role of the Atlantic Alliance in an extended political dimension of the European Union, the European Council in Brussels clearly confirmed the relations between the Atlantic partners and the Union partners. Precisely as, with the same clarity, it tried to delimit and specify the limits of the "Atlanticism" of the cooperation within the EU. It was above all underlined that, as for the member Countries of the European Union and NATO, the measures and the decisions taken by the Union within the framework of the military management of crises, would perfectly meet any obligation deriving from the Atlantic commitments. In other words, that meant that no action decided within PESD could be aimed against an Atlantic ally. In short, what was realized was a model of reciprocal information and consultation also between Atlantic and non-EU Countries, and vice versa. A model of interaction meant to prevent any possible overlapping of actions and plans, destined in any case to be implemented on the same strategic space concerning both NATO and the European Union. Since the Atlantic Council in Prague of 21-22 November 2002, the relations between European Union and Atlantic Alliance have at last undergone a slow but progressive re-orientation. This is due not only to a change of Washington and Russia's strategic horizons, but above all to a new European sensitivity that has asserted itself, not without conceptual and practical difficulties, as regards matters of security and defence. As a matter of fact, already since 1999, and

onwards, by recovering the inheritance of the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki, the European Union had had to stand the test of facts. A test that NATO itself had not wanted to avoid, understanding the necessity to support the political effort emphasizing the capabilities that the Union had expressed up to then in the management of a complex political activity. An activity aimed at achieving capabilities for an autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, by means for deciding the employment of such forces and by the possibility to timely use them in order to deal with international crises. Since the outline agreement, the Berlin-Plus accord defined within the Atlantic Council of 1999 and concluded by NATO, the United States and the European Union, almost ten years have elapsed. But if in that phase the strengthening of the European security dimension represented a further underlining of a model of parallel relations, which were meant to continue with the contextual capability of mutual support, at the present time this does not seem to have clearly shaped its contents.

COMMON HORIZONS

After all, the objective was then very clear: to give substance to a prospect of comprehensive security and defence, avoiding duplications and guaranteeing the participation in operations conducted under EU aegis also by non-NATO Countries through transparency, capability of consultation and constant cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic structures. However it should be acknowledged that the experience gained in the first years of the new century has allowed the Union to express an autonomous management capability in terms of organization and conduct of military missions. Operations "Concordia" and "Artemis", for example, represent the first, real taking on of responsibility on the field by the Union, both in a continental environment, as in FYROM, and out of area, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The capability of conducting autonomously law enforcement operations especially in FYROM even before the re-determination, years after, of the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, replaced by the EU operation "Althea", were proof of the possibilities that a European Policy of Security and Defence was not only possible but, in particular, credible in the modalities of conduct and the results to be achieved. As a matter of fact, already at the Atlantic Council of Prague, three results proved to be particularly important. The enlargement of the Atlantic space to seven former communist Countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia represented

“...the experience gained in the first years of the new century has allowed the Union to express an autonomous management capability in terms of organization and conduct of military missions”

the first. The second was the necessity to effectively counter the threats with a new operational capability, based on a common standard of operational and logistic efficiencies. The third, the acceptance of the US proposal to constitute a Rapid Reaction Force, whose deployment would take place in a very short time, and was to have its own support capability. But this was not the end of the Prague spirit. The challenge of an enlargement to the East required new capabilities of the Alliance, including an assessment of the standards necessary to ensure a full interoperability of forces, both in the employment and for logistic support. In this direction, also the constitution of a group of Multinational Forces and of a Rapid Reaction Force gave rise to the need to reshape the military instruments of the Atlantic partners. A progressive reorganization of the forces, trying to homologate organizational lines and operational capabilities so that the same levels of command could be integrated and modulated according to the forces that they were called to deal with. But, even if the organizational terms were fixed considering the possible enlargement, the question of the States of the East was still open. They were probable candidates but, as was the case with Ukraine, they were very near to the Russian umbrella. This was the real NATO–Russia challenge on the completion of the enlargement to the East that would be decided in the future. A worry for the Kremlin, like the attraction of Georgia, Moldavia and Byelorussia towards a West that is gradually expanding with its political and military institutions in the area of the former Soviet Union. Luckily, once more the political sentiment of the reasons of the enlargement, contained in the joint declaration on the war on terrorism, expressed at the EU–Russia Summit of Brussels in November 2002, placed again the Kremlin’s worries within a cooperation framework.

CONCLUSIONS

Up to this day, in the first years of the new century, the parallelism between Atlantic activity and the implementation of PESD by the European Union shows that both the Atlantic defence and PESD, after the entrance of the Atlantic Centre–Eastern partners into the Union, represent the developments of a willingness to proceed to a military integration within a continental political framework. Also the Copenhagen objectives were clear. Actually, the European Council of December 2002 not only demonstrated that the political physiognomy of the Union would soon change, becoming a space of twenty-five Nations, twenty-seven today, but represented the op-

portunity where the hopes of constitutionalizing PESD, inserting it within the Convention project, would be transformed in a new opportunity for continental integration. The European Union, from Copenhagen onwards, would never be what had been in the past. The passage to the East looked and, above all, still looks as a shift of feelings and of political and strategic prospects. A shift whose significance could not be ignored. Majority and consent are today the instruments through which a common political action can be realized, confirming the experiences consolidated by the founding partners and by the new democracies of Eastern Europe. But also diversity and coherence cannot but be the framework within which to set the further challenges concerning security and defence, matters on which the European process cannot afford to get stuck once more.

Giuseppe Romeo
Expert in geostrategy

NOTES

- (1) CFE – Conventional Forces in Europe.
- (2) In this document, the relations between Atlantic Alliance and Russia were defined as being of a “new quality”. Actually, as the document itself indicates, the NATO–Russia Council should have represented an instrument of consultation, of formation of consensus, of cooperation, decision and joint action on a range of matters related to the security of the Euro–Atlantic area. War on terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, anti-missile defence, search and rescue at sea, cooperation among the military, interoperability, NATO–Russia joint training, plans of civil defence, common assessment of the future threats represented only some of the leading aspects of the cooperative formula realized. It is within this framework that, with the European Council of Copenhagen of December of the same year and in view of a widening of the political horizons of the adhesion of the candidate Eastern Countries, the relations of the enlarged European Union and its neighbours will appear of more significant interest.
- (3) The approach of the enlargement of the Union and the practical sense of enhancement of the Atlantic Community have been gradually implemented between 1999 and 2002, wishing to avoid new fracture lines in Europe, promoting stability and prosperity within the borders of the Union. As regards the Balkans, for example, the European Council of Copenhagen of 1993 had already affirmed a similar viewpoint, repropounded at the Summit of Feira, so that the Countries of the Balkan region could be recipients of a political and economic support, to the advantage of their stability, considering the possibility of association with the European Union once the internal institutional dimension had been defined.

“The passage to the East looked and, above all, still looks as a shift of feelings and political and strategic prospects”





GUERRILLA WARFARE, TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRIC WAR

GUERRILLA WARFARE, TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRIC WAR

Today's operational scenarios have dismissed for good the traditional concept of "classic war" and opened a new frontier of strategic thought, where guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetric war entail a radical revision of the Armed Forces' features. This picture shows the complexity of the new requirements, for which it is often necessary to abandon the old doctrinal schemes, but without renouncing the experiences of the past.

Guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetrical warfare are the three terms most commonly used in strategy. It is significant that – at least for the short and medium term – the view of classical warfare as conducted by two opposing governmental forces has declined in importance, with ever more sophisticated armaments, strategies and tactics bearing a close resemblance to those used in Napoleonic warfare. *Mutatis mutandis*, this type of warfare – which could be called "classical" – was revised in the two world wars of the twentieth century, continuing particularly in the Korean War, the Israeli ones in the twentieth century, and the wars of the former Yugoslavia. To give an even more practical example, a great number of similarities exist between the strategy used by the famous Israeli general Dayan and that employed by Napoleon, both aiming at getting decisive results in a limited amount of time, through quick-fire manoeuvres and knowledgeable concentration of forces wherever called for at that particular moment. However, it needs to be said that, were the type of warfare described above to be used now in the relatively limited and heavily populated terrain of Old Europe, it would lead to unbearable damage to both those on the winning side and those on the losing one (which had not been the case up until the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871, but shown to be true to an ever greater degree afterwards).

As things stand, should we then speak of "progress" in the art of war in recent times? Supposing that, at a general level, a form of art

changes rather than progresses, and that strategy and the art of war, as held by Clausewitz, reflect an eternally changeable politico-social reality ("war is chameleon-like"), guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetrical warfare have features raising the number of obstacles put in the path of the way strategy is considered in the West of today (of course, the strategy of those opposing the West is a different matter altogether). To clearly identify the numerous interfaces of these problems, they must be compared, taking into account their most recent manifestations.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Today's guerrillas are as they have always been, able to cause problems for governmental armies for the simple reason that they are constituted and organized above all in order to fight against governmental armies. It is a form of organized warfare with its own strategy and tactics aiming to disrupt the control of the territory held by its adversary, with actions focussing on rapidity and the element of surprise, and at times is used even by sizeable forces. In this form of warfare, the classic concepts of the battle

field, such as those of the front and flanks, 1° and 2° formations, 1° and 2° echelons and backlines lose all meaning. To turn to it are those too weak to wage battle against their enemy openly, forced to exploit any and all vulnerability found in their adversary's system and make

“...guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetric warfare have features raising the number of obstacles put in the path of the way strategy is considered in the West of today”



full use of whatever chance arises to the point of reducing to a minimum – if not wiping out altogether – the effects of their enemy's greater strength and solidity.

The rapid concentration of its forces to unexpectedly attack civilian and military enemies under the eyes of the mass media – with considerably superior strength, even if local and momentary – and an equally rapid dispersion of these forces afterwards, is the way guerrilla forces typically conduct their struggles, avoiding open conflict and steering clear of clear objectives for their enemy. Sophisticated armaments are not required, but instead highly-motivated men and backing by the civilian population, both for logistical needs – relatively reduced, as well – and for informational ones (knowing beforehand the movements and transfers of the enemy is fundamental). Another point in the favour of a guerrilla force is the changeable quantity of its fighters. It starts out with rather limited forces, to then see adherents grow in proportion to the popularity enjoyed by its political cause and even more in relation to its successes. The key element is that there is nothing standing in the way of a peasant, or anyone else, going about his ordinary activities to then become a guerrilla fighter when the situation calls for it, and resuming everyday life again after the action is completed.

Guerrilla warfare could also be called a temporary form of struggle. Either it is crushed in a very short time or – if successful – in a relatively brief lapse of time tends to transform its formations into regular units, as a consequence adopting similar strategies and tactics to those

Title pages.

A patrol of Alpine troops in Afghanistan.

Above.

Hamas guerrillas.

of classical warfare. For example, immediately after the victorious guerrilla warfare conducted against the French, Algeria set up a regular army to all intents and purposes. It is also well known that in Vietnam, when fighting was still underway, Vietnamese fighters were converted into regular forces, first seeing success in the fortified French camp of Dien Bien Phu and, years later, against the well-armed local forces backed by the U.S., by going into Saigon with armoured tanks. By digging a bit deeper into history one also finds that Giuseppe Mazzini and his military mentor (previously Piedmont officer) Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz developed a theory on guerrilla warfare for the simple and explicit reason that they could not count on forces loyal to the monarchy providing for the establishment of a large national army once Italy had been freed from its foreign and home-grown tyrants.

As can be seen, the difficulties – existing for millennia – met with by regular armies having to fight against guerrilla formations are clear. There is only one major type of manoeuvre possible: that of protecting the most sensitive areas with sizeable forces and setting up a mobile force to intervene when the need arises, making use of (especially in this day in age) of a system of fortified bases. The difficulty lies in assessing the best dimension for the two forces,



An Italian AMIS observer in Sudan.

in the organization of an efficient informational service and, above all, in the winning of the hearts of the civilian population, using various methods while keeping in mind that, as said before, guerrilla forces rarely supply satisfactory objectives for aviation, artillery and the greater fire power of our current regular armies. On the contrary, it could be said that the latter – especially those in the West – need impressive but vulnerable logistical machinery, which in turn limits their operative mobility and makes for a prime objective for guerrilla forces, unless an excessive amount of forces are allocated specifically to its protection.

In order to fight guerrilla forces, the English actions in Malaysia in 1948–1960 offer an excellent example – one of the few cases in which forces against the guerrilla came out the winner, even if it took a long time to do so. The latter was based on actions carried out by small, extremely mobile units which focussed on flushing out guerrilla forces in the jungle as well as a series of measures to strengthen information services as well as to gain the backing of the civilian population (even making use of psychological warfare) and preventing guerrilla forces from getting supplies. However, these are all measures requiring time, risk and motivation, and are much easier spoken of than put into practice. And, finally, while for the regular armies involved these wars are usually limited in duration, and, whenever possible, in terms of the area and forces employed,

“The English actions in Malaysia in 1948–1960 offer an excellent example – one of the few cases in which forces against the guerrillas came out the winners”

for the opposing guerrilla forces the operations tend to progressively metamorphose into total war, since their strength consists in getting all the population involved as well as the resources it provides, whatever the different political beliefs may be (hence the success of “national fronts” in the anti-colonialist wars after 1945, which first appeared as wars for national independence, thereby gaining widespread support by the populace).

TERRORISM

Guerrilla warfare is often preceded and accompanied by acts of terrorism. By this term we mean acts of violence by extremely small groups of people (many times isolated individuals), usually limited in their effect, but which take advantage of the element of surprise and of their enemy’s vulnerability. They are aimed at both military and civilian objectives, but focus on having the greatest possible effect on public opinion. Their impact is today aided to an ever greater degree by the rapidity of the mass media: acts of terrorism in countries on the other side of the globe are immediately reported worldwide. It goes without saying that such acts exalt the morale of the political group carrying them out and depress that of the opposing side (something seen especially as concerns western public opinion).

Terrorism has always been an endemic phenomenon. Today, however, there are five factors conditioning it:

- the new importance it has taken on, especially in terms of the media – as can be seen in the case of Iraq – through a close and constant succession of acts of terrorism, with destabilizing effects difficult to control, similar to those produced by guerrilla actions (conducted by more sizeable forces and tending to directly involve the entire population);
- the fundamental role taken on by suicide attackers, abundantly available and suitably “fanaticized” to the point of becoming a new and effective strategic weapon;
- the global importance for the first time assumed by the threat of terrorism, particularly as concerns the violation of the American “sanctuary” on 11 September 2001, with the attack on objectives carefully selected for their status as symbols of American power, a high number of victims (2749 deaths) and the transforma-

tion of flight passengers into bombs directed by pilots on suicide missions – enough to spark a sense of insecurity in all major western nations;

- the extension of terrorism to maritime activities (attack on the U.S. Navy torpedo-boat destroyer “Cole”, with substantial losses and damage);
- greater vulnerability of developed industrial societies, not only due to the involuntary effect and inevitable propaganda by the mass media, but also to the widespread diffusion of such a vulnerable carrier as airplanes are. This results in a situation in which “sensitive” objectives are so numerous that it becomes difficult to keep them under constant surveillance.

The consequence is a generalized feeling of insecurity, in which the difference between the traditional terms “war” and “peace” is ever less apparent, while the latest and most fearful aspect is that of such a close succession of acts of terrorism, to the point of rendering the term “terrorist warfare” legitimate: on in which the first ingredient is no longer that of reserve troops, as in guerrilla forces.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Where exactly does the difference lie between the term “asymmetrical warfare” so much in vogue and those which came before it? It is the synthesis and the broadening of the latter, with a variable character in which guerrilla warfare, terrorism, psychological warfare and propaganda also have a variable weight, unfortunately often to the detriment of the West. While this is not place for an in-depth discussion of the role of Islamic fundamentalism, it is, in any case, necessary to ask oneself the reasons for its diffusion over the last few years. We must also bear in mind that any reference to ancient religious texts must be carried out by starting from the observation that “every analysis must be conducted with critical insight while taking into consideration the context and historical situation and shunning all absolutist deductions, serving as they do to obscure the truth”. Having said this, the experience of the last few years leads to the following conclusions:

- as always, asymmetrical warfare has as its basis a fundamental difference of politico-social values and, one could say, of religious ones. For the West the individual – and therefore also his or her life – is everything, whereas for its enemies of today what is important is not the individual but the cause for which one must fight to the very end and, if necessary, die. This



U.S. soldiers with an “EOD Robot” in Iraq.

is the origin of the abnormal phenomenon of suicide fighters, in contrast with the tendency to avoid losses as much as possible by Western armed forces, to the point of hypothesizing an impossible “war with zero deaths.”

- Western regular forces are bound by humanitarian rules which also concern the local civilian population (“collateral damage” is immediately reported to and condemned by the mass media). Nothing of the sort holds true for the forces opposing the West, which look only at the result and consider human life – their own and that of others – as secondary and expendable;
- the West makes use of volunteer forces for the most part less than numerous, relying heavily on machines and trying to get them to substitute humans as far as possible, whereas for its enemy it is a type of warfare which uses humans as its greatest asset, along with everything that renders technology (the strong point of Western armed forces) of secondary importance;
- the West tries to limit and extinguish the flames of war quickly and once and for all, while its enemy tries to extend them as much as possible both in time and space;
- the West tends to use regular forces and arm local forces friendly to it. In contrast, its ene-

- mies make use of irregular forces with forms of action capable of considerably reducing or entirely cancelling out its inferior strength. This is also the why terrorism is taking on a pre-eminent role, since it does not require – as guerrilla warfare does – total mobilization of the population nor can it be as easily confined;
- in the Iraqi theatre, American forces – in part to reduce to the lowest possible level the use of military forces – have to a significant extent “privatized” certain services, including that of protection. This trend – which resembles the “dynastic” European armies of the XVIII century, which in the XIX century had made inroads in the opposite direction, militarizing all logistical services – marks another fundamental difference compared with the opposite side, which even in this aspect tends to directly involve the populace to an ever greater degree, to the point of making them actual militants and not just civilian “supporters”. To put it in another way, the figure of a long-term professional volunteer, with some of the services contracted out to civilian firms that obviously profit from them, is entirely alien to the opposite side. However, the relative numerical scarcity and high technological content are the two characteristics most likely to increase for the armies of Western societies in future;
 - however, even asymmetrical warfare – as is the case for the guerrilla variety – still demands high levels of forces (difficult to achieve) from western forces for control of the territory, whereas its enemy forces can easily remain “d’elite”, with terrorist attacks carried out by few men armed with relatively rudimentary weapons. The latter are able to achieve striking results, compared with their western counterpart’s difficulty in trying to prevent attacks and defeat terrorist networks once and for all;
 - for the West’s enemies the figure – one could almost say myth – of the Leader is close to the pre-eminent character assigned it by Clausewitz, and often holds both a political role and a military one. The very opposite is true for the West, with political and military roles normally separate and leaders being only part of an all-important whole, as theorized by Clausewitz’s rival Jomini;
 - the West’s enemies make use of a strategy necessarily dominated by a Clausewitz-type anti-dogmatism. The exact opposite occurs in western armies, where the strategy is obliged to

“...guerrilla warfare and terrorism cannot be considered asymmetric warfare, but they are its main manifestations in a violent form ”

be more predictable and is affected by ever more stringent restrictions, planning needs and inter-force and inter-alliance coordination.

In conclusion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism cannot be considered asymmetrical warfare, but they are its main manifestations in a violent form. Putting aside such manifestations, the one to come out as victor is whoever, by way of well-organized psychological warfare, manages to gain the favour of the civilian population, condition sine qua non for achieving political and military objectives. This is once again an arduous affair for western forces, called upon as they are to provide clear proof of the advantages of the politico-social system they are representing in a short time. It is a matter of providing security to the daily lives of the populace while respecting their traditions. It is a matter of developing the local economy – including by way of humanitarian interventions – in order to prevent creating pockets of unemployment and poverty, ideal terrain for anti-western propaganda and for recruitment into the rank and file of terrorist organizations.

The time has come to provide more specific information. As shown by the Iraqi war – and to a

certain extent also the Afghan one – asymmetrical warfare is not the continuation of a real war between two regular armies, where regular local forces (when they exist) are defeated on the open field by western forces of a much higher quality. The war of today is – as will most likely also be true for the one of the

future – asymmetrical warfare, which therefore requires a certain amount of revision of the face worn by the Armed Forces. It cannot be said or stressed enough that the top priority must be the attempt to increase individual and collective protection, and not the strength of weapons or armoured tanks, as had always before been the case. Protective gear for the individual must once again be focused on, as well as transport and combat vehicles better able to withstand the explosion of simple and traditional weapons, such as mines and/or TNT, in such a way to prevent their explosion from being lethal, and reactivity inside and the visibility around these vehicles need to be increased. For air-borne forces, it seems clear that there is a need for aircraft and procedures suitable for close intervention to aid ground forces, with less relevancy given to prohibited objectives. As concerns naval forces, hulls need to be strengthened and – especially but not only for small marines – sea craft and



Two Italian rangers on patrol in an Afghan village.

procedures need to be adapted to the demands of asymmetrical warfare.

It is clear from this initial overview that the latest challenges to be dealt with are complex, and that frequently doctrinal patterns must be done away with, without discarding past experience. In any case, it cannot be denied that asymmetrical warfare –despite technological progress – decreases and does not increase the possibility to replace man with machines, and therefore is even more confirmation that a good infantry is required, including special infantry forces. The situation as it stands must dictate choices and impose empirical solutions, perhaps having little in common with doctrinal solutions and governing principles which were only appropriate in Cold War times. However – and herein lies yet one more difficulty – the armed forces of major western countries obviously cannot abandon the search for doctrines and extremely costly vehicles which were effective most especially in times of classical warfare.

The result is that asymmetrical warfare, beyond its taking-up again of other forms of armed conflict, requires that use be made of other types of warfare while at the same time tending to replace them (such as psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare). It bears a number of similarities with guerrilla and counter-guerrilla conflict, both because it requires the discarding of many patterns and themes more

adapted to classical warfare and because, in both cases, what is really at stake is the winning of the support by the local populace – objectives which require of western forces both a highly efficient informational system and well-conducted psychological warfare, alongside substantial economic measures. On the other hand, in contrast with guerrilla warfare, the asymmetrical type uses western military forces that are necessarily reduced in number and requires a strong ability to respond globally – both in civilian and military terms – to the threat of terrorism, in order to prevent it from spreading. Even measures to avoid losses as much as possible and minimize “collateral damage” have no counterpart in counter-guerrilla operations, which in the past took on conspicuous strategic dimensions typical of the Vietnam war, in which American land forces numbered 500,000 men (with 50,000 dying on the battlefield) and an impressive deployment of helicopters, other aircraft and artillery, which in the end were seen to be insufficient at a military level, resulting in a failure to reach the political goals set.

And finally, it must be asked to what extent in asymmetrical warfare the West should apply a Napoleonic strategy (of the Clausewitz or, if you prefer, Jomini type), with the aim of rapidly de-



AMIS observers speaking to a group of militiamen.

feating the opposing forces with a few, well-targeted strikes, or rather an “indirect” strategy closer to the ancient principles of Su Zhu. The answer is less immediate and simple than what it might seem at first, not only because the new strategy does not fit into a preformed theoretical framework, but also because the new situation seen in warfare must be taken into account. Above all, consideration must be given to the fact that between a good “classical” (or direct) strategy and an indirect one there is a great deal of common ground. In other words, we must not confuse “classical” strategy with some of its regrettable manifestations, most especially (though not limited to) the First World War, in which it took on the brutal and self-mutilatory aspect of a war of attrition, in which the victory was to be had simply by whosoever was able to get more men, cannons and munitions onto the field than his opponent, with extremely high losses corresponding to the smallest result gained with the greatest amount of effort. This was not the real strategy, not that of the great leaders of antiquity or Napoleon. The real strategy instead aimed at getting the maximum result with the least amount of effort, attempting to strike the

“Napoleon ...used to say... that one should never do as one's enemy would like or fight on the field the latter has chosen...”

adversary's weak point while catching him off guard (Caporetto in 1917, for example), with rapid and unified manoeuvres.

The essence of the indirect strategy is gaining victory by shifting the fulcrum of the struggle waged by the armed forces – especially as concerns ground forces – to the psychological, economic, and politico-diplomatic fields. Therefore, use is to be made of weapons only when rendered

absolutely necessary, only against worthwhile objectives and when positive effects are to be gained for both friends and enemies. Also, attacks should be made on little-protected peripheral objectives and not on the enemy's centre of gravity. In addition, every possible effort should be made

to substitute the actual use of armies – and in particular ground forces. This should be done beginning with the above mentioned diplomatic, economic-financial, psychological and propagandistic influences, to then use military forces (the navy and aviation) for dissuasive ends to crush the moral resistance of the adversary without needing to resort to massive land forces.

This strategy – in no way new, since it was what made it possible for England to dominate the world scene from the Napoleonic wars up to the Second World War, with a large-scale fleet but reduced land forces – would at an overall level be clearly adapted to asymmetrical warfare. In the 1920s, Liddell Hart backed its validity against the Clausewitz-type warfare, which he roughly identified with the bloody and expensive trench warfare. However, it should be taken into consideration that the West meets with sizeable difficulties in applying it, for three main reasons:

- air and missile forces even in the most industrialized nations have never met with the rapid, decisive results hoped for by Liddell Hart and, even before him, by the Italian Giulio Douhet (2);
- as previously noted, their effectiveness is even further reduced in current asymmetrical warfare, which rarely allow their enemies satisfactory targets;
- given the technological superiority and fire power of its forces, the West will always find it convenient to resort to blitzkrieg (rapid and decisive actions against the opposing forces), though the latter has been found in the most recent conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq) insufficient for definitive stabilization.

Even this direction leads to the discovery that *historia non facit saltus*. Managing to strike by surprise and at the enemy's weak point with the necessary superiority of forces with rapid operations and flexible systems, making the most of one's advantages and reducing one's disadvantages to the least possible have always been good rules to follow in warfare. Napoleon himself, who in the eyes of some revolutionized the art of war, used to say that war should be waged while taking into consideration the principles used by the great captains of the past, and that one should never do as one's enemy would like or fight on the field the latter has chosen, and that at all times one must ask what action should be taken in the case of an unexpected enemy attack. There has never been anyone like him who knew how to adapt theories and doctrines to the actual situation as it stood at the time: this is what must be done today, since what is important is success (Clausewitz). It is no coincidence that even general Giap, victor in Vietnam of one of the most accredited European armies, had studied Napoleon.

The current situation as concerns strategy therefore includes new elements, but also others of continuance with the past. What is most important, as well as most difficult, is the ability to take both into account within a changeable and never rigidly-defined synthesis – and one in



A VCC "Dardo" in Iraq.

which one must never lament the (supposed) certainties of the past. And this because there have always been surprise strategies and tactics resulting in decisive strategic turning points.

Ferruccio Botti
Colonel (ret.)

NOTES

(1) The art of organization and defence of encampments is still important; in the XVIII Century it was known as castramentation and considered by some writers as a part of the art of war.

(2) Italian Army general, supporter from 1919 of the pre-eminence of the Air Force employed in mass, not against the enemy forces but against demographic and industrial centres, in order to bring about, within the space of only a few days decisive results, thus preventing the type of bloody and costly trench warfare which had recently been seen.



FORCE PROTECTION

FORCE PROTECTION

Force Protection has always been considered by the regular Armies a necessary prerequisite for successful operations.

It is a basic military principle, acknowledged by all Services, which envisages for all units, including Headquarters, an appropriate self-defence capability against the effects of hostile actions.

This aspect has been acquiring a growing value since the appearance of modern terrorism, with the attacks against the American and French contingents in Beirut in October 1983, and a constantly evolving threat, increasingly aggressive and unforeseeable.

This has led to attribute a primary interest to the protection of soldiers, since they are the most exposed to the tactics adopted by the enemy who, by exploiting every perceived weakness in the deployment, aims at striking at any moment and in any circumstance, in order to create a climate of general insecurity.

The problem has become the subject of in-depth studies aimed at realizing a specific «doctrine» and working out consequent organizational and executive provisions, which assume in fact the value of an operational function called «Force Protection» (FP).

Moreover, the need to stress this aspect in non-conventional conflicts is not something new: during WWII, for example, the Wehrmacht, in developing the doctrine employed in anti-partisan warfare, attached great importance to force protection, although it was not certainly a priority in the context of a conflict of such dramatic dimensions and combat ferocity.

Within NATO, Force Protection - FP - is defined (pub. AAP-6/2006) a «body of measures and means for reducing to a minimum the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations vis-à-vis any threat and circumstance, in order to preserve the freedom of action and the operational efficiency of the forces».

The dictionary of military terms of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) (ed. 2006.) defines «Force Protection» as «Preventive measures adopted to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (including the components of the respective families), resources, infrastructure and critical information. Force Protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or to protect from accidents, atmospheric events or diseases».

Along the time, the FP concept has widened as far as including any situation that may concern the security in operations, progressively widening the

field of application as far as comprising aspects not directly connected with the enemy initiatives, such as sanitary measures (vaccine prophylaxis, personal hygiene, precautions against contagious diseases, etc), the soldiers' physical condition, the quality of food and water, or the aspects connected with the environmental and climatic characteristics of the scenarios of employment.

A VERY MUCH FELT NEED

It is a national commitment, even within contingents with a multinational leadership. Commanders at various levels have the institutional responsibility and the moral duty to do their best to put into practice every action deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the forces under their command.

Although Force Protection is not a resolute element of the operations, it is nevertheless a fundamental component that helps to outline a frame of reference within which the units can operate, preserving their freedom of action.

It is a factor that must be considered in every operational planning: inadequate measures can lead the mission to failure.

In short, the soldier's security must be the subject of accurate evaluation of the proportionality ratio of the mobility, firepower and protection factors, which should permit to exploit the ground as best as possible, in order to increase the effectiveness of one's weapons and reduce the effects of the enemy ones.

It is a need very much felt in the western ambit,

“It is a national commitment, even within contingents with a multinational leadership”



both for its emotional effects that possible losses cause within national public opinions and in order to limit the risks for the military as regards their moral determination, especially due to makeshift or rudimentary weapons.

The problem of the endurableness of the losses can, in fact, induce the community to refuse to share the mission's objectives, to the point of assuming an attitude of radical opposition.

The men (and women) themselves, constantly exposed to the attacks of guerrilla warfare, need clear signs that their primary needs of individual security are met. Otherwise, the consequence would be a diffusion of passive feelings, which undermine the combat spirit, and the perception of being considered relatively «cheap» operational tools.

Nevertheless, overemphasizing the measures of Force Protection should not induce to isolate the units from the population. The Commanders should have the ability to balance safety with operativeness, deciding the appropriate level of the measures to be applied.

Such decisions will have to take into account the parameters connected with the fulfilment of the mission (enemy, environmental conditions, civil-

Title pages.

Emplacement of a heavy 12.7mm cal. «Browning» HMG. «Hesco Bastions» are also visible.

Above.

A convoy of «Puma» armoured vehicles.

ians' attitude, etc.) and the level and type of the mission.

This necessity associates command competences with technical knowledge and with the adoption of standardized criteria applicable down to the lowest tactical levels, which concern:

- definition of appropriate procedures;
- carrying out specific training before the introduction of the forces in the theatre;
- adoption of suitable equipments.

But FP has also repercussions on the personnel's training, on the qualification of cadres and the military culture of each Service.

ADOPTABLE MEASURES

Force Protection includes a wide range of provisions constituted by procedures by now consoli-

PRINCIPLES OF FORCE PROTECTION

FP concerns a wide range of integrated provisions for security, defence and protection aimed at ensuring an acceptable level of risk for the troops. The ensuing measures must be flexible and able to respond to a quick change in the threat.

FP is a responsibility of the Command and of every soldier, regardless of rank, unit or Service.

Every soldier is a «sensor»: if he is not directly engaged in operations he is in any case engaged in FP.

Every Commander must act in such a way as to lay a due emphasis in informing his men about the importance of FP.

Every Commander must know the types of threat he has to face up to, in order to employ the most suitable means to confront it: without such knowledge, the response could result inappropriate.

No activity in an operations area must be considered routine.

The most effective measures are preventive, not reactive.

dated along the years, and another series that derive from the enemy procedures of action (TTP – Techniques, Tactics and Procedures), the knowledge of which permits to identify the potential risks and assess one's own vulnerabilities, in order to define the correct countermeasures. Such evaluation, which whenever possible should be conducted in the predeployment phase, assists the Commanders in orienting the training and defining the necessary security for personnel, materials and equipment.

The experiences made, and the consequent lessons learned, are some of the most effective means for supporting the Commanders in this decisional process. They must be diffused with extreme rapidity down to the minimal tactical levels, so that they may keep their validity and, at the same time, sent to the highest command levels, to let them intervene with the suitable adjustments in the organizational, training and technologic fields.

On the other hand, the system, in order to be valid, requires a continuous appraisal of the enemy TTPs, because the adversary is in a position to modify his procedures very frequently.

Every attack must be studied in its characteristics, and the advice of the military involved should also be sought, in order to be able to reconstruct the modalities.

Intelligence is one of the most effective means of supporting the decisions and allowing the personnel to receive the updated indications about the risks almost in real time.

The adversaries' ability to move from one theatre to another (for example, from Iraq to Afghanistan and vice versa), to observe, participate in the attacks and learn to strike, requires a study of the threat with a global vision of its development.

Such situation has made the IEDs (Improvised

Explosive Devices) the main «weapon» employed in Iraq by the insurgents for their high cost/effectiveness ratio and the consequent great propagandistic effect on the media and, in the past years, fostered their diffusion also in Afghanistan (during the war against the Soviet Union and in the first years of international presence this employment was accidental and had a scarce efficacy), even if the Afghans have not yet acquired the same capabilities and accuracy.

The FP measures can be of a defensive or offensive nature and have a codified form linked to the provisions to be put into practice, which should envisage clear indications of the actions to be carried out by each soldier/unit in the operations area, or consist of behaviours – either suggested by experience or the fruit of lessons learned – to be followed, such as the adoption of a «low profile» in movements or avoidance of non-necessary activities/journeys (1).

The «defensive measures» are aimed at providing an adequate preparation to the forces to confront the situation in the theatre, through a sequence of initiatives taken preventively in the phase of preparation or initial deployment. In their turn they can be «passive», if they are intended to deny or reduce the effects of hostile acts by making their consequences more bearable (personnel training/indoctrination, acquisition of appropriate assets and equipment, choice and fortification of infrastructure/cantonments) or «active», if they ensure protection against risks perceived or present (choice of different times and itineraries, avoiding areas considered risky).

The latter can also serve to deny or nullify an adversary action at the moment it is carried out (patrolling and surveillance of sensitive objectives, employment of means and equipment that are not familiar to the enemy formations operating in the area, etc.).

Among the above measures there is also the possibility to avoid the differentiation in the uniforms among units and among soldiers in the various ranks, which that can offer selected targets, owing to the proved skill that the hostile forces have in monitoring the contingents and hitting the elements/assets most significant from the operational and media viewpoint (Commanders, radio operators, air fire controller/FACs, etc.).

«At the beginning of the Russian-Afghan conflict (1979–1989), for example, the losses among the Soviet Officers were very high, because they wore field uniforms different from those of the soldiers. As a consequence, identical uniforms were handed out to all personnel and low-visibility stripes and badges were employed.

Moreover, an exclusively national polychromatic scheme permits to keep one's identity also in a

multinational environment and be distinguished from the other contingents.

On the contrary, the «offensive» measures are aimed at neutralizing hostile elements before they can conduct attacks against friendly forces (acquisition of information about the adversary, concealed observation of stretches of itineraries believed sensitive and/or high risk, remote-control neutralization of suspicious objects or things considered possible explosive traps).

An aspect that has rightly entered among the FP provisions is health. Today's scenarios of employment are often characterized by endemic and epidemic diseases that can debilitate the units with a significant impact on the conduct of military activities and, consequently, jeopardize the success of the mission.

The difficult hygienic-environmental conditions in which the Russian soldiers operated in Afghanistan, for example, together with scarce preventive sanitary measures, caused the «neutralization» of a high number of men, influencing also the operations of whole units.

From one fourth to one third of the force of a single unit were often sick with hepatitis, typhus, malaria, amoebic dysentery and meningitis. From October to November 1981, the entire 5th Motorized Division was «knocked out», due to more than 3000 cases of hepatitis(2).

The food supplies should be adequate to the environmental conditions of the Operations Area, avoiding an excessive handling of the foodstuff and the exposure to the dust normally present in the air, using precooked food and packed rations. The «Italian diet», if on the one side is more liked, on the other, for the mentioned reasons, may have negative effects on the health conditions.

PROCEDURES

The application of FP measures is implemented with suitable TTPs, which establish standard and detailed methods that all military must apply in order to confront a threat. These procedures must be logical, flexible and easily applicable, also in conditions of extreme stress, as well as be able to respond to a rapid modification of the situation.

The enemy can detect any technique employed for a long period, with direct consequences on its effectiveness: in fact, the first indication that a tactic has lost its validity is the success of an enemy attack.

Even today, from the videos of IED attacks that appear on various sites (www.ogrish.com; www.military.com; etc.) one can notice that the success of a hostile act is often due to the scarce attention of the military involved.



A rifle platoon embarking on a «Chinook» CH-47.

Commands and units must be able to understand the picture of the local situation and the intentions of the adversary, in order to establish a priority in risks, pointing out the prevailing one.

For example, from the results of an American study, in Iraq most IED ambushes to American convoys could have been avoided if the procedures envisaged for that moment had been properly applied.

On the contrary, the columns where the personnel show an attentive and aggressive attitude, capable of inflicting losses, are normally less attacked than the better protected or more «armoured» ones.

PERSONNEL TRAINING

The FP measures should be matter of specific training already from the preparation phase before their introduction, emphasizing their importance also during the illustration of the RoE, as well as of a constant action at all levels on the importance of their correct knowledge, in order to avoid a «fall of attention» during the mission.



A night fire intervention of 120mm mortars supported by Bengal light.

The activity must not be limited to those charged with garrisoning/defending the installations or the convoys, but concern all personnel, regardless of their main task, and must be aimed at the threats that have looked more insidious and frequent (an untrained soldier is surely a «burden», because he does not react like his colleagues).

As a matter of fact, guerrilla warfare manages to distinguish its targets: the forces that are apparently not well organized or not ready to react are the most likely to be attacked by a «patient» aggressor, capable of waiting and hitting where it finds «weak points» or those who appear less vigilant and alert.

In the 2nd Gulf War (2003) the traditional set-up of the marines, for which «every man is a rifle-man», has turned out to be more suitable than that of the US Army, where each man is a specialist in his own sector.

In the first phases of the war in Iraq, on March 24, 2003, an American supply convoy of the 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company, fell into an ambush near the town of Nassiriya after taking a wrong way (map reading and use of GPS) and suffered notable losses, also because of the scarce reaction capabilities of the soldiers (incident known for the vicissitudes linked with the liberation of Private First Class Jessica

Lynch, wounded and taken prisoner by the Iraqis).

The personnel, at all levels, must also develop an «observer's mentality», which accustoms him to appreciate every different element and detail in the area where he moves and compare it to a previous situation in the same zone. Up to now, in fact, the best system for detecting IEDs, often astutely hidden on the roadsides, remains as always the soldier, prepared, aware and ready to react.

At present, a particular attention must be paid to the ambushes with IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), employed in different ways (Suicide IEDs, Remote Control IEDs, Pressure Plate IEDs, etc.) with which the insurgents avoid the losses that they would suffer in a direct clash, where the western military usually prevail, thanks to their better training and equipment.

The insurgents, with the IEDs, have perfected a new type of war, owing to which a large part of the conventional Armies have become vulnerable.

These are actions that can no more be considered as simple criminal acts of a terrorist nature, on the contrary they assume the features of real military tactics, with a high cost/effectiveness ratio and a consequent big media and propaganda effect.

In Iraq, for example, the attacks with IEDs have doubled from 2006 to 2007, up to a number of 1200 a month, causing 70% of the American losses.

Another tactic that is more and more widespread, and which we should be prepared to confront, are the abductions of personnel working for the missions, with the aim of weakening the solidarity of the alliances/coalitions.

By kidnapping a soldier (but also any member of the various international organizations on the spot) the insurgents want to force the Nation that has sent him to withdraw its forces from the operational theatre concerned.

THE EQUIPMENT

The nature of the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that the main targets of the insurgents are the single man and the vehicles, underlining unmistakably how necessary it is to find new solutions in order to respond to the changed realities, which are so very different from the past ones.

In both theatres, in fact, the most significant activities are patrolling, reconnaissance and convoys, besides combat in spaces limited (like urban environments), or difficult due to ground conditions.

Every effort is therefore focused on making the soldier safer, by increasing his protection, both as

AN EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION OF FP MEASURES

The US Armed Forces have defined a sequence of arrangements for increasing the security of their bases in Iraq and Afghanistan against the threats due to indirect fire and/or VBIEDS (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices).

In order to protect them from mortar and rocket fire, the critical assets, such as Command Posts, operational centres, encampments, meeting places, etc., must be surrounded by embankments, brick/cement walls or hesco bastion barriers. Where possible it is recommended the employment of masonry buildings with reinforced concrete ceilings. The quartering areas and the areas for the daily activities must be sparsely spread inside the camps, envisaging in their vicinity the construction of protected shelters for the personnel.

In case of possible VBIED attacks the provisions envisage a passive system of defence, based in depth on embankments and barriers spaced out on several levels, supplemented by personnel charged with ensuring protection through observation and fire. This system must be located at a sufficient distance from the most sensitive targets, in order to avoid that the explosion of a suicide vehicle, stopped by the first level of defence, may in any case involve the personnel and the equipment of the base.

The forces present at the base must be integrated within the defence plan of the installation. Each unit must supply personnel and weapons to garrison the perimeter or be part of the QRF (Quick Reaction Force).

The defence plans must be verified with periodical exercises, to make sure that every soldier knows his tasks and responsibilities.

regards individuals (i.e. bullet-proof jackets) and vehicles.

To this, one should add a more and more sophisticated «combat» medicine, which can intervene with increased effectiveness (in Iraq, for example, the proportion of wounded American soldiers compared to the fallen is 8 to 1, with a survival rate much higher than that of the earlier conflicts. Moreover, 70% of the wounded go back to service within 3 days).

Yet, the personal equipment must not weigh excessively on the soldier, impairing his possibilities of reaction and sometimes exposing him to risks greater than the advantages obtained.

In substance, it is the problem faced in every epoch: to find the best protection and ensure at the same time a minimum comfort at reasonable costs.

Instead, the protection of the vehicles must concern the combat and the logistic ones (in Iraq the convoys employed to support the large bases of the Coalition are the most exposed to the attacks of the guerrillas, for which one must continuously find solutions proportionate to the adversary TTPs).

TRAINING

Training prepares the military, at individual and collective level, to carry out the foreseeable

tasks. If events occur that cannot be foreseen, one must have recourse to the rational capabilities developed during the training phase. This is a more than ever fundamental aspect in operations that are characterized by unpredictability and uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.

It requires minds that not only must be able to deal with the situation, but must also be endowed with flexibility, analytical rigour and objective investigation capability, as well as observation/exchange of other people's experiences, so as to be able to work out new concepts and bring in the suitable innovations.

This requires common sense and maturity of the Commanders, fruit of experience and knowledge of lessons learned, because, as General Westmoreland used to say «There is no book that can tell us how to accomplish the task».

For example, the containers called «hesco bastions» (3), widely employed for protecting the installations of the multinational forces, must be filled with inert materials (such as sand or earth), avoiding in any case rocks or stones, which could turn into splinters if hit (4).

A further aspect to be considered, which has finally prevailed in the collective imagination, is the identification that has led to call the serviceman «peace soldier».

To speak of «peace soldier» (or peace mission) is reductive and also dangerous, for it can produce in the fighter mental conditionings and wrong convictions about the reality of the mission and affect the level of attention that must be given to operational activities, altering moreover the degree of perception of the threat.

The soldier continues to be what he has always been, and keeps his traditional function, which appeals to the use of force to impose a will, to prevent – if necessary – tensions from re-igniting and to realize security bases for a gradual restoration of normal life conditions.

To call a man «peace soldier» means, in other terms, neither to underline or emphasize the humanitarian behaviours, nor to give him the credit for contributing to the attainment of stability, which is the political objective of a multinational operation, accepting at the same time the military operational modalities, including conflict, which he must put into action.

PREPARATION OF THE CADRES

As is known, the nature of the present operations implies a significant responsibility for the y-



Construction of the external perimeter of an operational base.

young Commanders, Officers and NCOs, who have to make decisions traditionally considered pertaining to much higher hierarchical levels.

As a matter of fact, the activities carried out daily on the field by the minor units represent the keys of success, with inevitable implications also at strategic level.

All personnel employed must always keep an attentive and balanced behaviour: a mistake in the assessment or an exaggerated response could spark off reactions with unpredictable consequences, and be suitably amplified and manipulated for the pervasive presence of the media in the operations area.

In a more and more global world, where the public perception is so essential, the decision made by a young NCO not only does it influence the activity of the patrol or the opinions of the population present on a road, but its effect can change dramatically the picture of the situation of an entire mission.

A soldier, today, must be able to manage borderline situations, conducting, at the same time and if necessary, resolute and strong actions. This entails the attainment of considerable self-control as a normal fact, without risking professional frustration.

The US military have coined the term «strategic corporals» to stress the absolute necessity of providing the young cadres with an adequate preparation, certainly superior to what was required by their young colleagues engaged in previous conventional operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The soldier's survival is a more and more vital aspect of operations, the subject of maximum attention by all Armies, which has become a requirement being continuously developed in order to adjust promptly to a threat made more lethal by the adversary TTPs.

This necessity has required a deep change in the equipment/resources, an increase in the preparation's quality of Commanders and Staff, as well as a targeted training of the units.

Nevertheless, «Force Protection» must not be considered the ultimate goal of the operational decisions: if this were true, it could clearly limit the actual troops' capacity on the field and the control of the field itself.

The FP measures must be able to minimize the risks, but it is unlikely that they will eliminate them completely, since they have to face an independent variable of the operational scenarios: the adversary's will.

Losses are actually an implicit reality of military operations, precisely like the destruction and damaging of materials and equipments.

To believe that such effects can be excluded appears to be a rather unrealistic expectation, which, on the other hand, can imply a negative impact on the performance of the task, and influence and/or jeopardize the decisions on the political and military plane when there are negative events among one's own forces.

Prearrangements, besides protecting the forces, should facilitate the mission, achieving a reasonable «compromise» between the risks that can be accepted and the «imperatives» of the operation.

In this connection General Rupert Smith (5), in a recent book, states: «The wish to

protect the soldier so as to keep up his morale, ..., often alienates him from the population. He appears with his helmet, bullet-proof jacket and armed, among the crowd or on his armoured vehicle on the roads. His attitude on patrol is threatening. His bases are heavily fortified and often placed in such a way as to be isolated from the population».

“ The Cadres must encourage innovation in the field of force protection and develop a specific culture in the sector ”

If the purpose of a counterinsurgency campaign is to acquire the support of the people in areas not yet completely stabilized, and assure their protection, an excessive emphasis on a FP policy risks to exclude the daily interaction with the civilian settlements, thwarting the very objectives of the operation, giving a negative picture of the «forces of occupation».

The contact with the population and the intervention in favour of the local communities are actually the most effective measures that help to create a climate of trust to the troops' advantage.

To neutralize an IED by means of technology is not risolutive. The adversaries will always be able to plan other devices more sophisticated and lethal. On the contrary, the keystone for gaining the upper hand is to obtain the support of the local people.

For its application, FP should not require an increase in forces vis-à-vis those assigned for the discharge of the duty, but must presuppose the optimization of the capabilities of the assets allocated.

For example, in the defensive organization of a FOB (Forward Operation Base) all the forces present must be inserted in the plan of defence of the installation and each unit must supply assets and personnel to guard the perimeter or belong to the QRF (Quick Reaction Force).

The Cadres must encourage innovation in the field of force protection and develop a specific culture in the sector. For example, the «physical measures» to be realized for protecting a base should not be limited to facing the risks of the moment, but they require a progressive improvement, in order to adjust the defences to the maximum threat assumable in the theatre.

To protect the forces must be a «way of thinking» that goes well beyond a prompt and correct application of passive/active measures, and entails the necessary cultural linguistic and historical knowledge, which permit to interrelate with the populations in an effective way.

The «technological presumption» that characterizes the current military thought, can support FP but not replace the forces in the discharge of their duty. For example, sensors and visual devices permit to cut the number of the personnel employed in fixed posts and employ them more conveniently in mobile activities.

The best equipment and protective materials do not reduce – per se – the number and the lethality of the attacks from adversaries determined to hit, who can study the innovations introduced and, in a short time, adopt the suitable countermeasures.

Technology and the new materials are some of the most important «ingredients» of FP, but

they are not the solution of the problem, although they remain the elements of support of the human dimension, which continues to be the leading factor, where man is the most employed, flexible and essential «weapon system» available.

Nevertheless, the pursuit of protection at any cost could create a dangerous defensive syndrome, with heavy reflections on the combat capabilities of the soldier, which are necessary for keeping the initiative: the problem is to provide the highest level of protection compatible with the mobility of the personnel.

If the will of the adversary is to strike, the FP measures will never be sufficient to eliminate the risks completely. These provisions are a support to man who remains, and will remain in the future, the dominant factor of the land military operations.

Giorgio Battisti
Major General,
Deputy Commander,
Alpine Troops

NOTES

(1) On May 19, 2007 three soldiers of the German contingent were killed in Afghanistan by a suicide attacker who blew himself up in a bazaar at Kunduz, where the military had gone on foot, departing from the itinerary of the patrol. «German troops die in Afghanistan» – «B-BC News».

(2) About 415,930 (more than 73% of the entire force, 650,000 men, engaged in 10 years of fighting) were victims of diseases that forced them to be hospitalised: among them, 115,000 for infectious hepatitis and 31,080 for typhoid fever. «Medical Support in a Counter-guerilla War: Epidemiological Lessons Learned in the Soviet-Afghan War». US Army Medical Department Journal, May-June 1995.

(3) Felt baskets of different sizes, which take their name from the firm that produces them. They consist of a metal net framework filled with inert materials (sand or earth) that by now distinguish all bases of the multinational forces.

(4) Publication no 6712/2005 of the Italian Army, «Handbook for the protection of the infrastructure and military bases within peace support operations», gives ample instructions about the measures that can guarantee the security of the Italian installations in «out of area» operations.

(5) General Sir Rupert Smith has been Commander of the British Armoured Division during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and of the UN Forces in Bosnia in 1995. In the period 1996-1998 he has been General Commanding Officer in North Ireland and NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.



AN OBSERVATORY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

AN OBSERVATORY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

An interesting meeting on National Security was recently held at Palazzo Salviati, the prestigious home of the Centre for High Defence Studies. In particular, the numerous and qualified speakers dwelt on three very important aspects: trans-border security, urban security and sensitive infrastructure.

The Military Centre for Strategic Studies, Finmeccanica, the University and other organizations launched an ambitious project, within which the National Security Observatory was founded. It aims to acquire a deep knowledge of how to strengthen security and of how to handle crises efficiently.

The first meeting of the NSO was held in October at the Defence High Studies Centre. Lieutenant General Giuseppe Valotto, President of the Defence High Studies Centre, Under-secretary of Defence Lorenzo Forcieri made the opening speech. The discussion centred on borders, cities and critical infrastructure. In particular, it focused on three key points: cross-border security, urban security and critical infrastructure.

Giuseppe Carrella, executive director of Railway Tele Systems, introduced the first issue, putting the emphasis on the marginal importance given to the work of security personnel. When a terrorist attack is thwarted, the mass media give a limited coverage to the event. On the contrary, when a negative event happens, they point the finger at the inefficiency of the security system. In fact, «invisibility» is a key word of the first debate: when everything works, nobody knows about it; when something does not work, everything seems inefficient. Basically, we feel safe when we are not aware of security measures. Actually, we should give great importance to the work that is done to defend our frontiers from any kinds of threat without reducing our freedom of movement.

Andrea Fazioli, a Captain of the Italian Navy, talked about «maritime Security and freedom of movement: the integrated surveillance of the maritime area», focusing his attention on the

importance of the maritime environment. About 65% of the energy resources that are EU-bound pass through the Mediterranean Sea. There will be an increase of container traffic of 75% by 2015. It is necessary to adopt defensive measures that must be effective but not invasive in order not to restrict the global economic freedom. There are lots of threats: piracy, terrorism, transport of toxic substances and of weapons of mass destruction. It is essential to collaborate closely with the other NATO Forces on the Mediterranean to plan effective strategies. For its geographical position and its 8000 km of coasts, Italy could become the ideal logistical platform with regard to the trade «from and to» the Continent. The Navy has the essential function of «integrated surveillance» and of «projec-

tion of skills to the sea and from the sea», through an activity of monitoring of areas of national interest in collaboration with the Navies that operate in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the Navy has launched an important project, which is called «Virtual

Regional Maritime Traffic Centre» (V-RMTC), which is an information system that allows them to exchange data about mercantile traffic that are input by the Navies of each member country in order to share the representation of the navy in the Mediterranean. The Head of the Operations Centre of the General Command of the Guardia di Finanza, Francesco Saverio Manozzi, discussed the problem concerning the role of the Guardia di Finanza in the security of goods traffic, highlighting the importance of the cooperation between customs Police Forces. The analysis of risks is an essential activity in the monitoring of customs operations and is done by different tools. The project (Container Secu-

“...when a negative event happens, everybody points his finger at the inefficiency of the security system”

**Title pages.**

The numerous participants in the meeting.

Above.

Rome. Palazzo Salviati, home of the CASD.

rity Initiative) was started after the tragic events of September 11th to prevent materials that are used to carry out terrorist attacks from entering the American territory. Italy cooperates with the American organism through the institution of «integrated Offices of analysis of risks» on export goods in the ports of Genoa, La Spezia, Naples, Leghorn and Gioia Tauro, which assess «all the information about individuals that are involved in the shipment to the United States». The shipment that is considered risky is subject to thorough Customs inspection and then data that are collected by the Corps and by the Italian Customs are examined. In particular, they pay attention to the typology of goods that are exported and imported, to the typology of goods that are exported to the United States, to the flow of containers, to the methods of naval transport, to the typology of containers. In addition, information about those who export goods to the United States is gathered.

In future, the Customs Information System (S.I.D.) will turn out to be a useful instrument for the cooperation between the customs Ad-

ministrations of the member countries. In fact, a query to the system through a linked terminal will allow them to know in real time all «warnings of risk» that are issued by all customs authorities of the member countries. The Commission has already implemented the Customs Information System. The Guardia di Finanza is regarded as a «relevant authority», together with the Customs Department to access the data bank S.I.D. that will make a rapid exchange of information between the member countries possible even in the case of serious violations of national regulations (drug smuggling, money-laundering and paedophilia).

Ranieri Razzante, Professor at the University of Macerata, has examined the delicate problem about money-laundering and its links with terrorism. money-laundering is regarded as a «worldwide problem» because terrorist attacks cannot be carried out without it. For this reason it is so dangerous. It is extremely difficult to eradicate it since it is performed by the so-called «white collars», who are difficult to identify because they are above suspicion. Security in the capital flows is essential for terrorism and crime prevention.

International rules and other tools make the tracing of the capital from its origin to its destination possible. However, they do not have to limit themselves to introducing controls on «big

THE DEFENCE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE

INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR MICHELE NONES

Michele Nones is a member of the management and executive Committee of the International Affairs Institute and Director of Security and Defence area. He is an expert from the Prime Minister's Office at the Office of coordination of armaments production. Since 1988 he has been working with the Military Centre for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence. Among his main publications in the economic and industrial field: «The integration process of market and industry of defence in Europe», «The space dimension of European security and defence policy» and «The system of logistic support of the Italian Armed Forces: problems and expectations».

We met him at the NSO conference in order to examine in depth some aspects of the delicate issue of critical infrastructure.

When we talk about «asymmetric» threats we refer to possible terrorist attacks that must be faced by unconventional means. In this context, how important is the protection of critical infrastructure?

The issue of critical infrastructure is central in the debate on national security on which our analysis focuses. In fact, a terrorist attack against a critical infrastructure could jeopardize the existence of a country. Hitting a critical infrastructure means hitting something that is beyond the military capabilities of a country: it means attacking the economic system of a country.

What is the main problem with regard to the protection of critical infrastructure, what makes its protection so complex?

The problem concerns their nature. They are not easy to identify and this makes the implementation of effective strategies difficult. In addition, they are widely distributed and numerous.

Do you think that the current level of protection of critical infrastructure can assure a good level of security?

No, it cannot. The government has never invested sufficient resources in the «computer» protection of critical infrastructure. It is necessary to establish a clear institutional picture so that we can identify the political responsibilities in the handling of security unequivocally.

What is the role of the Armed Forces in this sector?

They play a key role in the defence of critical infrastructure from terrorist threat. However, their task is more and more difficult since this threat has taken on new forms that elude the traditional strategies of control. It is not easy to cope with a «asymmetrical» threat because the Armed Forces are used to defending critical infrastructure from «symmetric» threats.

Which solution do you suggest for a more effective security policy?

The crucial problem concerns our economic resources. In my opinion, the first step towards the establishment of a culture of security is making all people more aware of the risks our country runs. It is necessary to invest more economic resources in this sector through targeted investments that will turn out to be savings in the future.

financial and commercial operations» because money-laundering involves a large number of fragmented operations, with lots of «complicity».

Those who are involved in commercial transactions can become «actors» of daily prevention which is carried out with bank and financial controls, through the data banks of the UIF, in close cooperation with sector Authorities and Intelligence bodies. Army Major General Riccardo Marchiò, employment department Chief of the Forces/Operational Centre of the Army, has highlighted the importance of the Italian peace-keeping missions for the «Security of our country». The concept of security has radically

changed because the typology of conflicts has changed (from «symmetric conflicts» to «asymmetric conflicts») and political and social problems (immigration, illegal traffic) have arisen and are seen as powerful destabilizing factors. Therefore, this concept is no longer seen as «defence of national integrity but it is seen as preservation of international stability that is threatened by different factors». The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have transformed terrorism from a national problem into a problem of global security: this transnational threat has determined a change in the organization of the Armed Forces whose task is not only to de-

fend the borders of the State but also to act beyond it in different theatres and in a multinational context. In the last years, Italy has become the nation that is most involved in international missions: in 2006 it employed 6000 units and more than 7000 units in areas such as Saharan Africa, the Middle East (Lebanon and Iraq), The Balkans and Afghanistan. In these contexts it is necessary to have good diplomatic support that can act as a point of reference in specific military operations and in the reconstruction of the country. It is essential to restore a form of legality and security in these areas training the security Forces and providing them with adequate logistic support. The future challenge is about integration: everyone has to play a central role in the security.

Galileo Tamasi, engineer of ENAC, the Italian Authority established by the new Code of Navigation as the only subject of regulation, control and certification in the air transport, examined the issue about airports as «places of frontier». Since the attack against the Twin Towers, all countries have tightened controls on airports and have imposed new rules to improve security also cooperating with other organizations and bodies, both at national and international level. ENAC has cooperated with the interested foreign authorities controlling the flow of information and enforcing the new rules about security. With regard to information, there is a press office, a toll-free number and daily radio communications in collaboration with RAI-Isoradio and the national mass media issue press releases and interviews. Within ENAC there is the airport technologies Office, which is a highly specialized body that carries out research on the effectiveness of new technology solutions for security. For example, the following devices are being tested in lots of Italian and European airports: Passenger Data management, Registered Passengers, Body Scanners, devices for identifying liquid explosives, biometric identification based on the scan of the iris and fingerprints, anti-deflagrating systems, devices for identifying toxic materials and controls of perimetric and superficial defence. Producing new technological solutions for security is extremely important in the new international context exactly like the cooperation between different international bodies and the creation of a new culture of security whose point of reference is the National Security Observatory.

Virgilio Costanzo, medical manager of the General Direction of Health Prevention, Ministry



Arrival of Undersecretary of Defence Lorenzo Forcieri at the Centre.

of Health, Laura Greco, Director of Identification Centre Saint Anna of Capo Rizzuto, Italian Red Cross, Paolo Neri, Engineer of SELEX - Integrated Systems and Colonel Achille Cazzaniga from the Air Force. Urban security is closely linked with the issue of prevention and control of the territory. The question was introduced by Professor Mario Morcellini, master of the faculty of communication science of La Sapienza University where he teaches Sociology of communication. The central focus is on the city as symbolic place of communication and conflicts of the contemporary age. It is no longer a safe

“ The future challenge is about integration: everyone has to play a central role in the security area ”

refuge that is able to give us protection, it fuels our fears and uncertainties, as a consequence of the increase in social complexity that makes the urban territory unstable and vulnerable. Instead of helping us to overcome insecurity the more and more up-

to-date and sophisticated technologies produce further complexity and are perceived by citizens as a source of new dangers. Morcellini referred to three instruments that can increase the level of security: knowledge, information and communication. Improving our knowledge of security enables us to analyse all dangers that threaten us to plan adequate strategies to reduce risks. Information enables us to spread technological and organizational knowledge beyond the closed community of experts. Through communication our point of reference can become that of «shared security» where each citizen can be at the same time an active sensor on the territory, promoter of the debate and decision-making processes with regard to risk assessment, coordinating authority of in-



A moment of the meeting.

interventions together with public authorities. Colonel Giovanni Cataldo, of the Carabinieri General Command, examined the issue about «urban security, in particular «shared security» and synergy between territorial components and special units of Carabinieri. The sense of conflict that we feel in the urban territory produces a sense of constant insecurity. This threatens our freedom and privacy and leads us to portray a marginal social category as criminal. Unfortunately this is a dangerous and only apparently defensive attitude we adopt to provide us with social security.

Paolo Massarini, Engineer and Director of Business Protection of the Acea industrial group talked about security in the management of network services that basically concerns the protection of Business, Goods and People from any events that are able to stop the business processes. In this context, we should refer to Mission Critical Activities (business activities that are necessary for the functioning of a company), to Business Continuity Management that regards the prevention system of the damage that can be caused by the interruption of critical activities and to the system of Crisis Man-

agement for the handling of crises.

Pietro Longo, coordinator of the Crisis Unit of the Public Local Transport of Rome, which was established after the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, stressed that the integration between human resources and technological aspects turned out to be essential for an efficient security system. Giovanni Ricatti of the Fire Brigade talked about the planning of civil defence and its influence on urban security. The main goal is to avert possible crises and to reduce the negative effects that a situation of emergency could have on the population. The defence is based only on the operational procedures that the Intervention Forces follow. However these have highlighted critical aspects concerning the ready availability of human and technical resources on which the same procedures are based. The civil defence is considering different aspects, such as protection of energy resources and the certainty of basic services, serious medical emergencies, information security and certainty of communications.

Engineer Emilio Montolivo underlined the importance of different technological tools that allow us to prevent crime and to handle situations of crisis efficiently and readily.

Professor Marco Lombardi discussed the issue of metropolitan terrorism: the city as a vulner-



The Undersecretary of Defence delivering his speech.

able place and a historical target of violence and attacks, the ideal context where a terrorist plan can be devised. Actually it has always been like that. In the past when the force of military defence was overwhelmed, the city fell victim to the incursions of bandits. As some people have highlighted: «... the reticular city pumps its life blood through transport infrastructure, which are targets of attacks, exactly like the buildings of the built-up areas». The history of the twentieth century is full of violent events and the city has been a tragic theatre of those events: in New York in 1920 a carriage exploded in front of Wall Street and killed 35 people, London has been a target of violence of the IRA, Madrid has been the theatre of the attacks of the Basque group «ETA» since 1968, Milan and Bologna were tragic theatres of violent attacks during the so-called «years of terrorism» and in 1995 a car bomb went off in front of the federal building in Oklahoma City. At the dawn

“ ...Civil Defence is considering different aspects, such as the protection of energy resources and the certainty the of basic services, serious medical emergencies, information security and certainty of communications ”

of the third millennium, New York, Madrid and London became theatres of horror and death again. Understanding the reasons of Islamic terrorism means identifying the most strategically sensitive points in our cities. Clarke and Newman have built a model to identify the most crucial objectives that are based on the acronym EVIL DONE: the targets that are at risk

are exposed, vital (for the functioning of a society), iconic (they must be a symbol), legitimate (the target must be legitimate, which means it must be morally acceptable by public opinion), destructible, occupied (the target must be occupied by lots of people so that they are involved in the attack), near (terrorists tend to choose places that are near to them as possible targets) and easy

(easy to hit). Cities are not seen as mere targets any more but as symbols and assume religious significance. In this context the cooperation between the Armed Forces and the Islamic community seems essential in the fight against terrorism. An example is given by the so-called Confidence Building Measures geared to identi-



A partial view of the audience.

fy people that represent contacts both for the Muslims and for the security services in order to improve the relationships between the security Forces and the population. Professor Gemma Marotta, who teaches Criminology, juridical Institutions, security and social change and Analysis of social change at the faculty of communication science of La Sapienza University, focused on the variety of urban environment, which is a source of fears and uncertainties. The surrounding environment is perceived by citizens in a different way. They give to the concept of «place of citizenship» a new meaning. Cities have become strongholds. We could define them as gated-communities where citizens are ready to reduce their own freedom to reach a higher level of security. The new urban technologies of video surveillance have brought about a shift from a repressive model of criminality to a preventive model. It is necessary to implement public policies aimed at reducing the level of risk and adopting technological systems in defence of privacy as well as the cooperation between all social actors (private and public sectors and citizens). All the measures that have been adopted must be constantly monitored to find more appropriate solutions.

Professor Michele Nones, who is a member of the management and executive committee of the International Affairs Institute and Director of Security and Defence area, introduced the third main issue concerning critical infrastructure. He underlined the fundamental aspects of the concept of critical infrastructure that is a system whose destruction or partial nonavailability weakens the security and the economic and social system of a nation significantly. Obviously, we cannot define all infrastructures as «critical» and each of them has a different level of criticality. A common feature of all infrastructures is their interdependence. Identifying a critical infrastructure means devising an adequate plan of protection but also imposing strict rules that can lead to invasive controls. The control of a critical infrastructure is also an element of criticality.

According to Engineer Maurizio Alivernini of the Fire Brigade Department, those who handle situations of crisis should face the problem of the improvement of one's performance according to the events. It is essential to identify elements of criticality to develop effective methods in order to decrease possible vulnerability, to prepare better plans of emergency, to favour the development of safe technologies and support international cooperation as an essential weapon for the global community.

Rear Admiral Francesco Carpinteri of the Port Authority talked about critical infrastructure with regard to maritime trade that has always had a considerable strategic importance for the economic development of the country. The need to safeguard human life and goods from illegal attacks (terrorism, piracy) has led to the adoption of legislative measures that are aimed at establishing common standards of protection and defence both for ships and for ports. Franco Fiumara, Director of the Business Protection of the Italian Railways, faced the problem of security and protection of critical infrastructure with regard to his sector. Engineer Luisa Franchina of the Civil Protection Department, Umberto Saccone, ENI Security Director, Professor Giuseppe Carrella and Professor Alessandro Mecocci of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Siena highlighted relevant aspects of their professional and human experience.

Engineer Galileo Tamasi of ENAC (Italian Authority for Civil Aviation) focused on the role of the Body in the sector of critical infrastructures and has talked about the strategies that have been implemented both at a national and a European level to increase the level of protection of critical airport infrastructures. The security measures that have already been adopted should be linked with the employment of methods of risk assessment aimed at decreasing the level of risk and at planning effective strategies of intervention in case of attacks. Lots of research is being carried out to assess the effectiveness of the new technological security systems of critical infrastructures. Lots of technological solutions have been installed experimentally in Italian and European airports (surveillance systems, thermal infrared television cameras, identifiers of highly toxic materials and airside vehicular control systems).

Damiano Toselli, Security Director of Telecom Italia, has talked about critical infrastructure with regard to his company. Communication technologies assume central importance because they have a high level of criticality. The interdependence of this infrastructure can lead to an osmosis with the vulnerability of other infrastructures: in the era of globalization, the risk of a «osmosis of vulnerability» between different critical infrastructures is high. Telecom Italia is working hard to plan an effective organizational model because improving critical infrastructures is a must for all industrialized

“The security measures that have already been adopted should be linked with the employment of methods of risk assessment aimed at decreasing the level of risk...”



Rear Admiral Luciano Gallini, Director of Ce.Mi.S.S., making his presentation.

countries. However, the handling of emergencies cannot be planned in detail because crises take on different forms.

Domenico Vulpiani, Director of Postal Police and Communications, has illustrated the main activities that the Ministry of the Interior is doing in order to combat any kind of computer crime against critical infrastructures. The Postal Police and Communications operate in the sec-

tor of communications. Their tasks are catching hackers, tackling on line paedophilia and conducting extensive investigations with regard to cases of industrial espionage and terrorism. Computer science is at the bottom of the information society. The security of our country is threatened by the real possibility of terrorist computer attacks against critical infra-

structures. For this reason all the security authorities should cooperate with each other and take strong and effective legislative measures. In this setting, the role of the NSO assumes a strategic importance. The project is aimed at promoting and spreading a new culture of security among the citizens as well as handling situations of risk competently and strategically according to shared values and to the integration between special skills to face different situations of risk effectively.

Sara Greggì
Journalist





AFGHANISTAN OPERATION UNIFIED VENTURE

TECHNE

AFGHANISTAN

OPERATION UNIFIED VENTURE

The «Nibbio» Task Force has carried out, in the risky valleys bordering on Pakistan, a brilliant operation aimed at neutralizing terrorist formations, creating conditions of security and stability.

The account of one of the protagonists tells us about the extraordinary professionalism of our soldiers, engaged for the first time in a helicopter attack conducted in an operational environment.

Within the framework of operation «Enduring Freedom», Italy has deployed a contingent of about 1000 men and women in the southeast of Afghanistan (Khowst), taking the responsibility to control the province of Paktia, on the border with Pakistan, for the period from March 15 to September 15, 2003.

The contingent, called «Nibbio», was divided in two sections: «Nibbio 1», based on the 9th «Alpini» regiment and «Nibbio 2», based on the 187th paratroop regiment. It was tasked with contributing, together with other units of the Coalition, to neutralize the terrorist formations, their possible logistic bases and recruiting centres still present in their area of responsibility, in order to create the conditions of security and stability necessary to reconstitute the Afghan system.

Among the various operations carried out by the Alpini of «Nibbio 1», the most significant was certainly Operation «Unified Venture», conducted from the 1st to the 4th of May 2003 in the Bermel Valley, on the border with Pakistan.

It was the first operation accomplished by Italian units integrated within an instrument under American command (1st Brigade 504th PIR of the 82nd Paratroop Division), together with units be-

longing to the 504th PIR (Parachute Infantry Regiment) and the Afghan National Army (ANA).

It was the first time that a complex unit of the Italian Army carried out a helicopter attack operation in a hostile operational environment.

The Bermel valley, in the Paktika province, is about 40km long and runs from north to south at an average 2200m above sea level, parallel to the border with Pakistan, at the heart of the strip of land known as a tribal area, where national entities are only an abstract concept for the nomadic populations of the Pashtun ethnic group, who have been living in the region for centuries, essentially with elements belonging to the Waziri tribe. The upper side of the valley penetrates into Pakistan, while on the opposite side it opens on a plateau, whose main village, Shkin, houses in its neighbourhood the most unsafe outpost of the Coalition: in the month of April 2003 it suffered more than ten rocket attacks (37), mortar shelling (27) and ambushes (2), which had caused 3 dead and 6 wounded among the US forces.

Task Force «Nibbio» (consisting mainly of the component of the «Nibbio» contingent stationed at Khowst) was under the command of the 1st Brigade stationed at Khandahar (Task Force Devil), and had the aim of denying freedom of movement to hostile elements called ACM (Anti Coalition Militia), reaffirm the presence of the coalition and of a central government's authority, through the employment of units of the Afghan Army, especially in activities in contact with the population, so as to promote a positive image.

Title pages.

The control of the paths near the Pakistani border represented a decisive factor for the success of the operation.

Left.

The Commander's intent for Operation «Unified Venture».





The Rock Drill activity performed at the Kandahar Headquarters.

The Italian component was therefore entrusted with the main task of occupying the head of the valley, realizing «blocking positions» aimed at «sealing» it during the period in which the other units of the 1st Brigade were operating on the valley bottom, in order to prevent hostile elements from possibly fleeing to Pakistan. In fact, it was a matter of realizing the classic scheme of «anvil and hammer». Other subsidiary tasks envisaged getting in touch and becoming acquainted with the population and the local authorities, especially in the village of Marghah (code name: objective Deer) employing personnel of the ANA, and be ready to carry out activities of reconnaissance and search if necessary.

Hereafter we are going to illustrate the development of the operation, from planning (made in English and with the procedures in use at Task Force Devil) to the conduct phase, and down to the lessons learned from this activity.

“The Contingent was tasked with contributing, together with other units of the Coalition Countries, to neutralize the terrorist formations, their possible logistic bases and the recruiting centres...”

On the April 21 the first forewarning of this operation reached the «Nibbio» Command, stationed at the FOB (1) (Forward Operating Base), which our predecessors (3-504 PIR) had called «Salerno» in memory of one of the places where they had fought during WWII.

Roughly the operation required the employment of a unit consisting of two companies reinforced by a platoon with heavy mortars and by various

assets, which was to be complemented by an ANA company, tasked with blocking the valley near the houses of Marghah by a pincer movement, which envisaged an arrival divided in two groups. The first was destined to penetrate by land using the GAC (2) (Ground Assault Convoy) technique, and the second through a helicopter attack carried out with the assistance of «Chin-

hook» CH 47s, «Black Hawk» UH 60s and «Apache» AH 64s.

The planning phase was started on the basis of these elements and, besides the activity of gathering information, envisaged also the choice of the Contingent's assets that were to be employed



The operations area with highlights on the most probable enemy actions.

for the operation, in order to inform in advance the personnel destined to participate.

Thus, the following units were chosen: the 2nd «Ranger» company of the «M.Cervino» Alpini paratroop battalion, the 108th rifle company of the «L'Aquila» Alpini battalion, 1 mortar platoon of the 119th company, 1 antitank squad of the 264th company of the same unit (the «L'Aquila» battalion, assigned to the 9th Alpini regiment, constituted the main component of the «Nibbio 1» contingent), 1 team of sharpshooters from a platoon of the 9th Alpini regiment, 1 team of engineers with dogs, 1 detachment of the 185th RAO (Objective Acquisition Regiment), 1 ranger detachment from the 9th «Col Moschin» Regiment, 1 paratroop team of «Carabinieri», elements for medical services and operators of the Command for activities of gathering of information, CIMIC elements (Civil Military Cooperation). These Italian components were complemented with one company of the 2nd ANA battalion, the liaison team of the 1st Brigade, the Combat Camera team of the CJTF 82 (Combined Joint Task Force 82) from Bagram and element of the American Special Forces, reaching a total of 293 soldiers, 4 interpreters and two wolf dogs of the EOD team.

The operation order arrived from the higher Command on April 26.

Satellite photo of the operations area, showing the landing zones singled out and the GAC's route.

The following day the final briefing was called at Kandahar, where the Command of the 1st Brigade illustrated the operation order. Both the Commanders of the three Tactical Groups and the elements of the Command involved in the management of the operation took part in the meeting.


The «Rock Drill» activity was carried out on the 28th, before a rough scale model of the zone. The Commanders of the three sectors in which the valley had been divided summarized to the Commander of the 1st Brigade the orders they had received and the modalities they were going to employ for performing the task.

On the 29th, on the return to the «Salerno» FOB, the last orders received were sent out and the final briefing was prepared for the Commander of «Nibbio», with the participation of all subordinate Commanders, down to the level of platoon, team and detachment. The briefing analysed all the topics concerning the operation such as, for example, the conduct modalities, the hostile activities in the area and, along the itinerary, the satellite photos available and the mined areas known, the weather conditions expected and their influence on

the operations (night-day variations of the temperature where around 30° centigrade, and the new moon permitted to exploit at best our technological superiority, thanks to the employment of snooperscopes) the air and land support available, including planned CAS (Close Air Support) activities, the various logistic directions regarding food, water and munitions, the activities for rescue and clearing, medical

evacuations, procedures for transmissions and coordination modalities, and everything necessary for such a complex operation.

In short, the plan envisaged that the land section (134 men) with a GAC of two days was to reach the





The GAC travelling between the Khowst and Orgun FOBs.

objective on May 2, at 5,30 Z (the time used conventionally by the entire coalition refers to the international prime meridian, belonging to the Z time zone, equal to a difference of -4,5 hours from the local time, therefore it was 10 a.m.).

At about two thirds of the route (the distance between Khowst and the objective is about 200km, the first ten of which can be travelled on a tarred road and the remaining on tracks and river beds, not always dry), near the Fire Base (FB) of Orgun (3), the exhausted supplies of fuel, water and food were to be replaced, vehicles and materials controlled, and the personnel could spend the night in a relatively safe area. From there, before dawn, the column would set out again and reach the objective half an hour before the arrival of the component transported by helicopters, in order to make safe the helicopters' landing areas through a quick clearing by the team of engineers with EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) capabilities, start to put up the block positions so as to control all persons, vehicles and animals travelling on the only road (actually an almost-dry river bed); control the trails that run along the ridges towards Pakistan, therefore

making the system active for at least 36 hours. After that time, and upon authorization, once the men had boarded again their helicopters, the GAC was to go back to Orgun's FB to resupply, and return definitively to Khowst on May 4.

The unit transported by helicopter, was to reinforce the deployment with «Chinooks» and «Black Hawks», taking off on May 2 from the «Nibbio» base and, in a single «batch», reach the area, transporting the heavy weapons (120mm «Thompson Brandt» mortars destined to provide fire cover to the deployment and operate, if necessary, in favour of the other two combat groups down the valley), placing the troops on the rises towards the Pakistani side, in order to thwart any possibility of escape or infiltration of hostile elements and, at the end of the operation, re-embark and return to the «Salerno» FOB.

April 30 was devoted to the preparation of the weapons (120mm «Thomson Brandt» RT - F1 mortars, at their first operational employment, and 60mm mortars, «Milan» missile launchers, «Panzerfaust» rocket launchers, 12.7 cal. «Browning» machineguns, Mg 42/59s, «Minimis», 12.7 cal. «Barret» rifles, 338 cal. «Sako» «Lapua Magnums», «Colt M4s», 5.56 cal. «Ar 70/90s», 12 cal. «Spas 15s», 40 mm «M203» and «Mk19» grenade launchers, «MP5» light machine guns. Besides,



The arrival of the second «wave» on the «Rooster» landing zone.

each soldier was equipped with 2 «OD 82» hand grenades and 10 magazines with 30 rounds) and the GAC vehicles, which, on the basis of the previous operations, were conditioned for confronting the operations by taking off the bulky structures, modifying the position of some components and creating, thanks to the nets of the «Hesco Bastions» (metal gabions which, filled with inert material, are employed to build shelters), ad-hoc structures, such as, for example, gratings that prevent the throwing of devices inside vehicles, supports for weapons, such as the «Panzerfaust», or the indispensable containers of supplies such as munitions, water, fuel, food.

In the morning of the 30th, the Commander of the «L'Aquila» battalion (who was to command the «Combat Group» during the operation) made a Back Brief to the Commander of the «Nibbio», with which he illustrated the modalities employed to carry out the task and organize the forces for implementing the mission. He also pointed out the problems that were to be solved by the Commander of the «Nibbio».

The GAC led by the battalion Commander consisted of 2 «VAVs» (Veicoli Armati Veloci=Fast

Armed Vehicles), 1 «HMMWV» (High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle) and 20 «VM 90 Ts» (Veicoli Multiruolo=Multi Purpose Vehicles). It was formed by the 2nd Ranger Company, 1 RAO detachment to ensure the presence of a FAC (Forward Air Controller) in the column, 1 ranger commando of the «Col Moschin» equipped with VAVs, which were to act as scouting tip, and by a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) under the Commander of the Combat Group (this also thanks to the high mobility of their vehicles and the firepower supplied by the «MK 19» automatic grenade launchers), 1 antitank squad with 2 «Milan» launchers, 1 squad of snipers, Engineer elements with EOD capabilities, the S2, CIMIC, Medical Service and MP (Military Police) components, the US liaison team from the 1st Brigade, the Combat Camera and the Afghan interpreters, 134 military in all.

The helicopter group, instead, consisted of the 108th alpine riflemen company, 1 platoon of 120mm mortars, 1 EOD dog unit, 1 detachment target acquisition, 1 company of the 2nd ANA battalion, elements of the USA special forces, everything under the orders of the Commander of the 108th company.

To carry out the attack, the group could avail itself of 8 transport helicopters (4 CH 47 «Chinook» and 4 UH 60 «Black Hawk») and 2 AH 64 «Apache» helicopters.

A quick Rock Drill was made in the afternoon, in the presence also of ANA personnel and American Special Forces.

The GO-NO GO briefing was made on the evening of the 30th (the last briefing of the decision-making process, following which the Commander decides whether to start the operations or not) on receiving the last information available, especially as regarded intelligence and weather conditions, and the Commander of the «Nibbio» was informed about the level of preparation reached by the units that were going to be employed. As soon as the briefing was concluded, the order was given to proceed with the operation.

At 00.30Z of May 1st, the GAC left, destination Orgun, making the journey of 140 km in 19 hours, without any particular inconvenience, also because the itinerary was already known as it had been done in the previous week during operation «Spring» (charged with escorting a «backfire» radar all the way to the FB of Shkin). For the first 13 and the last 10 kilometres the convoy could benefit from the cover given by the Fire Bases of the «Salerno» FOB and of Orgun. Moreover, the GAC had the cover of a couple of A-10 fighter-bombers for two hours. The time window for the cover was requested by calculating in advance the time needed by the GAC to cross the most dangerous area along the itinerary (CAS was in any case available on call within 30 minutes, the same as medical evacuation). The «shadowing» activities carried out by the A-10s, besides having the advantage of working as deterrent, allowed to receive information, with a forewarning of a couple of kilometres, about the vehicles that we would meet or the crowds along the road and on the ridges of the valley that we were driving through. Once at the FB, we made sure, as planned, to refuel, control the vehicles, eat our meal and settle ourselves into the Bivybags (a kind of single-place tent that proved to be one of the best pieces of equipment adopted by the «Nibbio» contingent). The night, decidedly cold because of the altitude, over 2400m, and the strong wind (it tore the guy-ropes of the tents put up by the Americans), was relatively calm.

In the meantime the component charged with the helicopter attack was continuing its preparations and the amalgamation with the ANA personnel.

A post of observation and control of the escape routes towards Pakistan.


At 5.30 of May 2, the GAC started moving towards its objective, and braving an unknown itinerary (known only on paper) headed for Marghah. After about one hour, a VM vehicle started to show carburation problems that slowed it down remarkably. After about twenty minutes another VM reported the same problem (probably due to the bad quality of the fuel of the refills made at the Fire Base the evening before). This convinced the GAC Commander to send three VMs back to the base of Orgun (on of the vehicles on tow). As a consequence, the force of the convoy was reduced to about twenty men, all belonging to the ranger Company. Half an hour later the convoy met an obstacle along its itinerary (the

only one shown by the maps): a pipeline inside a gorge obstructed the way to the VM. An obstacle not detected by the examination of the satellite photographs of the route. It was therefore necessary to change the itinerary on the spot, in order to find an alternative track (obviously not shown on the

maps), sending the VAVs to make a reconnaissance. This entailed an unexpected delay in reaching the target, which meant that it was impossible to clear and secure the chosen landing zone (LZ). The higher Command was informed about the event, in order to know if the helicopter assault might possibly be deferred. The answer was a confirmation that the plan should proceed as planned. Anyway, the GAC managed to find a passage and reach the block position 5 minutes in advance of the helicopter assault (06.00Z) and a group reached the LZ practically simultaneously with the helicopters: not in time for clearing the area, but in

“ To carry out the attack, the group could avail itself of 8 transport helicopters, 4 CH 47 «Chinook», 4 UH 60 «Black Hawk» and 2 AH 64 «Apache» helicopters ”





A 3D reproduction of the Bermel Valley.

time to make safe at least one side of the LZ and give the first instructions for adapting what had been planned to the real conditions on the ground.

The «Black Hawks» arrived with the 120mm mortars, and a problem that emerged almost immediately was that the LZ (code name Rooster) chosen by the Brigade Command, which on the satellite photos appeared as an ideal tableland, was actually what remained of the moraine of a glacier, characterized by rocks that made the emplacement of the mortars quite difficult.

The Commander of the 1st Brigade, arrived on the spot for a survey, having realized the situation, decided that to reembark the personnel the LZ had to be moved to the bottom of the valley.

With all subjects on the target, the men went on realizing a block position on the only road

“A ranger platoon carried out an activity of motorized patrol and temporary checkpoints with the intent to block possible movements towards the interior of the Country or headed for the border”

that coincided with a gravely dry rived bed. The position consisted of a platoon of the 108th company, the antitank squad, the Engineer elements and the snipers.

The men started with the Team Village activity, in order to give visibility to the personnel of the Afghan Army, gather information and be acquainted with the situation in that part of the region, finding out about the necessities related to the possible CIMIC activities. This activity was carried out by a ranger platoon, a platoon of the Afghan Army and the S2, CIMIC, medical service and MP components that were on the spot.

The two remaining Afghan platoons occupied two rises on the side looking towards Pakistan, with the purpose to prevent the movement along the paths leading to that Country.

A Fire Base was realized at the LZ level (3km higher than the block position) with the available mortars and, with the remaining two platoons, it was arranged to ensure the protection to the Fire Base and create a framework of security at the back of the deployment of the block position.

A ranger platoon carried out an activity of motorized patrolling and temporary checkpoints, with the intent to block possible movements towards the interior of the Country or headed for the border.

The activity went on as planned, without any particular impediment. Moreover, a communication came that, owing to the success of the operations conducted by the

other two battalions, the activity would end eight hours earlier than planned.

The only setback occurred at nightfall: personnel of cell S2 (information) reported that, according to information gathered through ANA, on our arrival anti-coalition elements had met in an unidentified place with the notables of the neighbouring villages, in order to decide whether they were to attack on the same night, lay an ambush when we were on our way back, or let us go.

The higher Command and the Commander of the 108th Company, responsible for the security of the Fire Base, were promptly informed about the matter. The higher Command supplied the ad-hoc cover of two «Apache» attack helicopters for the GAC's journey to Orgun.

Despite the tension caused by the preceding news, the night of the 2nd passed in relative tran-

A «Minimi» emplacement controlling the surrounding ridges.





A phase of the helicopter assault.

quillity; there was only the triggering of an illuminating mine, probably activated by an animal (the illuminating devices had been placed on the ground around the units as alarm systems).

On the morning of the 3rd we proceeded with the reembarkation (this time in two «batches») on the new LZ of the units that had landed the day before.

Next, we went on dismantling the block position, reorganizing the GAC and starting the return towards the FB of Orgun. Everything went off regularly (despite the fear of attacks or IEDS (Improvised Explosive Devices) and early in the afternoon we reached the base.

Here we had to remove, by means of a CH 47 with a barycentric hook, one of the VM that had had problems the day before and had not been able to carry out its mission, although a team of mechanics had been hastily sent from the «Salerno» FOB to repair the two vehicles.

In the morning of the 4th, the GAC resumed its journey towards Khowst, which this time lasted 12 hours because the VM that had apparently been repaired stopped 30km from the base and had therefore to be towed, forcing us to proceed at an even lower speed.

In the evening of May 4, all the units employed

for operation «Joint Venture» were back to the base.

The mission's last task, apart from putting the materials in order, was Mission Analysis. It was carried out in the afternoon of the 6th; and the various lessons learned from the operation just ended were itemized by the personnel that had operated with functions of command of the various assets and by the personnel that had followed the mission from the FOB operation room.

The most important aspects that emerged from the operation were:

- the importance of checking the vehicles with particular care before undertaking operations that lasted so long and were distant from the FOB;
- the usefulness of a close connection with the operations room during the entire conceptual phase. This had permitted to receive the operation order, of more than 60 pages in English, 48 hours in advance and to assimilate it entirely with little effort;
- the advantage of realizing additional containers, very useful for loading materials for long-lasting operations, exploiting the spaces of the vehicles as best as possible;
- the benefits deriving from having brought along camp beds during the operation, mainly because the ground, particularly rocky, made the use of self-inflatable airbeds scarcely convenient (it



The first groups of the first «wave» land on the «Rooster» landing zone. As can be noticed, the infantrymen just disembarked keep still near the helicopter (a procedure completely different from the national one).

is fundamental for drivers to rest properly, owing to the discomfort due to the prolonged effort of driving on rocky tracks, wearing stiff bullet-proof jackets. Moreover, one should bear in mind that on the most dangerous routes the life of the personnel on board is literally in the drivers' hands and in their capacity of concentration);

- the indispensability that one or more towbars be carried within the GAC (towlines, although less encumbering, are unsuitable, because when the engine is off the VM does not brake, with the obvious problems that one can imagine on mountain roads;
- the importance of reconnoitring, as far as possible and at least by helicopter, the itineraries never travelled before, in order to avoid that landslides or other interruptions not easily detectable by the simple examination of satellite photos may thwart operations of such importance;

“Not only did Operation «Unified Venture» achieve all the objectives predetermined by the Higher Command, but it demonstrated that the «Nibbio» Task Force could fully integrate within the American system...”

- the importance of using the traditional maps we are accustomed to, which give a picture more true to reality (hence the conclusion that satellite photos are complementary, not substitute of cartography);
- the effectiveness of GPS (Global Position System); especially the cartographic ones have proved very useful for finding routes, particularly at night-time and inside inhabited centres;
- the need to always make an accurate study of the cartography available (from a comparative examination of the Russian cartography with the American one, it emerged that, on one map, the houses of Margah stood on the left of the river and, on the other, they were on the right);
 - the value of snooperscopes, which have given exceptional results (for example, as regards flexibility and the easiness of employment, which permits to drive a convoy by night, with the headlights out and with no moon;
- To take advantage as much as possible of the itineraries followed by the «Jingle Trucks» (their name comes from the habit of decking them out with noisy small chains and various ornaments) in that they are almost certainly practicable and presumably not mined;

- the high versatility of the VM, more suitable for travelling on mountain roads than the HUMWEE, due to its limited width, to ford rivers for its height, and with a greater load capability (a characteristic appreciated also by our American colleagues);
- the importance of always carrying out the «Rock Drill» and «Rehearsal» activities, especially for those multinational operations where the English language must be used and understood by the various components of the operation;
- the advisability of increasing the number of interpreters (the activities performed simultaneously may require either a greater number of interpreters or the redefinition of the priority of the activities on the basis of the availability of the translators).

In conclusion, not only did Operation «Unified Venture» achieve all the objectives predetermined by the Higher Command, but demonstrated that the «Nibbio» Task Force could fully integrate

PUBLIC AFFAIR CJTF 180 COMMUNIQUE' OF MAY 5, 2003

During the last three days the Alpini of Task Force «Nibbio» have carried out the first «Air Assault» in the history not only of the Italian Army but of all the Italian Armed Forces, under the command of «Task Force Devil» and together with ANA (Afghan National Army) units, in Operation «Unified Venture». The operation took place in the Bermel Valley, not far from the Pakistani border.

The Task Force had to operate mainly in the northern part of the valley, in order to carry out combat actions and promote the visibility of both the Afghan leadership and the forces of the Coalition.

Task Force «Nibbio» has carried out its mission with air- and land- operations launched at different times, so as to achieve the assigned objectives simultaneously. The air attack was launched in various waves, employing 16 US «Chinook» and «Black Hawk» helicopters. During the operation the Alpini units of the Italian Army were integrated within the Command and Control System of the US Army, and carried out actions according to the doctrine, standards and operational procedures of the American Army without any problem. Within this framework, Task Force «Nibbio» was up to the operational times of the US Task Force.

Operation «United Venture», conducted in an extremely difficult environment, was entirely successful. Hundreds of people were controlled, and various meetings with clan and village chiefs were held, in order to create and spread a positive perception of the institutions and of the Afghan National Army.

The Americans consider the event particularly important and, in view of this, Col. King asked that the communiqué be read by the PIO of ITALFOR as a joint statement about Operation «Unified Venture».

ACRONYMS

ACM: Anti Coalition Militia
AH: Attack Helicopter
ANA: Afghan National Army
CAS: Close Air Support
CH: Cargo Helicopter
CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation
CJTF 82: Combined Joint Task Force 82
CJTF 180: Combined Joint Task Force 180
EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ACF: Forward Air Controller
FOB: Forward Operating Base
GAC: Ground Assault Convoy
HMMWV: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IR: Infra Red
LZ: Landing Zone
MP: Military Police
PIR: Parachute Infantry Regiment
QRF: Quick Reaction Force
RAO: Reggimento Acquisizione Obiettivi (Target Acquisition Regiment)
UH: Utility Helicopter
VAV: Veicoli Armati Veloci (Fast Armed Vehicles)
VM: Veicoli Multiruolo (Multipurpose Vehicles)

within the American system, brilliantly overcoming all the problems related with the difference of language and working procedures (this because the American procedures differ in various points from the NATO standard ones, on the basis of which we are trained to operate).

Giampaolo Romoli
*Lieutenant Colonel,
 Joint Operational High Command*


NOTES

(1) The «Forward Operative Base» is a forward base, temporary or permanent, which has the purpose of giving support (for example, medical, ammunition, fuel, etc.) for tactical operations, expanding the capabilities of Command, Control and Communications on a given area. Generally it includes an improvised landing area or a heliport.

(2) The «Ground Assault Convoy» is the bulk of personnel, vehicles, and assets necessary to ensure security to the movement of infiltration, as a precondition for other operational activities. The modalities that constitute it are explained in detail in a special article published on «Rivista Militare» no. 1/2005, It. Ed.

(3) The «Fire Base» consists of an advanced and fortified fire base equipped with howitzers and mortars. Its purpose is to ensure, in a given area of operations, support to the infantry units that operate within the range of the FB weapons. Their organization has been analysed in detail on «Rivista Militare» no. 5/2005, It. Ed.





OUTSOURCING OF MILITARY TRANSPORT

OUTSOURCING OF MILITARY TRANSPORT

Since the nineties, the Army, like other large civilian firms and government bodies, has been undertaking a rapid process of outsourcing of logistics. But widespread perplexities have been emerging lately, especially about the cost-benefits of the operation.

To delegate may be advantageous, a close cooperation with the industrial sector is desirable but, particularly in the Armed Forces, responsibilities and risks cannot be delegated.

The experience made at the 8th «Casilina» Transport Regiment can be a significant example of shrewd management of resources and correct balance between insourcing and outsourcing.

During the last years, the sector of Defence has been the subject of a deep process of reorganization that is still going on. Such process originates from the necessity to adapt the military instrument to the guidelines of the New Model of Defence (NMD), worked out some time ago to answer the changed needs in the ambit of UN, NATO, EU and the international community in general.

The modernization of the Army and the mentioned adjustment to the NMD, launched in 1991 and implemented through the following decade, have introduced in the military lexicon terms such as «outsourcing» (literally «external provisioning»). The increased recourse to «outsourcing» has made «insourcing» (according to which all the activities of a firm or body are carried out internally or «insourced») an outdated concept.

Today the concept of outsourcing has evolved, adapting to the new global managerial strategies, producing a new version of outsourcing called «cosourcing», whose principles lead to entrust more and more significant segments of the production process to enterprises that are external but carry out their activity as if they were divisions of the firm itself.

The system has its risks such as, for example, the fact that within the same organizational structure may cohabit different cultures and objectives, sometimes difficult to reconcile.


This model makes the control of the entire managerial and logistic process more complicate. In view of this, the role of the intermediate chiefs (project managers), who must be hinges between the various components, becomes fundamental. In short, the following aspects mark the model of «cosourcing»:

- management, which can also envisage actors that operate on the outside, but only on behalf of the commissioning firm or body;
- full control of the communication flow;
- capability of revising the performance;
- responsibility, which must entail the possibility of dealing appropriately with the emerging problems;
- flexibility, i.e. capacity to adapt to the new requirements of the sector in which one operates;
- innovation, which consists of the ability to perceive in good time the changes in the environment where one works and adapt accordingly.

Therefore, cosourcing envisages a long-lasting relationship between customer and outsourcer, based on reciprocal trust and common outlook.

If we wish to have a unitary vision of the various managerial options, we must resort to another term introduced recently, «multisourcing», according to which insourcing, cosourcing and outsourcing are progressive steps of a single policy that entrusts to outsiders many production activities, but regulates their various aspects.

Multisourcing is thus a new discipline of management, born to govern the multiplicity of external contributions, in a dynamic logic of evermore transient boundaries. It is the organizational answer to the limits of outsourcing, which, when is aimed at a mere reduction of costs, risks to impoverish the knowledge and culture wealth of the sector concerned. Multisourcing is therefore the manifestation of a renewed unitary approach, where the internal and external boundaries are reassessed in a key of



cost-effectiveness, owing to which outsourcing is a part of a detailed medium- long-term strategy.

The term «multisourcing» underlines the multiplicity of the sources in a position to provide services, be they internal or external; it is a real breakthrough in comparison with the model used up to now, because it transforms the multiplicity of the sources into a structural asset of the firm or body and introduces the existence of a real management of risks, costs and benefits.

As regards the Defence sector, the reorganization has led to define a conceptual picture of the possible multisourcing options that may be employed to handle a given process.

During the last years the recourse to outsourcing by the Defence Administration (D.A.) has been justified because of the change of the strategic, military and social reasons that in the past had produced a considerable implementation of insourcing.

Nevertheless, the possible strategies adopted by the D.A. do not end with the choice of the two extreme poles of the model of multisourcing (outsourcing and insourcing) but they need to involve also the intermediate pole (cosourcing).

In the technological field, in the main industrialized Countries the last decade has wit-

Title pages.

An ACTL 8x8 for transport of a VM 90.

Above.

The concept of multisourcing: going from insourcing to outsourcing through the intermediate option of cosourcing.

nessed the entering into service of new generations of weapon systems and equipment, especially vehicles and combat helicopters, rocketry and guided ammunition, communication satellites and Command-and-Control systems.

Technological development and the complexity of the new weapon systems, on the one side justify the recourse to outsourcing, on the other require considerable resources that the single European Countries cannot ensure anymore.

No European Country alone has today the industrial capability of manufacturing all the instruments necessary for security, neither has it the financial means for buying them, nor the specialised manpower for realizing them on its own; owing to these reasons, international collaboration, the recourse to private industry and cosourcing more and more represent an unavoidable choice.

It is in this scenario that the institution of a synergic relation with the world of industry as-

“...no European Country has today the industrial capability of manufacturing all the instruments necessary for security, neither has it the financial means for buying them...”

sumes aspects of necessary integration and complementarity.

This is even more true considering that, in the context of an Integrated Logistic Support (1) connected with a fixed system, it is possible to define the implementation modalities already since the initial phases, through the definition of a project of maintenance in working order (what the D.A. can and must do, and what it would be more profitable to entrust to the private industry) and of sustainability, which should permit to find the data of employment and management, obtaining indexes for the for working out estimates of procurement of materials and spare parts, as well as keeping the related configuration up to date.

The organizational system thus defined can guarantee an advantageous cost-benefit ratio, keeping the weapon systems at levels of operational availability so that the units may carry out the tasks assigned to them in the most effective way.

In relation to the sector of Movement and Transport, the Directive on the Planning of Logistic Support for the years 2007 and 2008, issued by the Army General Staff - Logistic Division, marks a conceptual shift as regards the regulation of outsourcing at paragraph 3 «Sectors of Intervention» s/ Par. «d» «Movement and Transport», which states: «In connection with transports on the national territory, the obligation to limit costs will be met by a larger employment of military vehicles in replacement of civil ones, envisaging if possible a reversal of the flow of supplies for all the services that can be completed within the same day, thus avoiding the expenses of overnight stays».

OUTSOURCING IN THE ARMED FORCES

In the Defence sector, the outsourcing process has undergone a particular escalation starting from 1998 and has increased along the years, keeping pace with the growing cuts in the economic resources destined to the functioning and upkeep of bodies, establishments and arsenals.

In view of this, the Army has increasingly farmed out services, production and maintenance, handing over almost completely to the private industry the research, experimentation and production of weapon systems, highly de-

veloped equipment and technologies.

As a consequence, this has produced an exorbitant growth of costs for the outsourced technologies and for contracts stipulated with the private industry: a trend contrary to the need to make economies through reorganization procedures.

The resulting «collateral effects» have caused the progressive marginalization and exclusion from the production and working process of personnel (especially NCOs and civilians) specialized in sensitive sectors of logistics.

The military plants (especially the Maintenance and Supply Centres of the Army) have lived (and are still living) in a situation of particular distress. They used to have teams for «home-delivered» maintenance and repair interventions, spread all over the national territory, and consisting of specialized personnel, who, because of the new policy, have seen their activity reduced to the point of disappearing altogether.

During the past decade there has been a trend of progressive reduction in the productive component of the D.A., which has transferred to the private industry vital logistic sectors, such as transport, maintenance and repair, through operations of uncertain outcome.

In view of the experience gained, we should now reflect on «how» we have been working up to now, and consider «what» it is possible to

acquire from the outside.

That is, it is necessary to move from a system where everything is managed individually on to a system where only the most significant responsibilities are exercised, trying to find a correct balance between cost and effectiveness. In short, it is not a matter of getting rid of some institutional activities handing them over to a third party, but of organizing and making use of the experiences (and professionalism) that the Administration does not possess or does not want to possess.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE «CASILINA» 8th TRANSPORT REGIMENT

Our assertions are inspired by the daily activity of the «Casilina» 8th Transport Regiment - Transport Central Unit.

Obviously the observatory, even if privileged,

“It is necessary to move from a system where everything is managed individually to a system where only the most significant responsibilities are exercised, trying to find a correct balance between cost and effectiveness”



Above.
Astra HD 7s, suitable for carrying 20' and 40' containers.

Right.
Transport of two 20' ISO containers with an Astra HD-7. This vehicle can also carry 30' and 40' ISO containers.

Below.
Fuel transported by an Astra HD-7 with a 20' container tank.



appears circumscribed, both as regards dimensions and for the logistic activities performed (transport and maintenance).

In any case, the «Casilina» 8th Regt constitutes a significant example of shrewd management of the resources and fair balance between insourcing and outsourcing: the proposed solu-

tion is a modern Army that has within itself the logistic capabilities essential to its functioning, so that it can apply to the external market from a «strong» position: that of a purchaser who decides to invest only if the proposals that are made to him are advantageous.

The 8th «Casilina», on the other hand, is an advantaged observatory for intermodal transport, in that it is a fundamental junction not only between the Homeland and the Operations Theatres, but also between different modes of transport (road, railway, ship and aircraft).

As regards the employment of its transport capacities, the regiment depends on the Logistic Command of the Army - Movement and Transport Office; for the functional and technical aspects it depends on the Mobility and



Counter-mobility Unit of the Department of Transport and Materials of the Army.

Among the main tasks carried out by the «Casilina» we can mention:

- transport on the entire national territory of weapon systems, vehicles, materials and fuel/lubricants to and from central logistic executive bodies (Material Yards, Maintenance Poles and Depots);
- special Transport (sensitive, dangerous and/or polluting materials);
- collection and disposal of inefficient vehicles and weapon systems;
- intermodal transport of containers of different types for Support and Adherence units;
- «home delivery» of provisions to the executive bodies of the Logistic Support Belt.
- re-modulation of containerised cargoes for the successive transport by general cargo or terminalization of bulk supplies;
- maintenance activity for the vehicle fleet of



Transport of armoured vehicles with Astra HD-7s.

the regiment and for the vehicles in transit in the Rome area.

Starting from the example constituted by the 8th «Casilina» and following a deductive criterion, we shall try to suggest solutions not only in the field of customary transport and vehicle maintenance, but also for intermodal transport in general.

Therefore our suggestions to balance the internal capabilities with outsourcing will concern also other types of transport (naval, air and railway) and the activities of maintenance and handling of containers.

INTERMODALITY AND STRATEGIC TRANSPORT

As regards the transport sector one can say, in general, that the modern military manager of logistics should pursue an adequate level of self-sufficiency in intermodality.

Intermodal transport permits to transfer an entire cargo unit from a means of transport to another without breaking down the load: therefore the originality of the new transport technique consists of its aptitude to combine several modalities in a logic of integration and complementarity.

For what concerns strategic transport (for which the incidence of intermodality is substantial), owing to law no 25 of February 18, 1997 – Reorganization of the Summit of the Armed Forces, the responsibility has been progressively transferred from the Staff of a single Service to the COI-JMCC (Operational Command of the Joint Movement Coordination Centre), which has become responsible for the planning and coordination of strategic transport at joint level.

The COI-JMCC is therefore responsible for finding assets for long-distance transfers of men and materials (by airplane, ship and railway), both in the deployment/redeployment phase and for the re-supplying phase of out-of-area contingents.

It should be underlined that at present our Armed Forces, like other European partners, do



A 20' open-side container.

not have an adequate military self-sufficiency in intermodality and strategic transport. In order to tackle these problems adequately, the Defence General Staff issued directives that lay down the guidelines for outsourcing strategic transport. In substance, in order to find the means of transport necessary for projecting a Contingent to an Operations Theatre, the COI-JMCC has recourse first of all to the available national military assets, subsequently to the military assets provided by other NATO/EU Nations and, as a last resort, to the full time chartered (2), assured access (3) and spot market (4) civilian ones.



ACTL 8x8 tactical logistic truck, also called APS-95 separable-body unit, suitable for 20'-container transport.

TRANSPORT BY ROAD

As regards the road component of intermodal transport (i.e. palletised or containerised freight), the Service has at its disposal standard pallets and 20' and 40' modules) (the As-



Haulage of transport and/or combat motor vehicles on the separable-body loading platform of an APS-95.

tra HD-7, issued to the Army, can also carry 30' modules, but they are not for military employment).

In the specific case, how should the percentage of the outsourced service be subdivided?

We are inclined towards a balancing of the activities in favour of military transport, which, in any case, should be supported by the avail-

ability of contracts of transport that supplement and complete the military capabilities.

With the professional Army and the acquisition of means of high technical level (i.e. APS-95 and HD-7) the Service has the capability of competing, at qualitative level, with any civilian provider.



Above and Below.

A course of safe driving on a Land Rover Defender and an Astra APS-95 at the Vallelunga racing track.



Moreover, most professional military have had previous experiences in Operations Theatres. Such know-how has given them a very high leading capability also in extreme circumstances. Therefore, difficulties like adverse weather conditions, roadbeds full of holes, and night-time driving do not constitute a problem, since we have highly qualified drivers at our disposal.

From the security viewpoint, the globalisation process and the competition at world level have induced the large transport companies to

pursue strict budget economies, employing not always qualified personnel.

Transport is profitably outsourced when the cost-effectiveness ratio appears less in favour of the D.A.

For the Support Logistic Belt, in the transport economy one should certainly consider the location of the transport detachments: in Rome («Casilina» 8th Regt), Padova and Napoli (Sup-



Restoration of a railway line by the Railway Engineers in Kosovo.

port Companies of the North and South Military Regions). Therefore, short-distance deliveries outside this «triangle» can certainly be outsourced according to cost/effectiveness criteria.

In conclusion, as far as road transport is concerned, recourse to outsourcing should be considered a complementary resource.

RAIL TRANSPORT

The railway is the only modality of land transportation that has the quality of strategic transport, since it permits to sustain a high flow of transfers of personnel, materials and vehicles over long distances at reasonable costs. Besides, where there is the possibility of land connection between the Strategic Base and the Operations Theatre, such modality can effectively be used also for the projection of forces and their logistic support. On the other hand, a train is characterised by scarce penetrability, is bound to a track (whose gauge may change from nation to nation, with the related problems of cargo transfers, as is

“A few years ago the D.A. stipulated special conventions with FS S.p.A.(Italian Railways), to regulate the services for the Armed Forces,”



Rail transport of «Leopard» tanks.

the case between western and eastern Europe), is influenced by the potentialities of the lines, by possible interruptions along the tracks and by the availability of cars. Besides, such modality offers scarce security in non-permissive environments. A few years ago the D.A. stipulated special conventions with FS S.p.A. (Italian Railways), to regulate the services for the Armed Forces. In particular, a convention is now in force for the chartered transport of personnel, and another for the haulage of materials and equipment of the D.A.

Moreover, the Army has at its disposal the regiment of Railway Engineers, a unit that can handle on its own about twenty trains a day, with the related railway infrastructure and, by repairing tracks and bridges, can rapidly restore the continuity of the railway infrastructure in case of interruption of the flow of supplies along the axes of the national railway network.

In the last years, the whole of Europe has recorded a lack of flat-wagons for tank transport, due to their high maintenance costs vis-à-vis their employment, which was occasional and, in any case unprofitable for the various railway companies, privatised during the eighties/nineties.

In particular, even if Italy can potentially avail itself of a substantial number of flat wagons, in reality they are often unemployable, due to their old age or scarce maintenance. Therefore, it is often necessary to resort to flat wagons hired from other European railway companies.

In general, the Defence General Staff has detected chronic shortcomings within the strategic railway transport. This specific modality is in fact



marked by defective regulations and lack of adequate international accords. When crossing extra-EU Countries, these limitations entail the necessity to acquire each time transit authorizations from the various Countries concerned.

Moreover, one can say that «heavy» containerised transport (15-20ton modules) is feasible mostly by train and ship, since trucks (particularly those with loading platforms) and airplanes show remarkable limitations related to embarkation/disembarkation and to the capacity to transport particularly heavy equipment.

Besides, for the Operations Theatres that do not have coastal outlets (like Afghanistan), trains are the only alternative to air transport, which is by nature extremely expensive and limited, both for cargo capability and for the scarce availability of military and civilian assets, especially in connection with the deployment in Theatre of the various Contingents of a multinational Force.

As regards the dilemma of the internationalization of the service, the problem does not exist, because the Service has no railway infrastructure and railway assets at its disposal and must necessarily have recourse to the capabilities of the Italian Railways.

For some years the companies of the Italian Railways Group have been bound to the Ministry of Defence by contracts that ensure railway trans-

The trans-European railway corridors of Italian interest.

port, combined transport (railway-road), additional services, fuel transport and also the removal of furniture and household goods of the personnel transferred.

In particular, the mentioned providers carry out a door-to-door service for the military organizations, delivering vehicles and materials, thus increasing the logistic flexibility of railway transport. The same service is also carried out abroad for exercises or operations, from Europe to as far as Afghanistan.

The Armed Forces have increasingly resorted to combined road-railway transportation, a fact that proves the extreme profitability of such modality. In any case, the only «competitors» against the FS Group are at present the military transport organizations of the Support Logistic Belt, which have a remarkable capability of road transport (with the connected handling capabilities), provided that an assessment be made of the cost/effectiveness of the modality at issue.

Until 2002, the military traffic by rail had been rather sporadic, for a sequence of reasons, one among which was the need to have immediate responses and definite times, connatural to the logistics of the Armed Forces.

In Italy the railway sector has undergone a radical reorganization, transforming the transport on track into combined transport, and this has brought the train closer to the military world.

Further advancements in railway transport for the D.A. have been obtained thanks to the experience matured with the transport of vehicles and materials to operational zones, like Afghanistan or Kosovo, as well as to foreign training areas, such as Poland, Sweden and Great Britain.

In order to offer these services, which much ensure the simultaneous arrival of notable quantities of resources in the required times, the Italian Railways had to create a network of relations with foreign railway operators. For these reasons, today the railway logistic system can be considered an institutional resource that can give precise answers suitable to the heterogeneous military requirements.

The future capability of developing land assets can allow the Defence to move its units according to criteria of inexpensiveness and efficiency. This option must presuppose the stipulation of specific agreements with the Countries (Ukraine and Russia in particular) belonging to the linking railroad network (corridors) between Europe and Asia, with which it is envisaged to start, from the strategic viewpoint, forms of exchange and cooperation in the railway sector.

In conclusion, as far as railroad transport is concerned, the scales are necessarily tipped in favour of outsourcing the service.

TRANSPORT BY SEA

The marine modality, in general ensures the delivery of large quantities of vehicles and materials with a favourable cost/effectiveness ratio. Yet the naval means has scarce penetrability, requires considerable harbour equipment and is very slow compared to the other types of transport.

Nevertheless it becomes indispensable when the task requires a long-lasting engagement of vehicles, materials and heavy weapons, such as, for example, the projection and support of a national Contingent employed out of area. Contrary to land infrastructure (roads, railways, tunnels and bridges), the sea offers a communication network that is hard to interrupt. Moreover, coming near to a Nation by sea, in case of inoffensive transit, does not need the relevant diplomatic clearance.

One should emphasize the negative effect on the strategic sea freight produced by the process of

“The marine modality ensures the delivery of large quantities of vehicles and materials with a favourable cost/effectiveness ratio,”



Above and right.

The Landing Platform Dock-LPD Ships «San Giorgio» and «San Marco» of the Italian Navy. This type of boat has a continuous flight deck that can embark helicopters and vehicles with Ro/Ro capabilities, for loading and unloading vehicles and containers.

privatization of the port areas and warehouses (by now in a completion phase in Italy and Europe). In fact, one should take into account the potential constraints that are now operative in ports, such as the unsuitability for embarkation of dangerous goods, or lack of links to a railway line.

These constraints are the natural consequence of a trend, by now well-established in Italy and the EU, which entitles a civilian port authority to control an infrastructure of strategic interest (in the past this was within the province of the Port Authorities of the Navy) with management standards that often do not safeguard the specific military interests: priorities in departures and arrivals, special wharfs, adequate security systems and devices suitable for the embarkation, disembarkation and storage of explosives, ammunition and all types of goods of a dangerous nature.

In connection with the possibility of outsourcing, the problems of sea freight is more or less comparable to railway transportation, since the Italian Armed Forces have no naval

assets specifically quipped for heavy transport, i.e. roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships. A Ro/Ro ship has a ramp that permits the rapid embarkation and disembarkation of wheeled and tracked vehicles, helicopters (on half-truck) and containers (by means of lifts for ISO containers) without the employment hoisting devices (cranes).

The Navy has only three units of the «San Giorgio» class, which are not specifically built

for heavy transport: «San Giorgio», «San Marco» and «San Giusto».

According to the standard NATO denominations, the ships of this class are defined «Landing Platform Dock (LPD)», i.e. amphibious transport units designed for landing amphibious assault troops in power projection operations from the sea. This type of ship has however a continuous flight deck, which can accommodate helicopters, equipment, Ro/Ro capabilities for loading and unloading vehicles and containers. Its payload is 1000 tons plus an amphibious assault Company (330-350 men with the appropriate combat and logistic equipment, besides some thirty various transport and combat vehicles).



The Ro/Ro ship «Romea», «full-time-chartered» to the Italian Armed Forces until 2006.

solution» and chartered two Ro/Ro ships, «Major» and «Romea», whose contracts were handled by the Movement and Transport Office of the Logistic Inspectorate, today's Logistic Command. Since 2005 this responsibility, as well as the air and rail freight, has been progressively moved under the joint aegis of COI-JMCC (Comando Operativo Interforze - Joint Movement Coordination Centre). Since 2007, in view of the reduced out-of-area engagement of our Armed Forces, the COI-JMCC has been chartering full time only the Ro/Ro ship «Major».

The two ships were in a position to answer the training needs at home (such as the exercises in Sardinia) and to carry out the cyclical supply of the units in a Theatre abroad.

But in case of opening of various operational Theatres in the same period, or deployment of a force at Brigade level in a new Theatre, or redeployment for turnover of the units or for end of the mission, «Major» and «Romea» were not sufficient anymore, and it was necessary to find other assets on the spot market, i.e. Ro/Ro ships chartered for a limited time and for a specific need.

In short, at the present time, the Defence General Staff (5), in order to meet the heterogeneous requirements of our Armed Forces, has specified a policy that envisages, in order of preference, the employment of the following assets for strategic transport by sea: the national military (LPD «San Giorgio» class and other ships with logistic capabilities), civilian full time chartered, assured access and spot market.

The Defence Staff has moreover detected the recurrent shortcomings of strategic sea freight,

In general, in Italy, as regards strategic transport by sea, after the long period of the Cold War, the assets of the Navy were not meeting the requirements of a Force that was undergoing a deep transformation and suddenly went from a static defence of the national territory to projectability to Theatres sometimes very distant from the homeland (Lebanon, Somalia, Mozambique, Balkans, Timor East).

Therefore, in order to guarantee the sealift for the out-of-area operations which have followed one another along the time, it has been necessary to resort to external contracts, i.e. chartering medium-capability Ro/Ro assets (about 1000 linear metres, corresponding to about 150 twenty ft containers and/or vehicles of similar size). On the whole, with each of these ships it has been possible to meet the requirements of basic strategic transport (vehicles and materials) of an infantry regiment.

Considering that, starting from the nineties, the needs of transport overseas, both for training and for operations, had increased and become stable, the Army Staff chose the «full time

which concern mostly the uncertainty of a ready availability of suitable civilian assets to be engaged in deployment operations.

After many years of experience, it is now possible to make an accurate analysis of the advantages and disadvantages that this type of outsourcing has brought in the sector of strategic transport by sea.

The fact that the Italian Navy in the nineties did not equip itself with Ro/Ro ships of middle/large capacity has avoided considerable financial investments related to the acquisition of the naval units, their maintenance in full working order, and the training and employment of personnel.

As «reverse of the medal», the fact that our Armed Forces do not have at their disposal adequate Ro/Ro naval assets has in any case limited the potentialities of strategic transport has made the military instrument dependent perforce on a civilian provider or on a NATO/EU ally.

In substance, with reference to costs, the expenditures related to the chartering of naval assets in the last decade have been considerable, and often it has been impossible to plan and control them adequately, because they were connected with criteria of necessity and haste strictly depending on unpredictable situations of international policy.

These costs, especially those related to the ships to be found on the spot market, have often spiralled to unthinkable levels, because in case of opening of a new Theatre, also other allied Countries with the same shortcomings have presented themselves on the civilian market. Therefore, the assets essential for the national and allied Defence eventually have become subjected to the mechanism of supply and demand like any other good on the market.

The D.A. and the allied Countries have tried to face up to this trend by creating international consortia (for example Eindhoven and Athens) with which it could be possible to share the assets available, try to find new joint contractual forms and, above all, appear as a single client and not in a competitive system that allowed the providers to speculate for a rise.

In particular, as regards the accord with Athens on the utilization of the AMSCC (Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center), the project was born to jointly charter civilian assets made available by Greece (whose Navy has at its disposal a pool of 120 promptly available merchant ships).

Italy, for the moment, has limited itself to a marginal participation in the mentioned consortia.

In the immediate future it would be suitable to acquire a minimal «flywheel» of Ro/Ro military assets through a resolute participation in international consortia, with contract forms that should be more suited to the military requirements, more flexible and readily applicable.



Above and below.

Pallet 46 3L for air transport. The materials are placed on the aluminum platform and secured with a containment net. The pallet is then placed on the loading ramp and conveyed into the cargo compartment.



The availability of a «flywheel» of sealift military assets would be a secure investment, since the Ro/Ro fleet, in case of operational standstill, could in any case be employed for the training of units out of area or be made available to the various international consortia.

TRANSPORT BY AIR

The aircraft for strategic transport allows vehicles and materials to reach their destination in a very short time and, therefore, to provide the logistic support to an Operations Theatre. The mentioned carrier, in any case, needs the authorization for flying over and landing (diplomatic clearance) in the Country of transit or destination. The airplane is an expensive modality and with limited cargo capabilities: at best it carries a limited number of conditioned materials on pallets for air transport: Very few airplanes (i.e. some Antonov and Ilyushin models) can carry ISO containers.



The Antonov aircraft AN-124-100 can carry 11 twenty-ft containers or 80 linear metres of motor vehicles, or a palletised cargo up to 120 tons. The picture on the right shows the electric chain block (orange colour) that facilitates the loading/unloading of ISO containers.

For example: the Antonov AN-124-100, which has one of the greatest cargo capabilities, can transport only 11 twenty-ft containers (or 12, if the container-carrier truck, which is part of the plane's equipment, is not left behind), or 80 linear metres of motor vehicles, or a palletised load up to 120t. As regards our Armed Forces, the



A Boeing 707 T/T (Tanker/Transport) Military aircraft for strategic transport.


transport planes of our Air Force can only embark air pallets and no ISO containers.

Besides, the availability of airfreight assets, also civilian, is very limited in Italy and Europe; costs are therefore prohibitive in that they are inevitably subjected to the law of demand (high) and supply (low).

The Defence General Staff, in order to meet our heterogeneous needs, has indicated to the COI-JMCC a policy that envisages the following order of preference for finding assets for strategic airlift:



national military (especially Boeing 707, Lockheed C-130J and Alenia C-27J), military of other NATO/EU Nations (especially Lockheed C-5 Galaxy and Boeing C-17 Globemaster) and civilian, with



A Lockheed C-130J military aircraft for strategic transport, and an Alenia C-27J. The Air Force has no aircraft of its own suitable for transporting 20' ISO containers and this is an important drawback for military intermodality.



the full-time chartered, assured-access and spot-market formulas (chartering above all Antonov AN-124-100, Ilyushin Il-76 and Boeing 747).

The deficiencies detected by the DGS in the strategic transport by air regard especially the transfer of containers, vehicles and outsize weapon systems, for lack of suitable military as-



Above and right.

The Lockheed C-5 Galaxy military aircraft is also employed by the Italian Armed Forces for strategic transport. It can carry 36 pallets for air transport or a payload of up to 122 tons. The loading space is 5.79m wide, 43.8m long and 4.11m high. The dimensions of the loading space provide room for ISO containers, but the plane has no specific lifting systems (electric chain blocks) or twist locks.

sets or non-immediate availability of civilian ones.

As regards the strategic-cargo air fleet (6), our Air Force has at its disposal a number of Boeing 707, C-130H aircraft (which since 2001 are being gradually withdrawn), C-130J, C-130J-30 (cycle of acquisition about to be completed) and Alenia C-27J.

Two of our B 707 have been fitted up as T/T (Tanker/Transport) and therefore they have a «combo» fitting for 66 passengers and seven pallets for transport by air (which are loaded through the side hatch); besides as tankers, the B 707s are frequently employed for long-range transport.

The C-130J has a payload of 93 passengers, 76 paratroopers or 5+1 (on the ramp) NATO-standard air pallets.

The C-130J-30 is nothing but a stretched version of the C-130J; compared to the C130J its payload is 128 passengers, 112 paratroopers or 6+1 (on the ramp) NATO standard air pallets.

Considering the limited availability of aircraft assets and taking into account that a fraction of them must in any case be kept in hangars for periodical maintenance, for the haulage of vehicles and materials to the Operations Theatres the DA has constantly employed airplanes for container transport, such as the Antonov AN-124-100 and the Ilyushin Il-76.

If one thinks that the Antonov AN-124-100, despite its being one of the biggest cargo planes available on the European market, has a load ca-

capacity limited to 80 linear metres, and if one compares this capacity to the standard bulk of vehicles and materials of a regiment, which, on average and according to typology, varies approximately from 1000 to 1500 metres, one can draw the following conclusion: the deployment and redeployment in a faraway Theatre, maybe without a coastal outlet (like Afghanistan), must be extended in time and requires necessarily the external contribution of commercial assets, with the attached spending of considerable financial resources.

At national, NATO and the EU level, there is a range of possibilities that permit to make up for the deficiencies in military assets for strategic transport by air: the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), the Airbus consortium and the constitution of a national or multinational fleet of C-17s.

SALIS is a multinational consortium aimed at increasing the airlift capability through the joint chartering of Antonov AN-124-100 planes; for some nations (Germany, France, etc.) this is a transitory solution, while waiting for the beginning of the cycle of acquisition of the Airbus A400M aircraft, envisaged for 2010.

SALIS is headed by Germany and includes Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.

On the basis of a renewable three-year contract, the mentioned sixteen nations joint-manage two AN-124-100 planes, under the «full time charter» formula (available upon a six-day notice), plus two «assured access» planes (available upon a nine-day notice).

The participating Countries have contractually undertaken to commission to the provider a minimum of 2000 flight hours per year. In the past, NATO has employed the Antonov to fly its troops to and from Afghanistan, and to transfer materi-



An Antonov AN-124-100 civilian cargo aircraft embarking a 20' container with an Astra APS-95 with CHU system (Container Handling Unit).



Embarkation phase of a 20' container (with an electric chain block lifting system) on an Antonov AN-124-100.

als to Pakistan, on the occasion of the earthquake of October 2005, and to Sudan during the humanitarian crisis of 2005.

Having assessed the preponderant disadvantages against the advantages, Italy did not participate in the SALIS project. In fact, the mentioned airplanes, according to the contract stipulated by the consortium, do not operate in non-permissive contexts and the cost per hour of flight in certain conditions is excessive.

On the contrary, for what regards the Airbus consortium, this has constituted an opportunity for increasing the national capability of strategic airlift; the project was aimed at building airplanes (A400M) that could carry great quantities of materials (25t), including air pallets (nine) and ISO containers (with adequate handling systems); but finally, for technical and political reasons, Italy in 2001 cancelled an order for 16 aeroplanes.

Germany, for example, although with obvious financial problems, is acquiring 73 Airbus A400M military transport planes, with an expense of 8.58



Above and below.

A civilian cargo aircraft Ilyushin Il-76. This plane has a payload of 40 tons or 20 linear metres of vehicles. It can also carry ISO containers.



billion Euros. Together with Germany, the nations participating in the European consortium for the purchase of the A400M are: France with 50 planes, Spain (27), Great Britain (25), Turkey (10), Belgium (7), Portugal (3) and even Luxembourg with a single plane.

Italy, by leaving the consortium in 2001, has suffered a decisive setback from the technical-logistic viewpoint, vis-à-vis the ambitions of intermodality of our Armed Forces.

At the time, some «against» of the project proved decisive for the final choice: the long

times of delivery and the limited outsize capabilities of the aircraft. It was moreover believed that the expenditure, in relation to cost/effectiveness, would be too onerous for the budget of Defence.

In view of the considerable resources employed for chartering civilian planes and the enormous difficulties met in supplying Theatres like Afghanistan and Iraq, wouldn't it perhaps be suitable to take advantage of the difficulties in which some of our partners find themselves in acquiring a number of planes that may be excessive for



their actual necessities? Another option for increasing the national airlift capability is represented by the constitution of national or multinational fleet of C-17s.

As advantages, we can surely mention the fact the aircraft is already in use and consequently is well tested; therefore it would constitute a convincing solution to the «outsize» operational problems.

In fact the loading space measures: length 26m, width 5.48m, minimum height 3.76m. The aircraft has load capacity of 77t of palletised material (18 pallets for transport by air) or 52 linear metres of motor vehicles.

Among the shortcomings one must take into account that, even if the loading space would permit to transport ISO containers (8 pieces), the plane has neither a handling system on board (electric chain block), like the Antonov A-124-100, for example), which permits the quick loading of the modules, nor a specific system to anchor the cargo to the floor (twist lock). Therefore, if one wanted to embark a containerised cargo, one had to employ specific devices (such as a truck or a winch) for shoving the modules up the ramp. One should also consider that the tare of the ISO containers (about 3t) would subtract a considerable percentage from the payload (77t), to the detriment of a rational exploitation of the assets and the speed of the transport.



Above, left and below.

A Boeing C-17 «Globemaster» military aircraft. It can carry a palletised load of up to 77 tons (18 pallets for air transport) or 52 linear metres of vehicles. The loading space measures 26m in length, 5.48m in width and a minimum height of 3.76m. Despite the considerable dimensions of the loading space, the C-17, compared to the Soviet medium-large capacity planes, has neither specific lifting systems (electric chain block) for loading and unloading, nor twist locks for lashing the modules to the floor.



Moreover, one should not overlook the high costs connected with the acquisition of the C-17, plus its operation and maintenance; besides the plane needs also adequate infrastructure (airports, hangars) and a «heavy» logistic commitment to keep it in working order.

Italy participates in the initiative that plans to constitute a multinational fleet of C-17s, through the joint, time-sharing acquisition of three or four planes. With this project, the sixteen participating Nations will be able to meet the needs of the Strategic Airlift Capability at relatively moderate costs.

In conclusion, we hope that the present tendency to outsource the strategic transport by air will be soon reversed with the acquisition of aircraft with «outsize» capability and container transport that will allow our Forces to guarantee the intermodality and to have airlift potentialities similar to those of our main European partners.

MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

For the maintenance activity we wish to start from the example given by the «Casilina» 8th Regiment, which gives us ideas for suggesting a mod-



The body shop of the «Casilina» 8th Transport Regt.

ern policy related to the specific logistic activity. For the particular maintenance activity, the mentioned unit employs a company that keeps in full working order the whole park of motor vehicles; the unit resorts also to external firms thanks to contracts for repairs and supply of spare parts.

The maintenance capability of U.Ce.Tra. (Transport Central Office) permits to provide support to the vehicles in transit, as regards both breakdown and rescue service, and restoration of efficiency.

All things considered and in relation to past experiences, in the heterogeneous maintenance organization of the regiment two «hinge» factors are winners in the unit's activity: the possibility to have a contractual cover for the repair of the Astra vehicles (e.g. HD-7 and APS-95) and the high autonomy of intervention (assistance, rescue and repair) of the workshop.

The first factor, the Astra guarantee, constitutes an example of wise fund management within the D.A.. As a matter of fact, a unit that travels all over the national territory (and sometimes also abroad), carrying out transports essential for the Theatres, requires an H24 assistance, 365 days a year. The network of military workshops and

plants, although large enough, could neither guarantee such service nor the quick procurement of spare parts.

In the case in point, the potentialities of outsourcing, coupled with a large availability of heavy means of transport and the excellent professional preparation of the military drivers, confers to the regiment a logistic physiognomy that can compete with (if not surpass) a civilian transport company.

Of course the maintenance company has the possibility of sending contact teams within 24-48 hrs all over Europe; this guarantees the operativeness of the regiment in any context or circumstance (e.g. a strike of civilian workers).

With regard to the second factor (the workshop's high autonomy of intervention), such «fly-wheel» constitutes the bargaining force of the unit; the choice to outsource, therefore, does not become unavoidable, because the regiment can resort to a highly skilled workforce.

Likewise, the recourse to outsourcing becomes a management's choice and, surely, this condition weighs considerably on both the containment of costs and the quality of the repairs made.

PROCUREMENT AND HANDLING OF CONTAINERS

When we mention intermodality, we refer of course to transports carried out with «unitised» cargoes (7), i.e. in pallets or containers



A 20' standard container.

In this paragraph we are trying to solve the following problem: «For haulage on the national territory, but especially to the Operations Theatres, is it more profitable to acquire a considerable number of military containers, which could meet



A 20' open-side container. Thanks to its fore and lateral openings a heavy cargo can be easily loaded and secured. Therefore the open-side container is particularly suitable for military employment.

every possible operational need, or to charter the containers in the desired quantity when they are needed? Obviously, as the *fil rouge* of this article shows, there is no «dogmatic» solution, but only an intermediate one.

What is really important is the procurement strategy adopted by the Service, to which the activity of management and monitoring of the civilian and military containers must be adapted. Be the modules in transit or warehoused.

According to the experience gained in the Operations Theatres, the D.A. has adopted two ways of acquiring this kind of materials: chartering from transport companies and purchase of new containers.

At first, especially for the operations in Somalia, it proved necessary to charter a substantial number of modules in order to meet the specific requirement, for lack of a sufficient «flywheel».

Afterwards, for the subsequent operations, the Service acquired a substantial number of military containers of different types: standard, open side, open top.

The materials on hand were ample, but it was nevertheless necessary to resort to chartering in order to adapt the available assets to the operational requirements.

The bonds that typify the procurement activity in the acquisition of containers are: duration of the mission, type of transport and relevant costs (return included), value of the transported materi-

al and possible need to use the containers also to store the materials in the Theatre.

To make it as short as possible: if the transfer of a container costs more than a new or a second-hand one after a particularly heavy employment (as in the case of the Afghan Theatre, which can be reached only by air), the most suitable solutions prove to be, in order of priority: chartering with a contractual clause of extinction of the charges when the containers reach the cost of new ones, purchase of second-hand standard civilian ones and cession free of charge, (to a NGO, for example) (8) when the modules are not needed anymore.

When the Theatre's distance permits a returning flow of the containers, according to cost/effectiveness criteria (as in the Balkan Theatre), it becomes profitable to use military containers, which constitute a good medium- long-term investment. When there is the certainty that the containers will return to the national territory, one should take into consideration, besides the standard containers, the acquisition of special ones (open side, open top and conditioned) and/or containers with military prerequisites that conform to NATO standards, which, although decidedly more expensive, are more suited to extreme transport conditions and to protect sensitive materials (i.e. ammunition) from damages during transfers and haulage.

CONCLUSIONS

«The utilization of the potentialities of outsourcing requires a global rethinking of the logistic organizational proceedings in order to concentrate the efforts on the strategic and main activities

“The utilization of the potentialities of outsourcing requires a global rethinking of the logistic organizational proceedings in order to concentrate the efforts on the strategic and main activities ”

From this viewpoint, some difficulties and criticalities are in sight as regards the entrustment of the outsourcing activities, especially in relation to the operation's costs and the verification of the results obtained. In substance, the many possible risks of outsourcing should be taken into account, i.e.:

- the civilian and military personnel's progressive loss of know-how. Giving up capabilities and autonomies of the military institutions and factories may turn out to be irreversible; on the other hand, the civilian industrial sector has no constraint or responsibility connected with the institutional tasks of the Defence, and gives or denies its cooperation according to factors



A 20' open-top container. It can be easily loaded with a crane through its opening on the top.

(company reorganizations, mergers, new forms of investment, etc.) that cannot be controlled by the D.A.;

- a total recourse to outsourcing may create bonds of dependence that can even be of a monopolistic nature, with the ensuing consolidation of «cartels» absolutely incompatible with the tasks of the Defence;
- the factors that can influence the reliability and continuity of the supply of external goods and services (strikes, delays not ascribable to the supplier) cannot always be governed through administrative and legal instruments;
- the EU and national contractual laws do not perfectly meet the Defence's needs of immediateness and reliability and, therefore, a policy of shrewd outsourcing is often conditioned by normative restrictions that limit their effectiveness.

One should moreover consider that, in the ambit of Defence, many proceedings, also of a logistic nature, should be considered «critical» for the operativeness of the Armed Forces, keeping in mind that while in the civilian sphere the strategic choices are essentially dictated by market demands, in the military the choices must be made in accordance with the requirements of the national security and defence.

This consideration is a fundamental parameter in the evaluation of costs, to which one must certainly pay attention, but not with the exclusive aim of obtaining budget economies.

Some essential activities (and one should certainly include the logistic activities of transport and maintenance), of absolute priority and fundamental importance, must undoubtedly be

carried out also at the cost of financial sacrifices.

Finally, when a specific logistic activity is entrusted to a third party, the action of control and monitoring must be optimised: in short, one should avoid incurring strategic mistakes that could prove fatal to the organization, or repeat errors that entail budget increases.

To this end, it is necessary to predispose all the essential procedures of verification of the service given, which can be based on a differential analysis between the service requested and the service supplied. Such assessment must not be made only by the top Structures, but in close cooperation with the final users (bodies, units, etc.) which should be, if possible, the contract executors and, in any case, always provide the evidence of what has been realized.

In conclusion, outsourcing is an extraordinary opportunity, if it is not pursued in a state of «necessity and haste», and if within ourselves we will continue to have the capabilities and skills that permit to use outsourcing from a position of «strength», keeping a minute control of the activities entrusted to third parties.

Cosimo De Lorenzo
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NOTES

(1) Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) is an advanced methodology of interventions that plans the maintenance of a give system, guaranteeing the optimization of its Life Cycle Cost. ILS is divided into three phases: project, coding and logistic configuration control.(2) For exclusive and continuative use.

(3) Guaranteed access.

(4) For the occasional acquisition of transport assets, only in case of real need.

(5) Presentation by the Defence Staff IV Div. «The experience of the Italian Ministry of Defence for the fulfilment of the national and NATO requirements». The presentation is available on the Internet: [www.laadexpo.com/files/1a7f04f3b6e996da31e23da8f51a2ecb/capresenta caoferdinando giufrida.pdf](http://www.laadexpo.com/files/1a7f04f3b6e996da31e23da8f51a2ecb/capresenta%20caoferdinando%20giufrida.pdf).

(6) Portal of the Italian Air Force: www.aeronautica.difesa.it.

(7) Unitisation consists in conditioning the cargoes in a single unit of intermodal transport to facilitate their handling.

(8) Non-governmental Organizations.





TODAY'S MILITARY



TODAY'S MILITARY

Speech made by the Hon. General Luigi Caligaris
at the meeting of the National Cavalry Association
(Pordenone, 26–28 October 2007)

One may ask why on earth one wishes to speak about the Army, today, when this subject is amply discussed on the media and on the political scene. Nevertheless, if there is no lack of information, the same cannot be said about its quality. The fact is that there is no real interest in understanding what it is and what it represents in a Country where all the institutions are in search of a role, of credibility and identity, and of a better relation with the Nation.

Apparently, in Italy the military issues do not deserve the attention given to other matters. The cultural and media *élites* are evidently ill at ease with them, and the Defence's relationship with both is edgy and reticent, while the political class shows interest only when it cannot help it, or as a pretext for starting a polemic. Differently from other Western Countries, where civil society deals with military matters in heated but qualified debates.

Thinking that they cannot obtain anything better, the Italian military are content with being considered «nice fellows» (which surrounds them with a liking to which they were certainly not accustomed), they are happy that the opinion polls put them at the very first places and that the population show them affection and warmth during their customary exhibitions as well as in difficult moments. Actually, this shows that between the Armed Forces and the Nation there is a potential of mutual solidarity that the State does not turn to account. But what is the problem today?

The problem lies in the changing of an epoch. The fall of the Berlin Wall convinced a considerable number of Europeans that Europe did not need to be defended any more and that the absence of war would relegate the Armies among the useless organizations. The Armed Forces have been reduced, and conscription was cancelled without bothering to consider what this would mean in political, social

“...while peace is achieved little by little with enormous tenacity and labour, wars are always lying in wait and take the unwary by surprise”

Fig. 1

Wars from the XX to the XXI century

WWI and WWII: wars among states, modern, industrial, mass conflicts, victims and immense destructions.

Cold War (1949-1989): virtual war, more deterrence than defence, large numbers count more than combat capacity.

Post Cold War: Local, alliance or coalition wars and postwar periods. Modern/post-modern military system. “High technology strategies”. Small scale clashes and forces.

Each time a different soldier: a reform is indispensable.

Title page.

Mission «Antica Babilonia»: «Lancieri di Montebello» on patrol.

and economic terms, besides the military ones. But hastening to get rid of everything that gives security does not pay because, as history teaches, while

peace is achieved little by little with enormous tenacity and labour, wars are always lying in wait and take the unwary by surprise. While for sixty years, since the end of WWII, peace has been reigning almost undisturbed in Europe, forms of extreme violence have been emerging in other places. They

are called asymmetric wars, and in the world the dangerousness and diffusion of military, nuclear and conventional power is growing. Challenges to stability and security disturb the international order in the Middle East, in central and eastern Asia, in the African continent. Also America is no more a sanctuary. As Raymond Aron said, «Europeans want to exit from history while hundreds of millions of other people enter or re-enter it».

A whole New World Order has still to be written.

What has marked history are wars above all, and every epoch has suffered its own, but it is the period between the XX and XXI Centuries that presented upsetting differences (fig.1). It opens with two apocalyptic worldwide wars. At the end of the second, there is the paradox of safeguarding peace in the shadow of the nuclear weapon, surrounded by large as well as motionless armies. It is the Cold War, global and virtual.

At the end of it, a transition war breaks out, the Gulf War, to which Europe, except Great Britain, is unprepared. Local wars follow in Africa and the Balkans, and peacekeeping operations increase, but the real turning point occurs at the beginning of the XXI Century, with the beginning of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The new commitments entail a different Army and a different soldier. The soldiers' stereotype, never changing armed labourers, belongs to a past to be disposed of.

The overseas enterprises (fig.2) are the great novelty, political as well as military, of the transition between the second and third millennium. In the new situation, our Army must be credited with having transformed itself, with no political guidance, support and resources, while doing its job. Its willingness to reorganize itself has no precedent. In the past, in fact, it persisted sluggishly in obsolete choices, facing unprepared every war. To be attached to the past is gratifying, but to be conditioned by it is stupid and shameful.

Nevertheless, also the opposite mistake is reprehensible, such as to be captivated by futuristic choices, as when the Pentagon decided to entrust the postwar period to the high technologies, relegating the land troops to the margins. A decision that proved disastrous. Both instances demonstrate that choices of this kind and importance should not be delegated blindly to the politicians or the military, as capable as they may be, but both should be involved in a responsible discussion.

The variety of the overseas activities would in fact suffice to define the change of employment as «epochal», but this is only a part of a revolution that is rooted in the change of the strategic policy of the Western Countries, and therefore also our own, forcing our Army to leave its barracks and operate abroad together with the Forces of other Nations.

In fact, they carry out joint operations, which for more than a decade have been following each other in a more and more expert and ambitious form. The responsibility of the enterprise is taken in turn by a different political referent: UN, NATO, EU, or a leader Nation. The operations in Bosnia are at present under the EU, those in Kosovo and Afghanistan under NATO, the United States leads the coalition in Iraq. During the crisis in Albania, Italy led the «Alba» operation. France and Great Britain directed inter-



Fig. 2

ventions in Africa. A single Nation has hardly ever conducted important operations. Not even the United States can afford them, at least for political prudence.

In the operations abroad each Country must forfeit a remarkable part of national sovereignty, so as to make the multinational machine function properly. In the nineties, with the activities led by the United Nations in Bosnia and Somalia, the multinational side was approximate and each national force was an almost independent fief. Chiefly for this reason, both endeavours ended badly. Today, thanks to a more sound and expert collaboration, those failures are improbable. But there is still a long way to go.

That a Country should aspire to a maximum autonomy is quite understandable, but this can go against the multinational formula of the operation, with serious consequences on the politico-military plane. If the political directions and the rules of engagement of the single Nations are conflicting, the effectiveness and security of the whole are impaired. There is a great deal of nonsense said about the implications of sovereignty in the field of security. It would be worth to discuss it.

Among the things changed in the Armies, there is the greater homogeneity, i.e. the lesser number of specializations, which is largely ascribable to the versatility of the network-centric C4ISR (Command-Control-Communications-Computer-Intelligence-Surveillance-Research) system, which assembles in a network operators, decision-makers, different and variously located sources of information and weapon systems. It is not only a matter of «smart weapons»: artificial intelligence is applied to the system.

Tactics and strategies are also changed thanks to C4ISR, and since the operations are entrusted to small groups or minor units, there is no more need for Divisions, Corps and Armies to be employed in battle. After two centuries, the Corps wanted by Napoleon for his daring manoeuvres, and which later became protagonists in the two World Wars, are



Mission «Antica Babilonia»: «Bersaglieri» supported by an «Ariete» tank.

out of date. Today, Major Units are an organizational and managerial module.

A vital prerequisite for operations with forces of different Nations is interoperability, i.e. «the capacity of forces and systems to exchange services and tasks among themselves, cutting burdens and maximising the individual and common potentialities». This is achieved through common language and procedures, comparable training, vehicles and weapons that are identical or have common characteristics, use the same fuel and munitions but, above all, soldiers able to operate with confidence in an interoperable system. Which is certainly something.

Multinationality has merits and shortcomings. The effectiveness of the whole is limited by the performance of a less keen or less prepared national unit; as long as nothing happens, one waves the common flag, when something goes wrong the national flags come back to the front row. For the European Countries the solution would be a European Union with its own Army and not, as it is now, separate national forces. But this solution is still far in the future.

Distance and time make life difficult for multinational forces. For instance, the European combat groups must be able to operate at a distance of 6500km from Europe. Just check that range of action on a map and imagine the difficulties that could come up.

It would be reasonable to conduct a peace-support operation, like the one in Timor East, in which also Italy participated about ten years ago. Instead, it would be unthinkable today to carry out an action like the one conducted in 1901 in China, during the Boxer War, by several European nations, and Italy among them. It is indispensable to define the range of action, provided that the scenario is realistic.

The era of the diplomacy of gunboats and expeditionary forces, counting more on the authority of

the Great Powers than on their own potentialities, has long waned, together with the empires.

Time and distance work together against interventions that must be conducted in very short times and at great distances. Only élite units can make it, provided that there is a timely political decision. Moreover, the time factor creates problems for the multinational forces, because it is very difficult to foresee the end of these engagements and, as they are exhausting, they must be conducted numerous shifts. The result is that a soldier can be sent many times to the same place at short intervals. If the situation is quiet, the task becomes a demotivating routine, while if it is a high-risk operation every re-entry into action is transformed into a nightmare. Ask the Americans about the difficulties they are meeting, after nearly 4000 casualties, to make their soldiers return to Iraq. And ask about the stress for their families.

The engagements, moreover, are of a scarcely foreseeable nature. In Italy, with superficiality, they call them all «peaceful» without distinction. But the «peace» adjective muddles one's ideas, preventing the troops from preparing, acting and reacting with due effectiveness.

Each unit must be armed according to the probable violence it has to confront, and not be scarcely armed on the basis of rosy prospects; all the more because, if the situation worsens, the dispatch of more weapons as reinforcement could be too late. Also the missions started under the best omens can rapidly worsen, surprising those who have relied too much on the concurrence of the population. Let us remember Somalia and Nassirya.

It is largely the political world's duty to explain to itself and to public opinion, without false reserves, the nature of the ventures, the risks and the reasons of the participations. Since civil society is today disconcerted by too many problems that touch it to the quick, without a convincing explanation that clarifies the «how and why» of every mission, the sword of Damocles of the precariousness of the political reaction is hanging upon it. The «all go home», even if it does not count as many followers as before, is behind the corner.

This problem is shared by all developed societies, which have had enough of the wars of the past and the related sufferings, besides a respect for life that has no comparison anywhere else. It is a hard task to involve society in military ventures carried out in remote and little known zones while the internal threat of crime is on the increase. It is a European and American problem, but it is also true that, especially in Italy, the attention on the internal and external security is lacking. Above all because of the distance between the military and the Country.

In this connection, a part was played by the end of conscription, which brought every year hundreds of

thousands of young men into the barracks, promoting bonds and memories among society and the military. Today this does not happen anymore and, since the professionals are less numerous and less present on the territory, the separation has grown. Germany, which in the last three centuries has never made a wrong military reform, today has half professional soldiers and half conscripts. What if also this time the Germans had been right?

In the past, in every Italian family there was at least a soldier, today many families don't even know one of them, nor do they know what a soldier does. The worst is that the politicians that have had some military experience can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Many do not understand the difficulties, moods and expectations of a world that has never been theirs, but which they have to shoulder nevertheless.

These operations are said to be «the war that doesn't exist». They have deserved this metaphysical nickname owing to the fact that with high tech strategy, i.e. high technology, the enemy has neither body nor face: it is only a trace on a monitor, an invisible target on which to discharge, with precision and at a great distance, an enormous firepower.

It is the war of the «strategist» corporal, whose action can start important reactions. The clash is episodic, the adversary is elusive, there are no defeats to be mourned or victories to be celebrated, but only a few successes or setbacks, whose relative importance is appreciated with difficulty in the context of a long period.

Nevertheless, this is true mainly for the Special Forces, while for the other units war does exist and is dirty. It regards the control of a territory where the enemy plays at home, among civilians, and can make use of stratagems, which in some environments, like in a city, are extraordinarily effective. In these scenarios, high technologies are scarcely successful or, to say the least, disproportionate for their purpose, as well as unintentional but traumatic cause of «friendly» and civilian losses.

After former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's infatuation with high tech, we have witnessed the advance of the doctrine of «how to win hearts and minds». A doctrine experimented with success half a century ago by Great Britain in Malaysia, which consists in conquering the confidence of the populations of the occupied Country and subsequently isolate and defeat the rebel forces. And go back home as soon as possible.

Incautiously, some assert that Italy is already following that path, because more than other nations it finds its way to the peoples' heart. But although we acknowledge the humanity of our soldiers who, unlike the Americans, do not need anthropologists to open a dialogue, honestly we go too far. The British doctrine is strategic, political and military and not



Afghanistan: Italian and French soldiers on reconnaissance.

limited to dialogue. It envisages important political actions at all levels, but also ruthless military offensives against rebel forces. Let's not delude ourselves that we can prevail only by relying on human relations. In the end someone will have to fight, and it cannot be always and only someone else's job.

Today the role of information is of vital importance. The media influence the operations, and consent depends mostly on them. But the item to be reported often is not so important as to awaken the public interest, because today's operations are conducted by scanty forces that are not commanded by renowned generals. Today, Montgomery, Mac Arthur and Rommel would certainly be ill at ease.

If there are no sensational events to report, the media go after any spectacular scrap and, when they find none, they just make it up. Because, as they say in the United States «if it bleeds it leads», meaning that if there is blood the piece of news gets the headlines and in television reports the temptation to turn the foul deed into a spectacle is not lacking. Moreover, the piece of news must be short. So much so that these wars have been labelled «teacup wars», i.e. they can be viewed while drinking a cup of tea. But shortness and reliability do not always match. In addition, as is occurring in Iraq, each day has its victims; deaths become a statistic fact that does not deserve mentioning.

For what regards the possible fallouts of the media's interest in the operations, what happened in Vietnam in 1968 deserves mentioning. Then the media attributed a vital importance to the clashes at Khe San, Hue and Saigon, convincing the American public opinion and the President himself to defend them to the death, when something else could be done. Is it not, perhaps, the case of the well-known combats at Fallujah in Iraq?

The Pentagon has recently launched the «embedding», i.e. the life in common of journalists and mil-



itary on the field. The idea is good, even if there is a risk that it may turn into a reciprocal conditioning that can harm both.

In Italy there is one more problem: it is the nauseating readiness to cooperate with the adversary, which praises the pacifism of any enterprise, implying that the soldier does not shoot, in case it gets shot. It is the instrumental martyr's syndrome. The fighter is not liked, it is better to shed easy tears, during a solemn mass, over someone designated to be a victim. Nobody considers the uncertainty caused in a man that has to act, and how much this increases the risks and reduces the capabilities. Lately, influential big names on important newspapers have ridiculed the disconcerting «do-gooder» pretension to impose submissiveness and inaction to the military. But idiocies are hard to die.


Never before have the media been so able to condition the military in their operations and politicians in their decisions, and this burdens them with enormous responsibilities. A conformist, ideological and pedestrian journalism helps to worsen things, while an independent and responsible one can give a precious contribution to the military and political difficult choices. This is another issue that deserves discussion, perhaps with a joint initiative by Army and media (fig.3).

Now, why are soldiers willing to risk? In common people's opinion the reason is money. But as Machiavelli would say, «It isn't pay that can persuade someone to die for you» *Ipse dixit* (fig.4).

According to others, it is for one's Country. But after fifty years of peace and, as regards Italy, of deliberate obscurantism on the matter, the affection for the Mother Country is more tenuous. Without the nostalgic turn imposed by President Ciampi, the Italians would still ignore what Mother Country means. Now they look at the tricolour flag with

emotion, singing the national anthem at the top of their voice, hand on heart (American style); but not long ago they applauded only the peace demonstrators and their rainbow flags. The conversion is too recent and coming from the top to be convincing. And today there is already someone that expresses the doubt that to die for one's Mother Country is foolish.

Ernesto Galli della Loggia, the well known essayist, has written a provocative book on the subject, «The Death of the Country», while Viroli's book «For Love of the Country» is neo-Risorgimento. The triptych is completed by the book written by Rizzo and Stella «La Casta» (The Caste), which shows that today Italy, our home Country, is not in good hands. If it must



be for all of us a valuable asset, which motivates our soldiers, it must be placed on a pedestal, away from cynical and greedy characters.

Also in other Countries, where patriotism is well established, the patriotic spirit is apparently vacillating. Even in Israel the dissent from conscription is

growing, and there are some that consider «stupid» to die for the Country. Nevertheless, if in the Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli had thought the same, Israel would have disappeared and the Israelis would be stateless people.

If on the present attraction of patriotism there are everywhere reasonable doubts, what could one say about other values, starting from heroism, which in the past was at the top of the scale of courage and today is often ignored or referred to for wrong reasons at the wrong moment?

An American research on heroism has been made and published on the book «A Call to Heroism». The research asserts that young people are looking for heroes and if they don't find them where a sound

“...lately, influential big names, on important newspapers, have ridiculed the disconcerting «do-gooder» pretension to impose submissiveness and inaction to the military, but idiocies are hard to die ”

culture indicates them, they seek them elsewhere. As the «Che» Guevara myth teaches. On the other hand, the book urges to speak cautiously about heroism and avoid exceeding with the term. In Italy, this is another subject that is more than worthy of discussion.

Gleaning through the foreign news magazines – because the national ones speak about it lightly and very rarely – today the ideas on heroism are rather muddled. According to someone there is no relation any more with the past and present heroes. Today, often, they call a hero someone that does not deserve it or, if he deserves it, he is mistaken for a victim. An American writes, «After Vietnam, Americans are ill at ease with military valour. It is a culture that honours the dead but not the bravery of the soldiers...this does not bolster their spirits».

In Italy, where it is not possible to lay the blame on Vietnam, the category of the fallen in combat has been replaced by the category of the victims. This is the consequence not only of the absence of a military culture that gives to every deed the name it deserves, but also of the false reserve of the political world, which condemns any employment of force, including individual combat, with the flimsy excuse of art.11 of our Constitution, which is listened to even among the military, who are offered a noble and «constitutional» pretext for avoiding risk.

More than a century ago, the much-decorated Rinaldo Pacciardi wrote, «One does not fight for the pleasure of fighting, one does not die for the pleasure of dying. One does not throw his youth away without understanding the necessity of sacrifice». To explain this «necessity» and uphold its reasons is the high task of politics.

In connection with what is said about these commitments, a British scholar observes «A soldier, whose sacrifice is considered by his parents as a wasted life, does not accept the risk of losing it». The comment of an American ranger, survivor of a combat in Mogadishu, is on the same line: «In an African city some young men have risked to die for their Country. They went back to a Country for which the combat had neither been a triumph nor a defeat. Actually, nobody cared. It was as if it had been a strange adventure, an extreme experience where things had got out of control and...excuse us...but some of us have been killed». I wonder if soldiers of other Countries have not had their reason for saying or thinking the same.

The problem is centred on the «nobody cared» referred to the American people who, after the shocking TV reports on the sufferings of the Somalian people, had demanded that soldiers be sent to Somalia. After a single shoot-out, public opinion has insisted that they should return home. From which

“...today, often, they call a hero someone that does not deserve it or, if he deserves it, is mistaken for a victim”




Fig. 5

one can see how short-lived is the consent for these operations, and how indispensable it is to motivate them in a credible way, so that they can stand the test well.

If the Americans approved of the war in Iraq it was especially because the scenario was convincing: the wound suffered, the weapons of mass destruction, an aggressive dictator, a suffering population. When, later, when some of the motivations proved groundless, it was too late to back out, when the whole Country was mobilized. To end a war is a much more difficult thing than the premature end of an action of appeasement. In the first case the politico-strategic stakes are very high, in the second there is only a temporary decrease in prestige.

The comparative superficiality with which some Countries engage or disengage themselves in ventures that are not war (operations other than war) relieves the political management of responsibilities, does not put the consent to the test and sows uncertainty among the military. In a recent meeting of British senior officers there were hints at a «Kafkaian» or «Orwellian» atmosphere. Just read Orwell's «1984» to believe it.

In other Countries there is a growing awareness of the necessity to fill, beyond any reasonable doubt, the motivational and conduct voids of these employments. In Italy one should speak about it openly and diffusely, also because the future of our security is multinational and therefore it would be advantageous to create a common feeling with the Countries destined to operate with us.

First of all, it is necessary to give shape to our security policy (fig.5), because if war is the continuation of politics, the latter has the task to point out the choices to be made with the critical advice of the military authorities. If the policy is uncertain and the military organization conforms with it, the enterprise suffers. The conformism of some American

Fig. 6



military at the beginning of the Iraqi engagement has been the subject of harsh criticism, inside and outside the military environment. An example that should not be followed.

Another matter to be discussed is what role and what rank should be assigned to Italy, and how and when the multinational commitments contribute to them. To cut a fine figure, please our allies, enhance our foreign policy, have a group photo made to our leaders, do not suffice as motivations. Considering Italy's generous military contribution, its voice will also have to be heard. If the formula of the operations is multinational, equally multinational will have to be their planning and political conduct. The inveterate habit of France, Germany and Great Britain to meet among themselves in the Summits on defence, without inviting Italy, will have to be stopped.

The initiative in Lebanon, of high political profile, is a positive example of what can be done. Hopefully, the possibility that the combat capability of our troops could be put to the test has been well considered, and it will not be necessary to rely only on the friendly collaboration of the opposing parties and on the amiability effect that our humanity assures us.

A vital aspect of our Forces' good health is to provide them with the due political and financial support. The British Government has secured for three years the budget of defence in order to protect it from possible cuts. A few days ago the Chief of Staff of the American Armed Forces has asked something similar. We should do the same, but making sure that the money is well spent.

To this end, it is necessary to help the Country understand the reasons of these choices. Why those soldiers, aircraft and ships are needed. In the past, the choices made were at times questionable, to say the least. Recently, the rationality of the expense has increased, but there is undoubtedly still room for improvements.

To explain what is necessary, and why, it is an ethical obligation rather than a political and military

one. In the past, a soldier, a gun, a ship or an aircraft more or less did not make much difference, because the war was «cold». Today the situation has changed, and weapons, materials and men are justified only if, together, ensure combat credibility, and their aim is not to gratify the industry and the military bureaucracies. This the principle pursued by others and we should also make it our own.

Consequently, the reform of the Army will have to give priority to the combat capability of the whole, resisting the corporative requests that certainly will make themselves heard. The goal is to have «good soldiers», courageous and capable, and not only «good». Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, about his soldiers in Iraq has said that they are: «brave beyond belief». What would happen to the Italian politician that dared to speak about our soldiers in these terms, instead of praising only their humanity?

And it is depressingly superficial the allegation according to which, in order to balance the expenses, one should reduce the number of soldiers. Undoubtedly there are soldiers that should be discharged because they are lazy and incompetent, and too many structures, but it would be inexcusable to dismiss «good soldiers» on the basis of a generic wish to save money. About the relation between numbers, quality and security, the ideas are confused, both as regards internal policy as well as defence policy. A serious and qualified debate should be opened on the media and at political level.

If Italy were to make cuts, especially in the Army, without renouncing its role, it should then follow the example of the Americans, who were forced to hunt for men everywhere, among the badly trained and armed ranks of the reserve, or in the less trustworthy and more expensive ranks of the mercenaries. Today there are 30,000 of them only in Iraq. Politics, when it deals with personnel, must show the fantasy and courage without which it will not be able to achieve a suitable solution. The risk is that after shrinking the Army to make it more muscular, one realizes that it was only made smaller.

The Country cannot be kept out of all this, and, to involve it, a deep cultural operation must be carried out (fig.6). It has been widely realized that, where things do not go well, what is lacking is culture. According to Sam P. Huntington, who studies seriously also military matters, it is the culture of a nation and that of its institutions that make the difference and the request for culture is widespread and growing, also on military questions. Why then our military Corps should be an exception, taking refuge in an isolating executive reality and not set itself a cultural dignity in rediscovering its own role and its own identity?

Today, in wishing a military culture in Italy, we do not have in mind the disputes between intervention-



Afghanistan: an Italian patrol on surveillance duty.

ists and pacifists of WWI. Neither we are thinking of the rhetoric flights of the Fascist era nor of the discriminating monologues of the Italian pacifism of the postwar period. We believe in convincing efforts aimed at explaining clearly and openly what is the role of the military institutions in our society and how they should implement it. To inform about a subject on which Italy has never shined it is not easy indeed, but one should try anyway. But how?

The occasional interventions of political and military authorities, the learned disquisitions *ex cathedra*, the official notes commenting facts or in memory of events, the unfailing political quarrels regarding the budget of Defence or the funding of overseas missions do not answer the purpose. Neither suffice the occasional editorials of highly rated journalists to fill of the vacuum of knowledge, sometimes their own. All that is written and said is certainly better than the indolent and hostile silence that has weighed on the Armed Forces after the war, but it is not enough to form a new culture.

What is necessary is a political and institutional culture abreast of the times, which should be understood and shared by the nation's society. To this end, it is necessary to open an in-depth and open debate in which the various opinion converge, involving as many citizens as possible, military and non-military, of any generation and origin. The Italian *intelligentsia* that helped so much to alienate the

military and to mortify their identity, now has a precious occasion to pay its debt.

And what is the reason? Certainly not for making Italy a militarist nation, an impossible and useless enterprise that has disappointed whomever has thoughtlessly attempted it, but to induce the Italians to discuss about a part of our institutions, not only the Army, but also the whole Armed Forces, whose physical, social, functional, political and cultural isolation is no good for anyone. The generic and occasional solidarity and liking shown to them is only a starting point, certainly not the goal.

After all, we cannot just ask the Army to carry out its task as politics wants. The Army is a multifaceted structure, with a body and a soul that must be assiduously supported and looked after. The present moment of favour is not irreversible. Even the formidable army of Prussia's Frederick the Great, in a few years became a soulless fragile body. And the same happened to many other armies.

Fig. 7




The Army is not like a bottomless well from where to draw, when necessary, a few soldiers willing to fight. Too easy. In every army there have been, and there will be, men that are there only for mere professional pride. On the contrary, it is a matter of providing Italy with an Army up to its needs and ambitions. And, to achieve this, it is necessary to know it. Moreover, this would also help Italy to know itself.

The aspects that deserve the discussion I mentioned before are only scattered samples of an ambitious cultural operation (fig.7), at the end of which the Italians, like their allies, should tell what kind of army and soldiers they want. But how do we involve a Country that has never taken any interest in these things?

As a cavalryman among cavalrymen, I suggest to clear the hurdles with the daring and energy of a cavalry charge. Moreover, for today's Italy, so confused and insecure, to «fling its heart over the obstacle» could be an excellent cure!





THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN INFANTRY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR



THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN INFANTRY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The extensive bibliography documenting and reporting the events of that bloody conflict has often overlooked some operational aspects that decidedly influenced the final events.

Among these, the gradual transformations undergone by the infantry units are very significant. At first to hold the enemy forces, and then to drive them back beyond the Alps.

At the beginning of the hostilities the Italian Infantry consisted of a total of 548 battalions that were divided into 438 battalions of Infantry, 58 of Bersaglieri and 52 of Alpine troops, among which 26 were of territorial militia. The Infantry would have been organized into a standing army that included the units that existed in peacetime, into mobile and territorial militia, which consisted of new units that could be employed as a reserve and for the internal defence of the State. Actually, the units of mobile militia were made up of the personnel of the same levy of the units of the standing army; consequently there was not a marked difference between these units. The units of territorial militia, which consisted of senior or young personnel that had been enrolled in these units, were employed to perform auxiliary tasks and rarely in the front line, with the exception of the Alpine units.

The Infantry and Granatieri regiments should have consisted of three battalions of four companies, each with an average of 250 men and a «machine gun» section for each battalion. Actually, the personnel were not complete because they were often lacking the «machine gun» section and the baggage train. At first the Bersaglieri battalions consisted of three companies, but at the beginning of 1916 they were given the fourth company. The Brigade that was made up of two Infantry regiments represented the fundamental tactical unit, but if this might be true in theory, it was not in practice, since at the beginning of the campaign several regiments ended up operating in isolation and sometimes in areas distant from those where their brigade operated. The Bersaglieri regiments that were employed as supplementary troops and were detached from the cyclist battalions, had the same problems of personnel shortage. On the contrary, the Alpine units had a full complement of personnel and equipment and consequently were efficient, both materially and morally.

On the whole, the army went to war with Infantry units that were not properly organized and only in the



Title pages.

A Bersaglieri squad training in the zone behind the Piave front line.

Above.

A 6,5mm «Maxim Vickers» machine-gun section of a Bersaglieri regiment at the beginning of the conflict.

spring of 1916 the units acquired the organizational effectiveness envisaged by the rules of mobilization. So organized, the Italian Infantry took part in the first bloody attacks that could not break through the enemy lines. The limited success in the battles of 1915 had been achieved thanks to the fervour and the bravery of the infantrymen; however they paid a high price for it, since they were not supported by weapons and by medium- and large-calibre artillery.

In the first months of the war there was an increase in the number of units which made the Infantry stronger (an increase of a quarter). In the spring of 1916, in fact, 32 new Infantry regiments, 26 Alpine battalions and 4 Bersaglieri regiments took to the battlefield; it was the largest increase in the forces during the campaign. But it was the support of new weapons and equipment that strengthened the Infantry enormously. Besides as hand grenades, bomb throwers and passive protective devices (helmets and shields) the soldiers were issued automatic weapons, in order to increase the number of machine guns. In

October 1916 each regiment had 4 machine gun sections, as well as one or two «submachine gun» sections, the latter was a new weapon used for close combat. In addition, each Brigade and Division was given two heavy machine gun units, which later would become companies,. Since the trench warfare had called for works of field defence, the number of sappers in the Infantry regiment was increased through the establishment of sapper units for each Infantry battalion; they were entrusted with the tasks previously assigned to the Corps of Engineers. In addition, the number of stretcher-bearers that were assigned to each Infantry company was increased (from 4 to 8 men) and the drummers became dispatch riders.

On the one hand, in the summer of 1916 the required enlargement of the Army led to a decrease in the strength of the companies (225 men), to a crisis in the cadres, because of heavy losses and bad recruitment strategies, and to a crisis in weaponry that made necessary the use of the old Vetterli rifle model 87/16 to arm the second line units. On the other hand, the war experience, the improved training, the use of new weapons such as the bombards and an increase in the amount of the artillery available, boosted the chances of success that peaked in August 1916 with the taking of Gorizia. During the winter of 1916–1917, organic units of skiers were organized into platoons, companies and battalions for tactical employment in the mountains. They were made up of members of the alpine troops and enjoyed some degree of logistic autonomy. They were almost completely disbanded in the spring of 1917.

Between the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, plans aimed at further enlarging the Army were prepared. Nine Infantry Brigades and a reserve unit were established with young personnel from Headquarters, services and battalions of territorial militia. In addition, in the first months of 1917, an important measure designed to use the individual skills of the infantrymen and to make them specialists was adopted unanimously. At first, squads of grenade throwers (both by hand and by rifle) were established. Then, in the summer of 1917, units of assault Infantry soldiers, (the «Arditi»), volunteers who had remarkable physical skills and fought bravely, were formed. They were organized into autonomous companies and battalions. Then they became units of three companies each, armed with 6 submachine guns, three heavy machine gun sections, 6 hand-held flamethrower sections and one torpedo-thrower section.

In the spring of 1917 the shape of the Brigade and the battalion changed radically. In the Brigade a reserve battalion, made up of as many companies as there were battalions that needed to be supplied, was



The 58mm «Bombard» was introduced in the infantry Division towards the end of the war.

established. In the battalion, after the company had been decreased at first to 200 and then to 175 men, the fourth company became a machine gun company, so that the number of machine guns in the regiment increased from 8 to 18; in addition, the submachine guns increased to section for each rifle company, and each battalion was given a section of 6 torpedo throwers to help the Infantrymen to crush the resistance met in the battlefield.

In October 1917, the Infantry consisted of 900,000 men, which was the equivalent of half the strength of the operational Army; there were 868 battalions, 64 of which Bersaglieri and 85 Alpini, as well as 615 autonomous machine-gun companies, 12 cyclist Bersaglieri battalions and 21 assault units. On the whole, the Infantry units increased by a third of their original number. Between the summer and the autumn of 1917 four new Brigades, organized into three Infantry regiments, were established.

In October–November 1917 the twelfth battle of the Isonzo took place. The retreat to the river Piave caused heavy losses, even with regard to the artillery. This made the reorganization of the Army, and in particular of the Infantry, necessary. 23 Infantry Brigades, 3 Bersaglieri battalions and 20 Alpine battalions were disbanded. The Infantry units were reduced by about a fifth, the Bersaglieri by a seventh and the Alpine units by a quarter. Even the strength of the companies was reduced at first to 150 and then to 145 men. Within the company all the auxiliary soldiers of the Headquarters and those who were assigned to special tasks were organized into a platoon, which was called «mixed». Thus each company had three «ordinary» rifle platoons, one «mixed» platoon and one submachine-gun section.

“ ...in the first months of the war there was an increase in the number of units which made the Infantry stronger by a quarter ”



A high altitude «Vickers» machine-gun emplacement.

At the same time, the units that had survived were reinforced by adding the reserve officers of the 1899 levy. New Brigades and regiments were formed: they were made up of soldiers who were specialists in artillery bombardiers and had run out of heavy weapons. They were employed as line Infantry units. The reorganization was rapid, so that in June 1918 the Italian Infantry could validly counter the Austro-Hungarian offensive launched on the Piave, on Mount Grappa and on the «Altipiani».

In 1918 the Infantry units did not undergo marked and significant changes, but they were improved and made more efficient by using new weapons such as the «Stokes» mortar in place of the torpedo thrower, assault flamethrowers and the 37mm light cannons, by increasing the number of machine guns (each regiment had 36 heavy weapons on average, considering also the automatic weapons that were given to the Brigades and Divisions) and by establishing in each regiment one assault platoon. In addition, an important decision was made: the machine gunners would no longer be under the orders of the training centres of the machine gunner units; they were to become an integral part of battalions and regiments. This measure was designed to improve the performance of the machine gun units in combat.

In order that different units came together well, the Infantry, the Artillery and the Corps of Engineers got on very well with each other and the Major Units could improve their performance in combat, the principle of the indivisibility of the Division was established. Until then, in fact, the limited supply of forces had caused different units to operate separately according to the pressing needs of the moment. But, later on, the new

Chief of Staff, General Armando Diaz, ordered that the Division should operate as a whole with its two Infantry Brigades, its field Artillery regiment and its support units.

An important innovation introduced in the Italian army during the Great War was at first the establishment of assault Divisions and then the establishment of an assault Corps. The assault Division included units of assault Infantry, Bersaglieri, Artillery transported by pack animals, Cavalry, cyclists and technical troops. At the end of 1918 the automatic carbine replaced the rifle as individual weapon and a project at the planning stage was a new model of Infantry battalion whose members were trained to fire direct shots, following the German model. This new formation was equipped with 37 weapons firing in bursts, as against the 16 arms of the old battalion. This innovation, which would change the combat technique of the Infantry as well as the organization, could not be adopted before the end of the hostilities.

With regard to transport, during the war there was a reduction in the use of the carriage in the Infantry regiments, but each Infantry, Grenadier and Bersaglieri regiment was equipped with a baggage train. The number of mules was reduced from 216 to 100.

When the armistice was signed, the Infantry consisted of 702 battalions of line Infantry, Grenadiers, Bersaglieri and Alpini, as well as 29 battalion-level assault units; its overall strength was equivalent to

three-fifths of the total strength of the Army. In November 1918 the percentages of elite troops (Bersaglieri and assault units) and special troops (Alpini and Bersaglieri cyclists) were 7,2% and 8% respectively, compared to the line Infantry. Despite the great development of the Artillery and the increase in the Corps of Engi-

neers, during the period 1917-1918 the percentage reduction in the Infantry was not very high compared to the other Specialities.

In conclusion, the main lines of development of the Italian Infantry during the Great War were:

- A massive increase in the number of machine guns, to develop the firepower of the minor units;
- A constant decrease in the strength of the company (from 250 to 145 rifles) to save human resources;
- Specialization of the Infantry skills with the establishment of the assault troops;
- Introduction of new fire sources (light cannons, flamethrowers, torpedo throwers, mortars, sub-machine guns, automatic carbines and hand grenades and rifle-launched grenades).

Filippo Cappellano
Lieutenant Colonel

Commander, Defence Service-Units Command

“The retreat to the Piave caused heavy losses, and this made necessary the reorganization of the army, and of the Infantry in particular”



Il Mar Nero, di Giovanni Ercolani e Carlo Frappi (pag. 2).

Perno del fianco sud della NATO, per gran parte del XX secolo ha rappresentato uno spartiacque e una barriera naturale all'espansionismo sovietico verso l'area euro-mediterranea.

Dopo la Guerra Fredda, ha riacquisito significatività e centralità come snodo fondamentale per il transito delle risorse energetiche euroasiatiche verso i mercati occidentali. Uno scacchiere che, confine orientale dell'UE, si presenta tra i più complessi e determinanti per lo sviluppo del panorama delle relazioni internazionali dell'intera area euroasiatica.

Darfur: la strage infinita, di Daniele Cellamare (pag. 12).

Nella martoriata regione occidentale del Sudan, dove religione e interessi economici si intrecciano in una trama inestricabile, le Nazioni Unite, l'Unione Europea e quella Africana sono impegnate in un'alacre operazione di peacekeeping i cui risultati appaiono spesso scarsamente decrittificabili. Le istituzioni sono ormai in evidente decomposizione e i riflessi rischiano d'investire anche i Paesi vicini.

Quanto sta accadendo è riportato in queste pagine, nelle quali sono stigmatizzati i drammatici sviluppi di un genocidio che sembra inarrestabile.

Il sogno di Pristina, di Daniele Cellamare (pag. 28).

L'indipendenza unilaterale del Kosovo è stata proclamata. Ma Belgrado si oppone, l'Unione Europea è divisa sul riconoscimento, il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite si è spaccato, Russia e Cina appoggiano i serbi. Dopo un travagliato percorso, il Kosovo è ancora oggi un intrigo internazionale difficile da sbrogliare: interessi e rancori inquinano l'azione politica e diplomatica mettendo a repentaglio la pace e la stabilità della tormentata regione balcanica.

Un'Europa da rifondare, di Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pag. 46).

Gli osservatori più attenti sono concordi nel sostenere che non bastano alcuni semplici aggiustamenti istituzionali per dare respiro alla Carta costituzionale. Per il suo eventuale rilancio sarà indispensabile esplicitare il progetto che si intende promuovere e verificarne l'effettiva applicabilità, oltre a definirne chiaramente i limiti geografici.

L'Europa guarda a est, di Giuseppe Romeo (pag. 54).

Sicurezza e difesa sono valori imprescindibili per la realizzazione di un assetto politico, economico e sociale del progetto eurounionista. Dopo la recente firma del nuovo testo fondamentale a Lisbona, in uno scenario a ventisette membri, la strategia futura dipenderà sempre di più da una chiara condivisione di responsabilità nell'ambito continentale. Una condivisione che continui a privilegiare le relazioni con gli Stati Uniti, ma che sia orientata anche a rafforzare le «periferie» a est tenendo in debito conto le esigenze di Mosca.

Guerriglia, terrorismo e guerra asimmetrica, di Ferruccio Botti (pag. 62).

Gli attuali scenari operativi hanno definitivamente archiviato il tradizionale concetto di «guerra classica» per aprire una nuova frontiera del pensiero strategico, dove guerriglia, terrorismo e guerra asimmetrica impongono una radicale revisione della fisionomia delle Forze Armate. Da questo quadro emerge la complessità delle nuove esigenze da affron-

tare, per le quali è necessario spesso prescindere dai vecchi schemi dottrinali, senza tuttavia rinunciare del tutto alle esperienze del passato.

La Force Protection, di Giorgio Battisti (pag. 72).

La Force Protection ha sempre avuto, in ogni epoca, una specifica attenzione da parte degli Eserciti regolari quale condizione necessaria per il successo delle operazioni.

Si tratta di un fondamentale principio militare riconosciuto in ogni Forza Armata che prevede per tutte le unità, Comandi inclusi, la capacità di sapersi difendere in modo appropriato contro gli effetti di un'azione ostile.

Questo aspetto ha acquisito un valore via via crescente a partire dalla comparsa del terrorismo moderno, con gli attentati ai contingenti statunitense e francese a Beirut nell'ottobre 1983.

Ciò ha portato ad attribuire un prioritario interesse alla protezione dei soldati essendo i più esposti alle tattiche adottate dall'avversario che, sfruttando ogni percepibile debolezza nel dispositivo, mirano a colpire in ogni momento e circostanza per creare un clima di generalizzata insicurezza tra le Forze.

Un Osservatorio per la sicurezza nazionale, di Sara Gregg (pag. 82).

A Palazzo Salviati, prestigiosa sede del Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa, si è tenuto, nei mesi scorsi, un interessante convegno sul tema. In particolare, i numerosi e qualificati relatori si sono soffermati su tre aspetti nevralgici: sicurezza transfrontaliera, sicurezza urbana, infrastrutture critiche.

Afghanistan: Operazione Unified Venture, di Gianpaolo Romoli (pag. 92).

La Task Force «Nibbio» ha svolto, nelle infide vallate al confine con il Pakistan, una brillante operazione volta a neutralizzare formazioni terroristiche e a creare condizioni di sicurezza e stabilità.

Dal racconto di uno dei protagonisti si evince la straordinaria professionalità dei nostri militari impegnati per la prima volta in un eliasalto in ambiente operativo.

L'esternalizzazione dei trasporti militari, di Cosimo De Lorenzo e Franco Fratini (pag. 104).

Dagli anni Novanta l'Esercito, al pari di altre grandi imprese civili e di altri enti pubblici, ha intrapreso un rapido processo di esternalizzazione della logistica. Ma, negli ultimi tempi, sono emerse diffuse perplessità soprattutto sul rapporto costi-benefici dell'operazione.

Delegare può essere conveniente, una stretta collaborazione con il comparto industriale è auspicabile, ma, specie nelle Forze Armate, la responsabilità e i rischi non sono delegabili.

L'esperienza condotta presso l'8° reggimento trasporti «Casilina» può costituire un significativo esempio di oculata gestione delle risorse e di equo bilanciamento tra internalizzazione ed esternalizzazione.

I Militari d'oggi, di Luigi Caligaris (pag. 124).

Intervento dell'Onorevole Generale Luigi Caligaris al raduno dell'Associazione Nazionale Arma di Cavalleria (Pordenone 26-28 ottobre 2007).

L'evoluzione della Fanteria italiana nella Grande Guerra, di Filippo Cappellano (pag. 134).

La vasta bibliografia che documenta e racconta le vicende di quel sanguinoso conflitto ha sovente trascurato alcuni aspetti, soprattutto operativi, che hanno decisamente influenzato gli eventi finali.

Tra questi, di assoluta rilevanza sono le graduali trasformazioni a cui furono sottoposte le unità di fanteria, dapprima per arginare il nemico, poi per ricacciarlo al di là delle Alpi.



The Black Sea, by Giovanni Ercolani and Carlo Frappi (p. 2).
Pivot of NATO's southern flank, for most of the 20th Century the Black Sea has been a watershed and a natural barrier against the Soviet expansionism towards the Euro-Mediterranean area. After the Cold War, it reacquired its significance and centrality as a fundamental hinge for the transit of Euro-Asian resources towards the western markets. It is a theatre which, being on the eastern border of the EU, appears to be one of the most complex and crucial factors for the development of an overall picture of the international relations in the entire Euro-Asian area.

Darfur: The Endless Massacre, by Daniele Cellamare (p. 12).
In this tormented western region of Sudan, where religion and economic interests intermingle in an inextricable web, the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union are engaged in an active peacekeeping operation, whose results can hardly be decrypted. The institutions are by now in a clear state of decay whose reflections threaten to involve also the neighbouring Countries. This article reports what is taking place and stigmatizes the tragic developments of a seemingly unrestrainable genocide.

Pristina's Dream, by Daniele Cellamare (p. 28).
The unilateral independence of Kosovo has been proclaimed. But Belgrade is in staunch opposition, the European Union is divided on the recognition, the United Nations Security Council is split in two, and Russia and China support the Serbs. After a troubled course, Kosovo is still an entangled, complex international mess: interests and rancour mar political and diplomatic actions, jeopardizing the peace and stability of the tormented Balkan region.

A Europe to be Refounded, by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 46).
The most scrupulous observers are agreed in maintaining that some simple institutional adjustments do not suffice to revive the constitutional Charter. For its possible relaunching it is indispensable to explain the project to be promoted and to verify its actual applicability, besides defining its geographic limits clearly.

Europe Looks to the East, by Giuseppe Romeo (p. 54).
Security and defence are values absolutely necessary for the realization of a political, economic and social structure of the Euro-unionist project. After the recent signing in Lisbon of the new basic text in a 27-member scenario, the future strategy will increasingly depend on a clear sharing of responsibilities within the continental area. A sharing that should continue to favour the relations with the United States, but also be oriented towards a reinforcement of the eastern «peripheries», taking into due account Moscow's requirements.

Guerrilla Warfare, Terrorism and Asymmetric War, by Ferruccio Botti (p. 62).
Today's operational scenarios have dismissed for good the traditional concept of «classic war» and opened a new frontier of strategic thought, where guerrilla warfare, terrorism

and asymmetric war entail a radical revision of the Armed Forces' features. This picture shows the complexity of the new requirements, for which it is often necessary to abandon the old doctrinal schemes, but without renouncing the experiences of the past.

Force Protection, by Giorgio Battisti (p. 72).
Force Protection has always been considered by the regular Armies a necessary prerequisite for successful operations. It is a basic military principle, acknowledged by all Services, that envisages for all units, including Headquarters, an appropriate self-defence capability against the effects of hostile actions. This aspect has been acquiring a growing value since the appearance of modern terrorism, with the attacks against the American and French contingents in Beirut in October 1983. This has led to attribute a primary interest to the protection of soldiers, since they are the most exposed to the tactics adopted by the enemy who, by exploiting every perceived weakness in the deployment, aims at striking at any moment and in any circumstance, in order to create a climate of general insecurity.


An Observatory for National Security, by Sara Gregg (p. 82).
An interesting meeting on National Security was recently held at Palazzo Salviati, the prestigious home of the Centre for High Defence Studies. In particular, the numerous and qualified speakers dwelt on three very important aspects: trans-border security, urban security and sensitive infrastructure.

Afghanistan: Operation Unified Venture, by Gianpaolo Romoli (p. 92).
The «Nibbio» Task Force has carried out, in the risky valleys bordering on Pakistan, a brilliant operation aimed at neutralizing terrorist formations, creating conditions of security and stability. The account of one of the protagonists tells us about the extraordinary professionalism of our soldiers, engaged for the first time in a helicopter attack conducted in an operational environment.

Outsourcing of Military Transport, by Cosimo De Lorenzo and Franco Fratini (p. 104).
Since the nineties, the Army, like other large civilian firms and government bodies, has been undertaking a rapid process of outsourcing of logistics. But widespread perplexities have been emerging lately, especially about the cost-effectiveness of the operation. To delegate may be advantageous, a close cooperation with the industrial sector is desirable but, particularly in the Armed Forces, responsibilities and risks cannot be delegated. The experience made at the 8th «Casilina» Transport Regiment can be a significant example of shrewd management of resources and correct balance between insourcing and outsourcing.

Today's Military, by Luigi Caligaris (p. 124).
Speech made by the Hon. General Luigi Caligaris at the meeting of the National Cavalry Association (Pordenone, 26-28 October 2007).

The Evolution of the Italian Infantry in the First World War, by Filippo Cappellano (p. 134).
The extensive bibliography documenting and reporting the events of that bloody conflict has often overlooked some operational aspects that decidedly influenced the final events. Among these, the gradual transformations undergone by the infantry units are very significant. At first to hold the enemy forces, and then to drive them back beyond the Alps.



La Mer Noire, par Giovanni Ercolani et Carlo Frappi (p. 2).

Pivot du flanc sud de l'OTAN, la Mer Noire a représenté pour la plupart du XX^e siècle une ligne de partage des eaux, une barrière naturelle contre l'expansionnisme soviétique vers la région euro-méditerranéenne. Après la Guerre Froide, elle a commencé à jouer un rôle de première importance en tant que carrefour pour le passage des ressources énergétiques euro-asiatiques vers les marchés occidentaux.

Un échiquier géopolitique, à la frontière orientale de l'UE, parmi les plus complexes et les plus déterminants pour le développement du panorama des relations internationales dans l'ensemble de la région euro-asiatique.

Darfour: le massacre infini, par Daniele Cellamare (p. 12).

Dans cette région tourmentée du Soudan où la religion et les intérêts économiques s'entremêlent d'une façon inextricable, les Nations Unies, l'Union Européenne et l'Union Africaine sont engagées dans une opération ardue de peacekeeping dont les résultats semblent difficiles à décrypter.

Les institutions se sont désormais effondrées et les retombées risquent d'investir les pays voisins.

Le récit des événements est reporté sur ces pages qui stigmatisent les déroulements tragiques d'un génocide qui semble inexorable.

Le rêve de Pristina, par Daniele Cellamare (p. 28).

L'indépendance unilatérale du Kosovo a été proclamée. Toutefois, Belgrade s'y oppose, l'Union Européenne est partagée quant à sa reconnaissance, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies est divisé et la Russie et la Chine soutiennent les Serbes. Après avoir parcouru un chemin tourmenté, le Kosovo est toujours une intrigue internationale qu'il n'est pas aisé de dé mêler: l'action politique et diplomatique est minée par des intérêts et des rancunes qui mettent en danger la paix et la stabilité de cette Région déchirée.

Une Europe qui demande à être reconstruite, par Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 46).

Les observateurs les plus attentifs sont d'accord pour dire que de simples réajustements institutionnels ne sauraient suffire à donner un nouvel élan à la Charte constitutionnelle. La relance éventuelle de cette dernière demande que soit explicité le projet que l'Europe souhaite promouvoir, que l'on en vérifie l'applicabilité effective et que l'on en définisse les limites géographiques.

L'Europe regarde vers l'Est, par Giuseppe Romeo (p. 54).

Sécurité et défense sont autant d'éléments indispensables à l'organisation politique, économique et sociale du projet euro-unioniste. Conformément au nouveau texte fondamental signé récemment à Lisbonne par vingt-sept pays, la future stratégie dépendra de plus en plus d'une séparation nette des responsabilités dans le contexte continental. Une division qui, tout en continuant à privilégier les relations avec les Etats-Unis, devra renforcer les «périphéries» de l'est et tenir compte des exigences de Moscou.

Guérilla, terrorisme et guerre asymétrique, par Ferruccio Botti (p. 62).

Les théâtres opérationnels actuels ont définitivement mis aux archives le concept traditionnel de «guerre classique» et ont ouvert une nouvelle voie à la pensée stratégique où guérilla, terrorisme et guerre asymétrique imposent une révision radi-

cale de la physionomie des Forces armées. Il s'ensuit que pour affronter la complexité des nouveaux théâtres il faudra désormais faire abstraction des anciens schémas doctrinaux, sans renoncer pour autant aux expériences du passé.

La Force Protection, par Giorgio Battisti (p. 72).

La «Force Protection» a toujours été considérée par les Armées régulières comme une condition nécessaire pour la réussite des opérations. Il s'agit d'un principe militaire fondamental reconnu dans l'ensemble des Forces armées, qui prévoit pour toutes les unités, y compris les Commandements, la capacité de se défendre de façon appropriée contre les effets d'une action hostile. Cet aspect est devenu de plus en plus important par suite de l'avènement du terrorisme moderne, avec l'attentat contre les troupes américaines et françaises à Beyrouth en octobre 1983. D'où le besoin d'accorder une attention primordiale à la protection des soldats, ceux-ci étant les plus exposés aux tactiques adoptées par l'adversaire qui ne manque pas de profiter de la moindre faille dans le dispositif pour attaquer et instaurer un climat général d'instabilité et d'insécurité entre les forces.

Un observatoire pour la Sécurité Nationale, par Sara Gregg (p. 82).

Cette question a été l'objet récemment d'une réunion d'étude très intéressante qui s'est tenue au Palazzo Salviati, siège prestigieux du Centre des Hautes Etudes pour la Défense. Les intervenants, nombreux et qualifiés, ont centré leur attention sur trois aspects névralgiques, à savoir: la sécurité transfrontières, la sécurité urbaine et les infrastructures critiques.

Afghanistan: Opération Unified Venture, par Gianpaolo Romoli (p. 92).

La Task Force «Nibbio» a effectué, dans les vallées insidieuses à la frontière avec le Pakistan, une brillante opération visant à neutraliser des formations terroristes et à créer des conditions de sécurité et de stabilité. Le récit de l'un des protagonistes met en évidence l'extraordinaire professionnalisme des militaires italiens engagés pour la première fois dans un assaut avec des hélicoptères dans un théâtre opérationnel.

L'externalisation des transports militaires, par Cosimo De Lorenzo et Franco Fratini (p. 104).

A partir des années 90, l'Armée de terre, tout comme d'autres entreprises civiles ou organismes publics, a entrepris un processus rapide d'externalisation de sa logistique. Toutefois, une certaine perplexité s'est répandue dernièrement à cet égard, notamment pour ce qui est du rapport coût - bénéfice de l'opération. Si tant est que déléguer peut présenter des avantages et qu'il y a lieu de souhaiter une étroite collaboration avec le secteur industriel, il n'en est pas moins vrai que dans le cas des Forces armées les responsabilités et les risques ne sauraient être délégués. L'expérience faite par le 8^e Régiment Transports «Casilina» peut être un exemple significatif d'une gestion réfléchie des ressources et d'un équilibre raisonnable entre internalisation et externalisation.

Les militaires d'aujourd'hui, par Luigi Caligaris (p. 124).

Intervention du Général Luigi Caligaris à l'occasion de la réunion de l'«Associazione Nazionale Arma di Cavalleria» (Portofino 26-28 octobre 2007)

L'évolution de l'Infanterie italienne pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, par Filippo Cappellano (p. 134).

La vaste bibliographie qui raconte les événements liés à ce conflit sanglant a souvent négligé certains aspects, notamment opérationnels, qui ont été décisifs quant à son issue. Parmi ceux-ci, il convient de signaler, de par leur importance, les transformations graduelles qu'ont subies les unités de l'Infanterie pour contrecarrer l'avance de l'ennemi d'abord et le repousser au-delà des Alpes ensuite.



Das Schwarze Meer, von Giovanni Ercolani und Carlo Frappi (S. 2).

Stütze der südlichen Seite der NATO hat es für den Grossteil des XX Jahrhunderts die Wasserscheide und eine natürliche Barriere gegen die sowjetische Expansionspolitik hin zum euro-mediterranen Bereich dargestellt. Nach dem kalten Krieg hat die Region Bedeutung und Zentralität als grundlegender Knotenpunkt des Transits der euroasiatischen Energieressourcen nach den westlichen Märkten wiedergewonnen. Ein Gebiet an der östlichen Grenze der EU, das unter den komplexesten und entscheidendsten für die Entwicklung des Panoramas der internationalen Beziehungen in der ganzen euroasiatischen Zone erscheint.

Darfur: das unendliche Blutbad, von Daniele Cellamare (S. 12).

In der westlichen gequälten Region von Sudan, wo Religion und ökonomische Interessen sich in eine unlösbare Intrige kreuzen, sind die Vereinten Nationen, die Europäische und die Afrikanische Union in einer gemeinsamen Peace-Keeping-Operation engagiert, wobei die Ergebnisse oft unentzifferbar sind. Die Institutionen sind nunmehr in sichtbarer Zerlegungszustand und es besteht die Gefahr, dass die Auswirkungen auch die Nachbarländer betreffen. Was dort im Moment geschieht, wird in den nächsten Seiten, mit der Beschreibung der dramatischen Entwicklungen von einem Völkermord, der unaufhaltsam scheint, benachrichtigt.

Der Traum von Pristina, von Daniele Cellamare (S. 28).

Die unilaterale Unabhängigkeit von Kosovo ist proklamiert worden. Belgrad setzt sich entgegen, die Europäische Union ist gar nicht einig über die Anerkennung, der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen ist gespalten, Russland und China unterstützen die Serben. Nach einer mühsamen Fahrt ist Kosovo noch heute eine internationale, schwierig zu entwirren Intrige: Interessen und Groll verderben die politische und diplomatische Aktion, indem sie Frieden und Stabilität in der Balkanregion aufs Spiel setzen.

Europa wiederzugründen, von Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (S. 46).

Die aufmerksamsten Beobachter stimmen überein, darin zu behaupten, dass bloße institutionelle Abänderungen nicht genügen, um die Konstitution wieder zu Atmen kommen lassen. Für eine eventuelle Wiederlancierung wird es notwendig sein, das Projekt, das man fördern will, klar auszudrücken und seine effektive Anwendbarkeit zu prüfen, dazu noch seine geographischen Grenzen zu definieren.

Europa schaut nach Osten, von Giuseppe Romeo (S. 54).

Sicherheit und Schutz sind unumgängliche Werte für die Erzielung einer politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Ordnung des eurounionistischen Projektes. Nach der Unterschrift in Lissabon des neuen Grundtextes, in einem Szenarium von 27 Mitgliedern, wird die zukünftige Strategie immer mehr von einer deutlichen Verantwortungsverteilung im kontinentalen Bereich abhängig sein. Eine Verteilung, die die Beziehungen mit den Vereinigten Staaten weiterbevorzugt, die aber auch orientiert ist, die östlichen «Peripherien», mit Rücksicht auf die Ansprüche von Moskau, zu verstärken.

Guerilla, Terrorismus und asymmetrischer Krieg, von Ferruccio Botti (S. 62).

Die aktuellen Operationsszenarien haben den traditionellen Begriff von «klassischen Krieg» endgültig archiviert, um eine neue Grenze des strategischen Gedankens zu öffnen, wo Guerilla, Terrorismus und asymmetrischer Krieg eine radikale Revision des Charakters der Streitkräften auferlegen. Aus diesem Bild kommt die Komplexität der neuen Erfordernisse hervor, für die man oft von den alten theoretischen Schemen absehen muss, ohne trotzdem auf die Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit zu verzichten.

Die Force-Protection, von Giorgio Battisti (S. 72).

Die Force-Protection hat in jeder Zeit eine spezifische Aufmerksamkeit, seitens der regulären Heere, als Voraussetzung für den Erfolg der Operationen bekommen. Es handelt sich um einen militärischen Grundsatz, von jedem Korps erkannt, der für jede Einheit, einschließlich der Kommandanturen, die Fähigkeit, sich gegen die Folgen einer Feindesaktion angemessen schützen zu können, vorsieht.

Dieser Aspekt hat seit dem Erscheinen des modernen Terrorismus, nach dem Attentat gegen die nordamerikanischen und französischen Kontingente in Beirut, Oktober 1983. Dies hat dazu gebracht, dem Schutz der Soldaten großes Interesse beizumessen, da sie der Taktiken des Gegners, der, jede kleinste Schwäche in dem Apparat ausnützend, in jedem Moment und in jeder Gelegenheit zu schlagen bezweckt, um eine Atmosphäre von generalisierter Unsicherheit unter den Streitkräften zu schaffen, ausgesetzt sind.

Ein Observatorium für die Nationalsicherheit, von Sara Greggi (S. 82).

In Palazzo Salviati, eindrucksvollem Sitz des Zentrums der Hohen Studien für die Verteidigung, hat in den letzten Monaten ein interessantes Treffen über dieses Thema stattgefunden. Die zahlreichen und qualifizierten Redner haben sich überhaupt bei drei Schwerpunkten aufgehalten: Sicherheit über die Grenzen, Sicherheit in der Städten, kritische Infrastrukturen.

Afgahnistan: Operation Unified Venture, von Gianpaolo Romoli (S. 92).

Die Task-Force «Nibbio» hat in den unsicheren Täler an der Grenze mit Pakistan eine brillante Operation durchgeführt, um terroristische Formationen zu neutralisieren und Sicherheits- und Stabilitätszustände zu schaffen. Nach der Erzählung von einem der Anwesenden geht die außerordentliche Professionalität unserer Militärs heraus, die für das erste Mal in einem Hubschrauberangriff in dem Operationsraum eingesetzt waren.

Die Vergebung der Militärtransporte, von Cosimo De Lorenzo und Franco Fratini (S. 104).

Seit den 90er Jahren hat das Heer, wie auch andere großen Zivilunternehmen und öffentliche Einrichtungen, ein schnelles Prozess von Vergabe der Logistik. Nur sind in den letzten Zeiten diffuse Bestürztheiten über das Verhältnis zwischen Kosten und Nutzen in dieser Operation hervorragen. Das Überlassen kann vorteilhaft sein, eine enge Mitarbeit mit der industriellen Welt ist erwünscht, aber, überhaupt in den Streitkräften, sind Risiken und Verantwortungen nicht übertragbar. Die Erfahrung des 8. Transportregimentes «Casilina» ist ein bedeutendes Beispiel von umsichtiger Ressourcenführung und gerechter Ausgleich zwischen verpachteten Leistungen und intern geleisteten Diensten.

Das Militär heute, von Luigi Caligaris (S. 124).

Rede des Generals Luigi Caligaris an der Versammlung des Nationalvereines der Kavallerie (Pordenone 26.-28. Oktober 2007)

Die Evolution der italienischen Infanterie in dem ersten Weltkrieg, von Filippo Cappellano (S. 134).

Die umfangreiche Bibliographie, die die Ereignisse von jenem blutigen Konflikt erzählt und dokumentiert, hat oft einige überhaupt operativen Aspekte unterlassen, die aber entscheidenden Einfluss auf die letzten Geschehnisse ausgeübt haben. Unter diesen bedeutend sind die stufenweise Transformationen der Infanterie-Einheiten, zuerst um den Feind einzudämmen und dann um ihn jenseits der Alpen wieder zurückzuwerfen.

**El Mar Negro, Giovanni Ercolani y Carlo Frappi (pág. 2).**

Meollo del flanco sur de la OTAN, durante casi todo el siglo XX el Mar Negro ha representado un partiaguas y una barrera natural contra el expansionismo soviético en el área euro-mediterránea. Al finalizar la Guerra fría fue cobrando importancia y centralidad como encrucijada fundamental para el tránsito de los recursos energéticos euroasiáticos hacia los mercados occidentales. Es ésta una zona, en la frontera oriental de la UE, entre las más complejas y determinantes para el desarrollo del panorama de las relaciones internacionales en toda el área euroasiática.

Darfur: la masacre infinita, Daniele Cellamare (pág. 12).

En la atormentada región occidental de Sudán, donde la religión y los intereses económicos se entrelazan en una maraña inextricable, las Naciones Unidas, la Unión Europea y la Unión Africana están llevando a cabo una operación de peacekeeping cuyos resultados parecen difíciles de describir. Las instituciones se están desmoronando y las consecuencias amenazan con repercutirse hasta en los países cercanos. Los acontecimientos están relatados en estas páginas en las que se estigmatiza la dramática evolución de un genocidio que parece ser imposible detener.

El sueño de Pristina, Daniele Cellamare (pág. 28).

La independencia unilateral de Kosovo ha sido proclamada. Sin embargo, Belgrado se opone, la Unión Europea resulta desunida sobre el reconocimiento, el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas está dividido y Rusia y China apoyan a los Serbios. Al cabo de un atormentado camino Kosovo sigue siendo una intriga internacional difícil de desenmarañar: intereses y resentimientos contaminan la acción política y diplomática, haciendo peligrar la paz y la estabilidad de esta azotada Región balcánica.

Una Europa por reedificar, Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 46).

Los observadores más atentos concuerdan en decir que no bastan simples reajustes institucionales para darle nuevo aliento a la Carta constitucional. Si se quiere reanimarla habrá que explicitar el proyecto que Europa desea promover, comprobar su aplicabilidad efectiva y definir claramente sus límites geográficos.

Europa mira hacia el este, Giuseppe Romeo (pág. 54).

Seguridad y defensa son dos valores imprescindibles de la organización política, económica y social del proyecto europeo. Con la reciente firma en Lisboa del nuevo texto fundamental por parte de 27 países miembros, la futura estrategia dependerá cada vez más de una clara división de responsabilidades en ámbito continental. Una división que deberá seguir privilegiando las relaciones con Estados Unidos, sin descuidar por ello las «periferias» del este y las exigencias de Moscú.

Guerrilla, terrorismo y guerra asimétrica, Ferruccio Botti (pág. 62).

Los escenarios operacionales actuales han archivado defini-

tivamente el concepto tradicional de «guerra clásica», abriendo una nueva frontera en el pensamiento estratégico en la que guerrilla, terrorismo y guerra asimétrica imponen una revisión radical de la fisonomía de las Fuerzas armadas. De ahí la complejidad de las nuevas necesidades que de ahora en adelante habrán de encararse prescindiendo de los viejos esquemas doctrinales, sin por ello renunciar completamente a las experiencias del pasado.

La Force Protection, Giorgio Battisti (pág. 72).

La Force Protection siempre ha sido y sigue siendo considerada por los Ejércitos regulares como un requisito necesario para el éxito de las operaciones. Trátase de un principio militar fundamental reconocido en todas la Fuerza armadas que prevé, para todas la unidades, Mandos inclusive, la capacidad para saber defenderse apropiadamente contra los efectos de una acción hostil. Este aspecto ha ido cobrando un valor creciente a raíz de la aparición del terrorismo moderno, con los atentados contra los contingentes estadounidenses y franceses en Beirut en octubre de 1983. De ahí la necesidad de atribuirle un interés prioritario a la protección de los soldados, siendo éstos los más expuestos a las tácticas adoptadas por el adversario que aprovecha el mínimo fallo en el dispositivo para atacar y crear un clima de inseguridad entre las fuerzas.

Un Observatorio para la Seguridad Nacional, Sara Gregg (pág. 82).

Palazzo Salviati, sede prestigiosa del Centro de Altos Estudios Estratégicos de la Defensa, ha organizado en los meses pasados una interesante reunión sobre este tema. Los numerosos y calificados ponentes han centrado sus intervenciones en tres aspectos neurálgicos, a saber: seguridad transfronteriza, seguridad urbana e infraestructuras críticas.

Afganistán: Operación Unified Venture, Gianpaolo Romoli (pág. 92).

La Task Force «Nibbio» ha llevado a cabo, en los insidiosos valles de la frontera con Pakistán, una brillante operación encaminada a neutralizar formaciones terroristas y a crear condiciones de seguridad y estabilidad.

El relato de uno de los protagonistas hace resaltar la extraordinaria profesionalidad de los militares italianos que por vez primera llevaron a cabo una asalto con helicópteros en un teatro operativo.

La externalización de los transportes militares, Cosimo De Lorenzo y Franco Fratini (pág. 104).

A partir de los años 90 el Ejército de tierra, al igual que otras empresas civiles o entes públicos, ha emprendido un rápido proceso de externalización de su logística. Sin embargo, se ha ido difundiendo últimamente cierta perplejidad al respecto, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la relación costo-beneficio de la operación. Si es cierto que delegar puede presentar ciertas ventajas y que es de desear una cooperación con el sector industrial, también es cierto que en el caso de las Fuerzas armadas la responsabilidad y los riesgos no pueden delegarse. La experiencia llevada a cabo por el 8º Regimiento transportes «Casilina» puede representar un ejemplo significativo de una atenta gestión de los recursos y de un equilibrio razonable entre internalización y externalización.

Los Militares de hoy, Luigi Caligaris (pág. 124).

Intervención del General Luigi Caligaris con motivo de la reunión de la «Associazione Nazionale Arma di Cavalleria» (Pordenone 26-28 de octubre 2007).

La evolución de la Infantería italiana durante la Primera Guerra mundial, Filippo Cappellano (pág. 134).

La abundante bibliografía que documenta y relata los acontecimientos de aquel sangriento conflicto, descuidó algunos aspectos, y en particular los operativos, que tuvieron mayor peso en los eventos finales. Entre ellos cabe señalar, debido a su importancia, las transformaciones graduales que experimentaron las unidades de infantería para contrarrestar el avance del enemigo y luego rechazarlo allende los Alpes.



O Mar Negro, de Giovanni Ercolani e Carlo Frappi (pág. 2).

Fulcro do lado sul da NATO, durante grande parte do séc. XX representou uma divisão e uma barreira natural à expansão soviética para a área euro-mediterrânica. Após a Guerra Fria, re-adquiriu significância e centralidade como cruzamento fundamental para o trânsito dos recursos energéticos euro-asiáticos para os mercados ocidentais. Um «tabuleiro de xadrez» que, como confirm da UE, se apresenta entre os mais complexos e determinantes para o desenvolvimento do panorama das relações internacionais da inteira área euro-asiática.

Darfur: a devastação infinita, de Daniele Cellamare (pág. 12).

Na martirizada região ocidental do Sudão, onde religião e interesses económicos se cruzam numa trama inextricável, as Nações Unidas, as Uniões Europeia e Africana estão empenhadas numa dura operação de peacekeeping, cujos resultados aparecem com frequência escassamente decifráveis. As instituições estão agora em evidente decomposição e os seus reflexos arriscam-se a atingir também os países vizinhos. Aquilo que está a acontecer vem reportado nestas páginas, nas quais vêm condenados os dramáticos desenvolvimentos de um genocídio que parece impossível deter.

O sonho de Pristina, de Daniele Cellamare (pág. 28).

A independência unilateral do Kosovo foi proclamada. Mas Belgrado opõe-se, a União Europeia está dividida acerca do reconhecimento, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas despedaçou-se, a Rússia e a China apoiam os sérvios. Após um trabalhado percurso, o Kosovo é ainda hoje uma trama internacional difícil de desenrolar: interesses e rancores poluem a acção política e diplomática pondo em risco a paz e a estabilidade da tormentada região balcânica.

Uma Europa a reconstruir, de Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (pág. 46).

Os observadores mais atentos estão de acordo em afirmar que não bastam alguns simples ajustes institucionais para dar relevância à Carta Constitucional. Para o seu eventual relançamento será indispensável explicitar o projecto que se pretende promover e verificar a sua efectiva aplicação, para além de lhe definir claramente os limites geográficos.

A Europa olha para Este, de Giuseppe Romeo (pág. 54).

Segurança e defesa são políticas imprescindíveis para a realização de uma ordem política, económica e social do projecto da União Europeia. Após a recente assinatura do novo texto fundamental em Lisboa, num cenário de vinte e sete membros, a estratégia futura dependerá cada vez mais de uma clara divisão de responsabilidades no âmbito continental. Uma divisão que continue a privilegiar as relações com os Estados Unidos, mas que seja orientada também a reforçar as «periferias» a Este tendo em débito de contas as exigências de Moscovo.

Guerrilha, terrorismo e guerra assimétrica, de Ferruccio Botti (pág. 62).

Os actuais cenários operativos arquivaram definitivamente o tradicional conceito de «guerra clássica» para abrir uma nova fronteira do pensamento estratégico, onde guerrilha, terrorismo e guerra assimétrica impõem uma radical revisão da fisionomia das Forças Armadas. Deste quadro emerge a

complexidade das novas exigências a enfrentar, para as quais é frequentemente necessário prescindir dos velhos esquemas doutrinais, sem, todavia, renunciar completamente às exigências do passado.

A Force Protection, de Giorgio Battisti (pág. 72).

A Force Protection sempre teve, em cada época, uma específica atenção da parte dos Exércitos regulares, qual condição necessária para o sucesso das operações. Trata-se de um fundamental princípio militar reconhecido em cada Força Armada que prevê para todas as unidades, Comandos incluídos, a capacidade de saber defender-se de modo apropriado contra os efeitos de uma acção hostil. Este aspecto adquiriu um valor que foi crescendo a partir do aparecimento do terrorismo moderno, com os atentados aos contingentes dos Estados Unidos e da França em Beirut em Outubro de 1983. Isto levou a atribuir um prioritário interesse na protecção dos soldados sendo os mais expostos às táticas adoptadas pelo adversário que, usufruindo de cada perceptível fraqueza do dispositivo, miram a atingir em qualquer momento e circunstância, para criar um clima de generalizada insegurança entre as forças.

Um Observatório para a Segurança Nacional, de Sara Greggi (pág. 82).

No Palácio Salviati, prestigiosa sede do Centro de Estudos para a Defesa, decorreu, nos meses passados, um interessante congresso sobre o tema. Em particular, os numerosos e qualificados relatórios fixaram-se em três aspectos nevrálgicos: segurança trans-fronteiriça, segurança urbana, infra-estruturas críticas.

Afeganistão: Operação Unified Venture, de Gianpaolo Romoli (pág. 92).

A Task Force «Nibbio» desenvolveu, nos infelizes vales do confin do Paquistão, uma brilhante operação voltada para a neutralização das formações terroristas e para a criação de segurança e estabilidade. Do relato de um dos protagonistas evence-se o extraordinário profissionalismo dos nossos militares empenhados pela primeira vez num heli-asalto em ambiente operativo.

A exteriorização dos transportes militares, de Cosimo De Lorenzo e Franco Fratini (pág. 104).

Desde os anos Noventa que o Exército, assim como outras empresas civis e outras entidades públicas, empreenderam um rápido processo de exteriorização da logística. Mas, nos últimos tempos, emergiram diversas dúvidas sobretudo na relação custos-benefícios da operação. Delegar pode ser conveniente, uma colaboração próxima com o compartimento industrial é auspicioso, mas, especialmente nas Forças Armadas, a responsabilidade e os riscos não são delegáveis. A experiência conduzida junto do 8º regimento de transportes «Casilina» pode constituir um significativo exemplo de uma cautelosa gestão dos recursos e de justo balanceamento entre interiorização e exteriorização.




Os Militares de hoje, de Luigi Caligaris (pág. 124).

Intervenção do Deputado General Luigi Caligaris aquando da reunião da Associação Nacional Arma de Cavalaria (Portenone 26-28 de Outubro de 2007).

A evolução da Infantaria italiana na Grande Guerra, de Filippo Cappellano (pág. 134).

A vasta bibliografia que documenta e relata as vicissitudes daquele sangrento conflito descurou amiúde alguns aspectos, sobretudo operativos, que decididamente influíram sobre os eventos finais. Entre estes, de absoluta relevância são as graduais transformações às quais foram submetidas as unidades de infantaria, primeiro para cercar o inimigo, depois para voltar a caçá-lo para além dos Alpes.

THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



RIVISTA MILITARE